June1940.

France is on the verge of defeat
and Great Britain is fighting for its life.

For Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini, this is a
historic opportunity to expand the Italian Empire.

Instead, Italy suffers a series of humiliating
disasters.

So why did Mussolini declare war on the Allies at this moment, and could Germany be
ultimately responsible for the Italian fiasco? Unlike Germany, Italy has few concrete plans for
action at the outbreak of World War II.

Still, Germany’s expansion of the war in 1940 provides
an unmistakable opportunity for Rome.

On June 10, Italy declares war on the Allies.

Mussolini hopes
contributing to German victory may earn him major gains, like the seizure of the French fleet,
the occupation of France and Corsica, and French colonies like Tunisia or French Somaliland.

Italy
belatedly joins the German invasion of France through the Western Alps, but the army’s poor
performance, and German desires for a cooperative neutral Vichy French regime, mean that when
France surrenders on June 22, Italy gains little.

Italian actions though, do trigger a crisis
in London.

As British invasion fears grow, so does the need to secure the Mediterranean as
a vital link to the empire.

Since the mid-1930s Italy has expanded its imperial reach in
Africa and the Balkans, and the British worry because of their high estimations of
Italian capabilities.

The Royal Navy initially recalls ships from the Mediterranean fleet to
British waters, but Churchill cancels the move.

Britain’s strategy is to turn the war
into a longer attritional conflict, and it requires the Mediterranean and
access to its wider empire to do it.

On June 11, Italy bombs British-controlled Malta,
but elsewhere, Britain takes the initiative.

From June 10, British armored cars and tanks raid
across the Egyptian border into Italian Libya.

Most Italian troops lack heavy,
modern equipment or experience in modern war.

Instead, they are trained for
colonial pacification.

In one engagement, Italian forces form a 19th century-style
fighting square, which British tanks easily destroy.

In three months of combat, the Italians
suffer 3,500 casualties for Britain’s 150.

Britain can’t go on wider offensive because
it too lacks men and material .

Meanwhile, French capitulation frees up Italian forces,
and Mussolini demands an invasion of Egypt to eliminate the main British Mediterranean port
of Alexandria and seize the Suez Canal.

But his commanders are reluctant.

After friendly fire
kills respected commander-in-chief Italo Balbo, Rodolfo Graziani takes over.

He’s a desert expert,
but his experience is mostly against Senussi tribesmen.

Mussolini is encouraged by Italian
success in East Africa, where colonial forces have pushed back a small British garrison.

But although
Graziani outnumbers the roughly 36,000 British-led troops, he lacks vehicles, water and supplies.

After lengthy delays and pressure from Rome, he reluctantly invades British Egypt on September
13, setting a modest first objective of Sidi Barrani – 80 kilometres from the border.

As Italian troops advance, Graziani makes a grandiose statement:
“One wonders when the English will begin to understand that they have just dealt with the best
fitted-out colonial army in the world, and when they finally learn to appreciate the valor of the
Italian soldier.

” [Rodolfo Graziani] (Burgwyn 40) British troops withdraw and Graziani orders
his men to build fortified camps around Sidi Barrani – again following colonial practices.

Mussolini pressures him to advance another 130 kilometers along the coast, but Graziani
knows his troops are unlikely to make it.

Although Mussolini encourages a push into
Egypt, he also has imperial ambitions closer to home.

In 1939, Italy established a
protectorate in Albania.

From there, Italy looks to expand into Yugoslavia or
Greece to link up with the Italian Islands in the Aegean.

Rome considers Yugoslavia
too pro-German, so they turn to Greece.

Mussolini’s foreign minister and son-in-law
Galeazzo Ciano urges action.

He claims Greek forces are corrupt and inept, Greek civilians
are indifferent , and Albanian minorities in Greece will welcome Italians as liberators.

But King Vittorio Emanuele, Italian ambassador in Greece Emanuele Grazzi and chief of
staff Pietro Badoglio are skeptical: “The Greeks are good fighters.

They showed
it in their last war with Turkey.

They were defeated but they fought valiantly.

” (Carr)
But Mussolini and Ciano ignore these warnings.

Germany is also against an invasion.

They need
peace in the Balkans to extract war materials, and an Italian attack could encourage British
intervention.

Britain guaranteed Greek neutrality in April 1939, and the presence of British
aircraft in Greece could threaten Romanian oil fields .

Germany accepts that Greece is in Italy’s
sphere of influence but wants any invasion delayed until after Britain’s defeat.

Mussolini agrees.

After the German Luftwaffe moves into Romania to protect the oil fields, an outraged Mussolini
accelerates plans to invade despite his promises: “Hitler always faces me with a fait
accompli.

This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin.

He will find
out from the papers that I have occupied Greece.

In this way the equilibrium will be
re-established.

” [Benito Mussolini] (Burgwyn 44) Italian plans grow from a partial to a complete
occupation of Greece, but Italian planning is rushed and complicated by mass demobilization for
the harvest, unenthusiastic officers, and a lack of suitable Albanian ports .

The only usable
port for troops, Durazzo, is already clogged with barges carrying marble for fascist building
projects .

As a result, not all troops have their heavy weapons .

Mussolini hopes Bulgaria will join
in the attack, but the Bulgarian king refuses.

By late October, around six Italian Divisions,
including the crack Julia Alpini Division, are moving towards the Greek-Albanian border.

The 87,000 Italian troops expect to oppose around 30,000 Greeks, despite intelligence
suggesting 10 times as many may be available.

Italy’s aggressive rhetoric and poor operational
security means Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas is aware of Italian intentions.

He hopes for an
orderly withdrawal as far as Mount Othrys, although some commanders prefer
a more aggressive plan.

Luckily, for the Greeks, the border’s mountainous
terrain limits Italian invasion routes.

Mussolini starts the invasion for October
28: the date of Hitler’s planned visit to Florence.

He plans to surprise his
ally with news of imminent victory.

At 3am, after staging border incidents, ambassador
Grazzi issues Metaxas an ultimatum: Allow Italy to occupy key strategic locations in Greece or
face war.

Metaxas responds in diplomatic French: “Alors, c’est la guerre.

(Well then, it’s war)” (Carr) His response is later popularised as
an emphatic “‘Ochi!’ (No!)” In reality, Italian troops like Lieutenant Genserico Fontana
are moving before the ultimatum was delivered: “The night is dark and rainy.

.

.

Tomorrow we may
hope that Mars will favor us.

.

.

Even though we are few, we have no fear.

We have our hand grenades
in our pockets and they don’t weigh much.

.

.

Here comes the dawn, dismal and soundless.

” (Carr)
In the opening attack, the Ferrara, Siena and Centauro Divisions, with 163 light tanks, push
into the Kalamas River valley towards Ioannina, while the Julia Division attacks in
the center around Mount Smolikas.

A smaller force pushes along the coast.

Although the Greeks expected Italian aggression, the rank-and-file are
still shocked when it happens: “We woke up around 06:30.

We
heard thunder from the west, its brightness was mirrored on the clouds.

[…] A rumor was spread that war was declared between Greece and Italy! It was a shock.

Nobody
expected this news.

Our hearts froze.

” (Gaglias) Initial Greek resistance is light, but
rain slows the Italians.

Greek 8th Division commander Charalambos Katsimitros decides to
make a stand at Kalpaki, where the Italians have to cross a plain.

From November 2, Italian
columns enter the area and come under artillery fire from well-concealed positions.

The Greeks lack anti-tank weapons, but their artillery scatters the Italian tanks,
while infantry improvise by throwing blankets onto light tanks’ tracks to immobilize them.

As
the Italians attempt to push through the plain, fighting centers on Grambala Hill,
which changes hands several times.

As the weather clears, Italian
aircraft bomb Greek positions: “.

.

.

an airplane bomb whistled over me and fell
into the forest, 20 meters below my tent.

.

.

A fellow soldier shouted for his foot and called
for help.

.

.

I approached the bomb crater.

A body drowned in blood without skull or brains.

Beside him, a corporal.

.

.

was still alive.

.

.

[A] open wound in his back, and his intestines poured
out.

He died in my arms! My heart was completely broken from the horror …” (Chronopoulos)
While the Italians struggle at Kalpaki, the Julia Division hits Greek positions in
the Pindus Mountains.

They make early progress against Greek reservists, but sporadic Greek
sniping and poor weather exhaust and disorganize the attackers.

After Greek reinforcements
stall the Italian advance on November 2, the Greeks counterattack, capturing Samarina and
threatening to cut off the Italians.

By November 8, the Greeks capture Distrato, forcing the Julia
to withdraw.

In two weeks of fighting, the Julia Division loses a fifth of its strength.

The
Greek army now moves over to the offensive, even invading Albania in the north.

A frustrated Mussolini orders his air force to bomb all Greek towns of over
10,000 people.

The Italian air force has already bombed Athens and other towns with
little effect, which denies frontline Italian forces desperately needed air support .

In Rome there is tension and even talks of truce – reluctant Italian ministers even
consider asking for German help.

Hitler is furious when informed about the invasion during
the meeting in Florence as his adjutant recalls: “F[ührer] in a rage.

Observed that this
occurrence had spoiled many plans he had in mind.

.

.

and doubted if the Italians would
be able to defeat Greece.

” (Holland 414) Things do not improve for Italy
in November.

On November 11/12, the British attack the Italian fleet at
Taranto with carrier-based torpedo-bombers, disabling three battleships
in a surprise raid.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Albania ties down reinforcements
and equipment desperately needed in North Africa.

By December, UK invasion fears have eased, and
more British and Commonwealth troops and equipment arrive in Alexandria, including Matilda tanks and
Hurricane fighters.

Western Desert Force commander Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor realizes the
role mechanized forces and surprise can play in a desert environment.

The Matilda – considered
invulnerable to most Italian weapons – plays a major role in the upcoming Operation Compass.

In early December, British-led forces, including many Indian troops, gather in the
Egyptian desert .

British naval bombardment and air attack destroy Italian aircraft
and divert attention from the buildup.

The Italians partially detect it but aren’t worried.

Early on December 9, British forces rush Nibeiwa through poorly laid Italian minefields.

The 23
Italian M-11 tanks are outmatched and surprised, and Matildas quickly destroy 13.

An
Italian doctor describes the scene: “[It was] the nearest thing to
hell I ever saw.

” (Latimar 32) Italian troops, with no anti-tank weapons,
resort to tossing grenades onto British tanks, but despite fierce resistance it is a one-sided
battle.

The British capture 4,000 Italians and suffer just two killed and five wounded.

After
securing Nibeiwa, the British assault the camp at Tummar West and defeat a counterattack from
Tummar East.

Meanwhile, the 4th Armoured Brigade moves to cut the Sidi Barrani to Bardia road.

The next day, the assault continues, although severe sandstorms and accurate Italian artillery
delay Shelby Force in the east.

In some cases, British columns simply follow a compass
bearing through the storms towards their target .

The British capture Maktila with the
aid of naval gunfire, but Italian resistance at Sidi Barrani is fierce, forcing Shelby Force
to temporarily withdraw.

Italian morale though, is crashing.

Tummar East and Point
90 surrender, and as artillery, air power and Matildas concentrate on Sidi
Barrani, it too surrenders.

British mobile forces race west to capture fleeing Italians.

A British soldier reports to his regimental HQ: “Have arrived at the second B in Buq Buq, as far
as I can see, there are twenty acres of officers and a hundred acres of men.

” (Latimar 37)
In the first three days, the British capture 38,000 Italian troops, 237 guns and 73 tanks.

But the Italians are not completely defeated, and they fall back to new positions q.

SEGUE More Greek advances in Albania cap off a
disastrous year for Mussolini.

Far from forging a new Mediterranean Empire, Italian forces are being
pushed back across the theater.

In early December, Mussolini relieves Badoglio in favor of
Ugo Cavallero , and Rome introduces wider mobilization and rationing.

A new recruit recalls:
“Now they ’re calling up more age groups.

We don’t understand anything anymore and what we
hear is pretty bad.

For the time being, while they’re just handing us empty chatter,
all we can do is trust in God.

” (Tsirpanlis) There is no doubt that by the end of 1940,
Italy had suffered a series of military disasters.

So why did Italian forces do so badly?
After the war, some historians emphasized the poor quality of Italian troops, low morale,
a lack of equipment, and Mussolini’s personality.

They claim Mussolini rushed into
war for imperialistic reasons without adequate preparation and relied on optimistic propaganda
as opposed to realistic military assessments.

Only 19 of Italy’s 73 divisions were ready in
1940 and its smaller economic base hindered mobilization.

Italy accounted for only 2.

7
percent of world manufacturing output, compared to Britain’s 9.

2 percent and Germany’s 10.

7 percent.

Observers also blame Italian equipment.

Italy heavily relied on obsolete World War I weaponry
to equip its troops.

This is partially true of all militaries at the time, but Italy’s lower
industrial base prevented rapid development of new equipment , or mass production of higher
quality weaponry like the 90mm anti-aircraft gun or Beretta Model 1938 sub-machine gun.

A reliance on older equipment meant Italian officers fell back on older methods of warfare,
especially colonial policing.

When modern equipment was available they sent it first to
police units as opposed to frontline combatants.

As a result, Italian troops lacked automatic
weapons, vehicles, radio and anti-tank weaponry, as well as the tactical and technical
skills for their use .

Most of the Italian rank-and-file were peasants, and class
differences, poor conditions, and harsh discipline created clashes with conservative
officers.

One conscript mobilized in June 1940 referenced rebellions by Italian troops in 1917:
“All the officers have become like beasts, and they issue punishments fit to break your neck… but
once we’re on the move they’ll pay for it.

We’ll do like they did in the last war.

” (Bellomo)
But a lack of equipment was only part of the problem.

In Greece, Italian troops were
similarly-equipped to Greek troops.

The failed invasion of Greece is therefore more a
result of poor terrain, planning, and logistics.

Internal Italian planning was dysfunctional.

All-important naval logistical routes were badly prepared, and the Italian navy learned
about the planned invasion less than two weeks in advance.

The Italians had accurate information
on Greek troop numbers, which far exceeded Ciano’s optimistic assessment, but the high command
ignored it.

As a result, Italian troops struggled to even achieve numerical parity with Greek
defenders.

They also relied too much on hopeful outcomes they couldn’t control, like Bulgarian
assistance and a pro-Italian uprising in Greece.

Some historians argue Mussolini’s fervent,
longstanding desire for an expanded Italian empire is the cause of these failures.

But
another view places the blame partly elsewhere.

There is an argument that Germany plays a
more significant role in Italian failures than previously thought, and although Mussolini
may have roused Italian patriotism with talk of empire, he knew Italy was unprepared for war.

Unpreparedness was not a uniquely Italian problem either.

Although only 24 percent
of Italian divisions were ready in 1940, just 34 percent of German divisions were
similarly prepared in September 1939.

Mussolini may have been a much less an
enthusiastic participant in the so-called “Pact of Steel” with Germany than commonly
believed.

Historian James Sadkovich suggests Mussolini joined the Axis partly to restrain
Hitler’s expansionism, and even considered breaking the alliance in December 1939.

In any
case, there was little practical cooperation, and both sides kept their plans from the other.

Sadkovich also argues Mussolini’s decision to join the war was more about avoiding punishment
by a dominant Germany for past transgressions than imperial goals.

Until mid-1940, Mussolini’s
imperial dream was mostly limited to the Balkan coast and weaker African nations.

But Mussolini
had encouraged Austria to resist the Anschluss in 1938 and failed to join the war in 1939, which
frustrated Hitler.

Unexpected German victories, including a seemingly imminent one against
Britain, might have encouraged Mussolini to make more maximalist imperial claims and act
prematurely, not necessarily just because of Allied weakness, but due to concerns Germany
would capitalize on its position to expand into Italy’s sphere of influence in the Balkans.

In this circumstance, Italian actions in Egypt can be seen as securing the Greek front,
as opposed to outright imperial conquest.

It’s claimed Mussolini hoped to fight a so-called
‘guerra parallela’ – a parallel war – to the wider Second World War.

However, doing so inevitably
brought Italy into conflict with Britain, which WAS fighting a total war.

In this
circumstance, Italy became overextended across the Mediterranean, which was only
of secondary importance to its German ally, but of vital importance to Britain.

Still,
Italy overstretched itself based on the assumption Germany would soon invade Britain.

The distrust, suspicion and lack of communication between the Axis however meant Mussolini
didn’t know about Germany’s lack of will and capability to launch it, or Germany’s shift
to prioritizing an invasion of the Soviet Union.

Italy therefore became embroiled in a long,
multifront war that its smaller economy simply could not maintain.

According to Sadkovich, it
was the disparity in equipment and motorization between British and Italian troops, not inherent
low morale or fighting ability of Italian troops, which caused the mass surrenders during Compass.

Italian troops simply could not withdraw on foot across the desert.

And British accounts do speak
of fierce Italian resistance during the battle.

Sadkovich concludes that Anglo-American
historians are influenced by stereotypes in their writing about Italian fighting ability,
and suggests Italian troops are unfairly compared to German troops, who had the benefit of better
equipment and leadership.

Some historians may also exaggerate German abilities to excuse Allied
failings or aggrandize their eventual victory: “It is thus normal to dismiss as loss of nerve
Graziani’s request for permission to retreat in late 1940, even though a rapid retreat seems
to have been what was needed.

At the same time, Anglo-American writers tend to
depict Rommel’s various retreats as evidence of military genius.

” (Sadkovich 42)
While accepting weak Italian industrialization and command played an issue, this line of
reasoning also highlights Germany’s failure to force Britain into an all-out defense of
the British Isles.

This allowed Britain to invest significant resources into North Africa,
turning it into a wider war than Italy could, or even wanted to, fight.

It might have
been German management of the wider war and the pursuit of their own interest in
the Balkans, rather than Italian inherent weakness or expansionism that laid the
foundations of Italian failure in 1940.

But of course, this is still up for debate.

That Italy did experience disaster after disaster is not debatable, and in fall 1940,
Italy reluctantly seeks German help.

Germany, which has paid little attention to Italian
capabilities or needs, agrees to shore up a seemingly unreliable ally .

As one Wehrmacht
commander put it: “[help was] unwillingly given and unwillingly accepted”.

(Overy)
On December 14, Hitler issues Directive No.

20, ordering preparations for wider German
intervention in Greece.

Meanwhile, as Italian troops continue to fall back in North
Africa into early 1941, a newly-promoted German commander and his troops are heading for
Libya: Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps.

In WW2, after Rommel’s campaigns in Northern
Africa, in 1944 he took over Army Group B in Northern France, which was preparing for the
Allied invasion.

He argued unsuccessfully for the Germans to concentrate their tanks close to
the beaches, and organized the Normandy defences.

But he was soon badly wounded, implicated in the
July Plot against Hitler, and committed suicide.

Meanwhile Army Group B was eventually pushed back
across the Rhine River and encircled in the Ruhr pocket.

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