Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt referred to Adolf
Hitler as a “Bohemian corporal,” revealing his disdain for the Nazi leader.

Yet, he continued
to serve Hitler throughout the war.

How did von Rundstedt reconcile his aristocratic values with
the realities of Nazi Germany? In today’s video, we peel back the layers of Von Rundstedts’
life.

We’ll explore his aristocratic roots, his rise through the ranks, and the
decisions that put him at odds with Hitler.

In 1892, Gerd von Rundstedt joined the German
Army, unaware of his future role as Hitler’s top field marshal.

Born into an aristocratic
Prussian family with a long military tradition, Rundstedt’s early years were marked by
rigorous training and a deep immersion in Prussian military values of discipline,
honor, and duty.

These principles would shape his entire career and leadership style.

The aftermath of World War I presented new challenges for Rundstedt.

Despite the severe
restrictions imposed on the German military by the Treaty of Versailles, he remained in service.

As
Germany began rebuilding its military strength in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Rundstedt played
a crucial role in modernizing the army while maintaining his commitment to traditional values.

In 1932, Rundstedt achieved the rank of full general.

This promotion came on the eve of a
radical transformation in German politics with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party.

As
the political landscape shifted dramatically, Rundstedt faced the challenge of navigating
the treacherous waters of Nazi Germany.

His aristocratic background and
traditional military values were at odds with the Nazi regime’s ideology.

Despite referring to Hitler as a “Bohemian corporal” and harboring disdain for many
Nazi Party leaders, Rundstedt continued to serve in Hitler’s army, however his
aristocratic background and traditional Prussian values clashed with what he viewed
as the ambitious nature of Nazi leadership.

The Blomberg-Fritsch Affair of early 1938
highlighted these tensions.

When General Werner von Fritsch was accused of homosexuality,
Rundstedt defended him, insisting on Fritsch’s right to face his accusers before a Court of
Honour.

This action demonstrated Rundstedt’s commitment to military tradition and justice,
rather than direct opposition to the Nazi regime.

Rundstedt held to a strict code of political
neutrality for military officers, famously stating, “It is a very ancient Prussian
tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics.

” This belief led him
to avoid involvement in anti-Hitler plots, even when aware of their existence.

He
viewed his duty as being to Germany itself, rather than to any particular regime, which
allowed him to rationalize his continued service.

In November 1938, shortly after the occupation of
the Sudetenland, Rundstedt retired from the army.

His retirement was short-lived, however, as he was
recalled to active duty in June 1939 to lead Army Group South for the impending invasion of Poland.

As the invasion of Poland began in September 1939, Rundstedt’s troops advanced rapidly from
Silesia and Slovakia, capturing key cities including Kraków and Warsaw.

The Polish campaign
demonstrated Rundstedt’s proficiency in mobile warfare, with his forces employing combined
arms tactics to overwhelm their opponents.

The Battle of Bzura stood out as a significant
engagement during this campaign.

Polish forces attempted a counterattack, but Rundstedt’s
leadership ensured his troops contained and ultimately defeated this offensive.

This
success in Poland set the stage for the further refinement of Blitzkrieg strategies
that would soon be deployed in Western Europe.

In May 1940, Rundstedt led Army Group A in
the invasion of France.

His forces executed the ‘Manstein Plan,’ which involved a swift
armored assault through the Ardennes forest.

This bold maneuver caught the Allies off guard
and led to the encirclement of their forces.

Rundstedt’s troops reached the English Channel,
cutting off the British Expeditionary Force.

These early victories elevated Rundstedt to the
highest rank of the German military.

On July 19, 1940, Rundstedt was promoted to Field Marshal
in recognition of his crucial role in the fall of France.

This new status brought Rundstedt
closer to Hitler and the Nazi inner circle, increasing the scrutiny of his future decisions While Rundstedt’s military
achievements were undeniable, they came with significant moral implications.

The tension between tactical success and ethical responsibility would weigh heavily on
Rundstedt throughout the war and beyond.

Rundstedt’s relationship with his subordinate
commanders revealed both his strategic insight and personal conflicts.

He supported Erich von
Manstein’s innovative tactics, recognizing their potential to transform warfare.

However, he often
disagreed with the aggressive Heinz Guderian, whose tendency to push beyond ordered objectives
clashed with Rundstedt’s more cautious approach.

As Western Europe fell under German control, Rundstedt found himself at the peak
of his military career.

However, greater challenges loomed on the horizon,
with Hitler’s attention turning eastward.

Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 presented Von
Rundstedt with an unprecedented challenge as he took command of Army Group South.

Tasked with conquering Ukraine, Rundstedt’s forces achieved significant victories.

By late September, his troops had encircled Kiev, capturing over 452,000 Soviet soldiers.

The success continued into autumn, with Rundstedt’s forces seizing Kharkov in
late October and Rostov by the end of November.

As winter approached, the German advance began
to falter.

Overextended supply lines, harsh weather conditions, and fierce Soviet resistance
took their toll on the German Army.

Rundstedt, recognizing the deteriorating situation,
made a critical decision that put him at odds with Hitler.

He advocated for a tactical
withdrawal to the Mius River line, arguing that his exhausted troops needed to regroup and
resupply after months of continuous combat.

Hitler viewed any form of retreat as unacceptable,
insisting on holding ground at all costs.

This clashed directly with Rundstedt’s
military judgment.

Rundstedt replied by insisting on his decision and adding: “Should
confidence in my leadership no longer exist, I beg to request someone be substituted
who enjoys the necessary confidence of the Supreme Command.

” This act of defiance sealed
Rundstedt’s fate.

On December 1, 1941, Hitler dismissed the Field Marshal, replacing him with
Walther von Reichenau.

However, Reichenau quickly recognized the gravity of Rundstedt’s assessment
and effectively convinced Hitler, through Halder, to approve the strategic withdrawal.

The
dismissal marked not only a personal setback for Rundstedt but also signified the first major
defeat for the German Army in World War II.

Hitler quickly realized he had overstepped
by dismissing his highest-ranking German Army commander Upon arriving at Rundstedt’s
headquarters Poltava on December 3, he was confronted by both Walter von Reichenau and
Sepp Dietrich, who defended Rundstedt’s decision.

Hitler reluctantly accepted this explanation.

In a meeting with Rundstedt, Hitler claimed the dismissal was a misunderstanding and
suggested Rundstedt take a leave of absence, promising his “incomparable services”
would be needed again.

On December 5, with his honor restored, Rundstedt left
Poltava, never to return to the Eastern front.

When Rundstedt returned to his home in Kassel, he
received a 250,000 Reichsmark check from Hitler, part of a strategy to secure loyalty among senior
commanders.

Although many found this offensive, none refused the gifts.

Rundstedt avoided
cashing the check, but by February 1942, pressure from Berlin led him to do so.

Some people
have linked his acceptance of the money to his failure to support the resistance against Hitler’s
regime, but Rundstedt distanced himself from it, giving the money to his daughter-in-law.

In March 1942, Hitler recalled Rundstedt from retirement, appointing him Commander-in-Chief
West.

Rundstedt’s task was to defend the Atlantic coast against an impending Allied invasion.

Rundsted was tasked with overseeing the construction of the Atlantic Wall, a vast
network of coastal fortifications.

However, Rundstedt had no faith in the Atlantic Wall
and only saw it as a useful form of propaganda.

As the threat of invasion grew, Rundstedt
again found himself at odds with Hitler’s strategic vision.

The Führer insisted
on a static defense strategy, keeping German forces close to the coast.

Rundstedt,
drawing on his extensive military experience, favored a more flexible approach.

He argued
for positioning armored divisions further inland for greater maneuverability.

This
strategic disagreement with Hitler extended to Rundstedt’s relationship with Field Marshal
Erwin Rommel, who had been assigned to improve coastal defenses.

Rommel agreed with Rundstedt’s
assessment that the Atlantic Wall was merely a gigantic bluff.

However, he also felt that
Rundstedt’s defense strategy was impossible due to the overwhelming air superiority of the
Allies.

Like Hitler, Rommel was convinced that the only way to stop the invasion was
to confront it directly on the beaches.

On June 6, 1944, the Allied invasion began.

Rundstedt faced the largest amphibious assault in military history.

His initial response
was hampered by Hitler’s insistence on personally authorizing the deployment of
the panzer reserves.

This delay cost the German forces a crucial opportunity
to hold off the invasion early on.

As Allied forces established their beachhead,
Rundstedt’s concerns about the Atlantic Wall’s vulnerabilities were confirmed.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, he and Rommel advised Hitler to consider
a strategic withdrawal.

Hitler’s refusal led to further losses and a deteriorating
situation for German forces in Normandy.

On June 29, Rundstedt and Rommel attended
a meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, where they again advised Hitler to withdraw, but their demands were again dismissed.

Upon
returning to his headquarters on June 30, Rundstedt received a critical message from
General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, who was in charge of the armored forces at Caen.

Schweppenburg urgently requested permission to withdraw his units to escape the relentless
Allied naval bombardments.

Rundstedt agreed with this request and informed the Armed Forces
High Command or OKW of his decision.

However, on July 1, Rundstedt received an order from
the OKW that reversed his order.

Angered by this turn of events, Rundstedt contacted Keitel
to persuade him to appeal to Hitler for a change in the decision.

Keitel responded that this was
not possible.

“What shall we do?” Keitel asked.

Rundstedt is said to have replied:”Make
peace, you fools! What else can you do?” Hitler dismissed Rundstedt from his command.

He was replaced by Günther von Kluge.

Rundstedt departed France permanently on July 4,
accompanied by his son Hans Gerd von Rundstedt, as they traveled to a sanatorium
in Bad Tölz to be with his wife.

In December 1944, Hitler recalled Rundstedt
to oversee the Ardennes Offensive, a desperate attempt to split the Allied forces.

Rundstedt harbored significant doubts about the operation’s feasibility, proposing a more
modest plan with his fellow commander, Model.

They believed the original objectives
were impossible with the available forces.

Hitler’s insistence on launching the offensive
before the end of November put immense pressure on Rundstedt and his command.

The field
marshal found himself effectively sidelined, reduced to a figurehead as Hitler dictated the
planning directly.

Despite these limitations, Rundstedt oversaw the initial stages of the
offensive, which began on December 16, 1944.

The German forces initially made progress,
breaking through weak American defenses.

However, Rundstedt soon recognized that the Allies
were quick to react.

Concerned about the offensive’s sustainability, he urged OKW
to halt the operation to prevent it from becoming a “second Stalingrad.

” His fears were
validated as improving weather allowed Allied air forces to attack with devastating
effect, pushing the German forces back.

On March 9, 1945, Hitler called Rundstedt
to inform him that he was replaced by Albert Kesselring and with that came an end to Gerd von
Rundstedt’s 52-year military career.

On March 11, Rundstedt had a final meeting with
Hitler, during which Hitler expressed his gratitude for Rundstedt’s loyalty.

Rundstedt was captured by American forces on May 1, 1945.

In the final days of
the war, Rundstedt’s health had rapidly declined.

His heart condition worsened, and
he suffered from arthritis.

Upon capture, Rundstedt was taken into custody and held
in various internment camps, including the British-controlled Island Farm Special Camp 11 in
Bridgend, Wales.

During his initial interrogation, Rundstedt suffered a heart attack, reflecting the
strain of his final months in command.

In 1948, Rundstedt was released on health grounds due to
his declining physical condition.

This release did not absolve him of responsibility, as he was
still under scrutiny for his role in the war, particularly regarding war crimes.

However, he
was never formally tried at the Nuremberg Trials.

After his release Rundstedt spent his
remaining years in relative seclusion, surrounded by family until his
death on February 24, 1953.

Gerd von Rundstedt’s legacy in World
War II remains a subject of debate among historians.

His tactical brilliance,
particularly in the early stages of the war, contrasts sharply with his continued
service under the Nazi regime despite awareness of atrocities committed under his
command.

Rundstedt’s aristocratic background and private disdain for Hitler further
complicate assessments of his actions.

The field marshal’s stance on political neutrality
for military officers encapsulates a central dilemma faced by professional soldiers
under totalitarian regimes.

His belief that as a soldier, it was his responsibility to
follow the orders of the government, regardless of the nature of those orders, exemplifies the
tension between duty and moral responsibility.

Rundstedt’s case raises critical questions
about the ethical obligations of military leaders during times of war.

It challenges
us to consider at what point following orders becomes complicity in war crimes.

The ongoing
discussions about Rundstedt’s accountability highlights the complex moral terrain navigated
by military commanders under authoritarian rule, prompting reflection on the nature of duty
and honor in the face of systemic evil.

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