The Daring Submarine Raid: How the USS Harter Sank Four Destroyers in Four Days

At 0647 hours on June 6, 1944, Commander Samuel Dei stood in the cramped conning tower of the USS Harter.

He was observing three Japanese destroyers slicing through the moonlit waters off Tawi Tawi, tracking his submarine with deadly precision.

At 37 years old, Dei had already completed five war patrols and was credited with the destruction of 18 enemy ships.

The Imperial Japanese Navy had dispatched the destroyers Minizuki, Hayanami, and Tanikaz with specific orders: eliminate the American submarine that had been terrorizing their supply lines for the past three weeks.

Until April 1944, American submarines had avoided direct encounters with Japanese destroyers.

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With a speed of 35 knots, a destroyer could easily outpace a submerged submarine, which struggled to reach nine knots.

Between December 1941 and March 1944, Japanese destroyers had sunk 14 American submarines, and not a single American submarine had managed to sink a Japanese destroyer while both vessels were actively engaged in combat.

However, Commander Dei was about to change that equation.

On April 13, when the destroyer Ikazuchi charged toward Harter’s position at flank speed, every officer on the bridge expected Dei to dive and run.

Instead, he ordered flank speed ahead, heading straight toward the destroyer.

At a range of 900 yards, Harter fired four torpedoes in a spread pattern.

Two of those torpedoes struck amidships, resulting in a massive explosion that sank the destroyer within five minutes.

Dei’s radio report became legendary throughout the Pacific submarine force, stating simply: “Expended four torpedoes, one destroyer.”

Admiral Souimu Toyota, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, did not find this amusing.

Between January and May 1944, Japan had lost 23 destroyers, and Operation Ago, which aimed to annihilate the American invasion fleet at the Philippines, required precise coordination.

Losing destroyers to submarine attacks disrupted the entire operation.

By late May, Toyota had concentrated the mobile fleet at Tawi Tawi Anchorage, assembling four battleships, including the Yamato, nine carriers, 15 cruisers, and 28 destroyers—the largest concentration of Japanese naval power since the Battle of Midway.

American codebreakers were aware of their movements.

Admiral Charles Lockwood sent Harter to patrol the waters around Tawi Tawi and attack targets of opportunity.

For nine days, Harter operated undetected.

Then, on June 6 at 0300, a Japanese patrol plane spotted Harter’s periscope wake 15 miles north of Tawi Tawi.

Three destroyers responded immediately to the sighting.

Commander Dei studied the lead destroyer through his periscope.

Minizuki, weighing 1,250 tons and armed with four 5-inch guns, was closing in fast, zigzagging to avoid torpedo attacks.

Behind her, the other two destroyers spread out in a search pattern, boxing in Harter and tightening the noose.

Dei swung Harter’s bow directly at Minizuki.

The range was 1,100 yards, and the time to collision was 96 seconds.

Every man in Harter’s conning tower understood the meaning of “down the throat.”

This tactic involved firing torpedoes straight at an attacking destroyer’s bow and then diving beneath her keel.

If the torpedoes missed, the destroyer would drop depth charges directly on their position.

If they dove too late, the destroyer could ram them at 750 yards.

At 750 yards, Dei fired three torpedoes.

Harter’s bow dropped at a 30-degree angle.

Forty seconds after firing, two explosions shook Harter violently, shattering light fixtures.

Then a third explosion lifted Harter’s stern six feet before slamming it back down.

When Dei climbed to periscope depth, where Minizuki had been, he saw only debris and an oil slick.

The destroyer had broken in half and was sinking.

The other two destroyers raced away, dropping depth charges at random in a panic.

Admiral Toyota received the news at 0900 and ordered six more destroyers to find the submarine.

By noon, Japanese patrol planes were searching every 20 minutes, but Dei was not finished hunting.

On June 7 at 0230, Harter surfaced to recharge its batteries.

The night was pitch black, with no moon and heavy cloud cover—perfect conditions for an attack.

At 0312, Dei made radar contact with a single ship bearing 095, closing fast.

The contact was moving at 28 knots.

It was definitely a destroyer: Hayanami, weighing 700 tons, had been searching for American submarines since 0100.

Her captain, Commander Hideo Kuboki, had received orders to return to base at 0300 and was exhausted.

Nobody expected an American submarine to attack on the surface at night.

Dei ordered flank speed.

Harter’s diesel engines pushed the submarine to 21 knots, closing the range deliberately to get inside Hayanami’s radar detection range before being spotted.

At 4,000 yards, Hayanami’s radar operator picked up a surface contact.

It was small and moving fast—probably another destroyer returning to base.

At 3,000 yards, Kuboki realized his mistake and ordered flank speed while turning to ram.

But it was too late.

At 2,300 yards, Dei fired four torpedoes.

Two struck Hayanami’s starboard side near the aft magazine.

The explosion tore the destroyer’s stern completely off.

The ship rolled 90 degrees, her propellers still spinning as she sank stern first.

Kuboki and 147 sailors died immediately.

Japanese patrol planes would arrive within minutes.

Two destroyers sunk in 24 hours.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was hunting for him with everything they had.

Admiral Toyota was furious—two destroyers lost in two days to the same submarine.

He pulled eight destroyers from convoy escort duty and organized them into hunter-killer groups, with the sole mission of finding and destroying the American submarine operating near Tawi Tawi.

Every destroyer captain received the same orders: maximum aggression, no retreat.

Kill that submarine.

On June 8, Dei took Harter south toward Sabutu Passage, the narrow strait between Tawi Tawi and Borneo.

Japanese destroyers patrolled that passage constantly.

Dei wanted to see how many he could sink before they figured out his tactics.

At 1400 hours, a lookout spotted two destroyers steaming in formation: Tanikaz and an unidentified escort.

Both were moving at 25 knots, conducting a standard search pattern.

Dei studied their movements for 90 minutes.

The destroyers followed a predictable zigzag pattern, changing course every eight minutes.

This gave him about 30 seconds to set up a shot after each turn.

He positioned Harter directly in their path and waited.

At 1630, Tanikaz turned toward Harter’s position.

The range was 3,000 yards.

Dei let her close: 2,500 yards, 2,000 yards, 1,500 yards.

At 1,200 yards, he fired four torpedoes at 17-second intervals.

The first torpedo missed, but the second struck Tanikaz near the bridge.

The third hit the forward magazine.

The explosion was so massive that Harter’s crew heard it clearly underwater, even with the hatches sealed.

Tanakaz’s bow section separated from the main hull, and both pieces sank within three minutes.

The escort destroyer immediately turned and charged Harter’s position, dropping depth charges as she came.

Dei ordered Harter deep to 400 feet.

The depth charges exploded overhead, shaking the submarine violently but causing no serious damage.

After 40 minutes, the destroyer gave up and withdrew.

Three destroyers sunk in three days.

Admiral Toyota was about to make a decision that would change the entire course of the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

But first, Dei had one more destroyer to sink.

And this time, he was going to do it in broad daylight with two Japanese destroyers watching.

On June 9 at 0500, Dei took Harter to periscope depth, 12 miles southwest of Tawi Tawi.

What he saw made every man in the conning tower hold their breath.

Dead ahead were four Japanese destroyers steaming in line of breast formation, actively searching for submarines.

Their sonar was pinging so loudly that Harter’s sound operator could hear it without headphones.

Dei had eight torpedoes remaining.

Four destroyers meant he would get maybe two shots before they overwhelmed him.

He studied their formation through the periscope.

The lead destroyer was zigzagging aggressively while the second maintained a steady course.

That was his target.

At 0612, the second destroyer turned directly toward Harter’s position.

Range: 4,000 yards.

Dei waited: 3,000, 2,500.

At 1,800 yards, he fired three torpedoes.

All three struck the destroyer’s port side within five seconds of each other.

The ship exploded so violently that debris flew 300 feet into the air.

She rolled over and sank in 90 seconds.

The other three destroyers immediately converged on Harter’s position.

Dei took her deep to 500 feet.

Depth charges began exploding overhead—23 in the first ten minutes.

The lights went out, and emergency lighting kicked in.

Hull plates groaned under the pressure, and a pipe burst in the forward torpedo room, spraying seawater across the deck.

Harter’s crew worked in silence, repairing damage while depth charges continued to detonate around them.

After two hours, the destroyers withdrew.

Dei climbed to periscope depth.

The destroyers were gone.

Four enemy warships sunk in four days.

But Dei wasn’t thinking about his success; he was thinking about his fuel.

Harter had burned through 60% of her diesel reserves.

She had maybe three more days before she would have to withdraw to Fremantle.

Admiral Jizaburo Ozawa, commander of the Japanese mobile fleet at Tawi Tawi, received reports of the attacks at 1400 hours on June 9.

Four destroyers lost, one submarine.

Ozawa did the math.

If an American submarine could penetrate his defensive screen this easily, the entire anchorage was vulnerable.

He sent an urgent message to Admiral Toyota: the mobile fleet needed to depart Tawi Tawi immediately.

Toyota agreed.

Operation Ago required the mobile fleet to intercept the American invasion force near the Marianas, but the operation wasn’t scheduled to begin until June 15.

Moving six days early meant his carriers would arrive without proper reconnaissance.

His destroyers would be scattered across multiple patrol zones, and his supply lines wouldn’t be established.

But staying at Tawi Tawi with an American submarine hunting his destroyers was suicide.

On June 10 at 0800, the Japanese mobile fleet departed Tawi Tawi.

Four battleships, nine carriers, 15 cruisers, and 24 destroyers were heading northeast toward the Philippine Sea.

American codebreakers intercepted the movement orders within hours.

Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, adjusted his battle plans accordingly.

The early departure gave American carriers an extra day to position themselves for what would become the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Dei knew none of this.

On June 10 at 1630, he spotted two more destroyers patrolling north of Sibutu Passage.

Both were moving at high speed, conducting an aggressive search pattern.

Dei had five torpedoes remaining—enough for one more attack.

At 1715, he fired three torpedoes at the lead destroyer.

One struck near the bow, slowing the destroyer but not sinking it.

The second destroyer immediately charged Harter’s position.

Dei fired his last two torpedoes, but both missed.

He had no torpedoes left and no way to defend himself against a Japanese destroyer bearing down on his position at 32 knots.

Dei ordered emergency deep.

Harter’s diving planes bit hard, pushing the submarine down at maximum angle: 300 feet, 400 feet, 500 feet.

The destroyer passed directly overhead, her propellers churning the water so loudly that Harter’s crew could hear the blades through the hull.

Then silence.

The destroyer was circling back.

Dei knew the pattern: the destroyer would make multiple passes, dropping depth charges on each run until either the submarine surfaced or imploded.

Harter had no torpedoes to fight back with, and no way to damage the destroyer.

His only option was to outlast the attack and hope the destroyer ran out of depth charges first.

The first pattern dropped at 1723.

Six depth charges exploded in a tight pattern around Harter, rolling her 15 degrees to starboard.

Light bulbs shattered, and men grabbed handholds.

A second pattern dropped two minutes later, closer this time.

The explosions lifted Harter’s stern and slammed it back down.

Cork insulation rained from the overhead, and a hydraulic line burst in the control room.

For 90 minutes, the destroyer hunted Harter, dropping 42 depth charges.

Most exploded too shallow or too far away, but three came close enough to crack gauge glass and spring minor leaks.

Dei kept Harter at 500 feet, moving at two knots and making as little noise as possible.

Finally, at 1900 hours, the destroyer withdrew.

She had exhausted her depth charge supply.

Dei waited another hour before surfacing.

The ocean was empty—no destroyers, no patrol planes, just darkness and the sound of diesel engines recharging batteries.

Harter limped south toward Fremantle at eight knots, preserving fuel.

She arrived on June 26 after a 17-day patrol.

The moment Harter tied up at the pier, Admiral Charles Lockwood was waiting.

He had been tracking Dei’s patrol reports via radio intercepts.

Five destroyers attacked, four confirmed sunk, and one damaged.

In just 12 days, it was the most successful anti-destroyer patrol in submarine warfare history.

Lockwood awarded Dei the Navy Cross on the spot.

Then he asked the question every submarine commander dreaded: could you do it again?

Dei’s answer was immediate: “Give me torpedoes, and I’ll sink ten.”

Harter’s crew spent July in Fremantle undergoing repairs and resupply.

Dei trained new crew members on down-the-throat attack tactics.

By late July, every submarine commander in the Pacific had studied Harter’s patrol reports, and the tactic worked.

Between June and August 1944, American submarines sank 14 Japanese destroyers using variations of Dei’s aggressive approach.

On August 5, Harter departed Fremantle for her sixth war patrol.

She was assigned to operate as part of a three-submarine wolf pack with USS Hado and USS Hake.

Commander Dei was in charge.

Their mission was to patrol the waters west of Luzon and attack Japanese shipping heading to the Philippines.

The patrol started well.

On August 21, the Wolfpack intercepted a 16-ship convoy off Palawan Bay.

In a coordinated attack, they sank four cargo ships totaling 22,000 tons.

On August 22, Harter and Hado attacked three coastal defense vessels off Batangas.

All three sank, with Harter credited with destroying two frigates, Matsua and Hiboui.

By August 23, Hado had expended all her torpedoes and withdrew from the patrol.

This left Harter and Hake operating together off Dasal Bay on the western coast of Luzon.

Japanese intelligence had tracked the Wolfpack’s movements.

They knew approximately where the American submarines were operating and sent something special to deal with them.

At 0453 on August 24, USS Hake submerged four miles off Hermoname Island.

Through her periscope, she could see Harter on the surface, 4,500 yards to the south.

Both submarines were preparing to attack a damaged Japanese destroyer that Hado had torpedoed the previous day.

Then Hake’s sonar operator heard something that made his blood run cold: echo ranging.

Close.

Getting closer.

Two Japanese escort ships were closing on Harter’s position: CD22 and minesweeper PB102, both moving at 18 knots and conducting an active sonar search.

They had been hunting American submarines for three days.

Japanese intelligence had intercepted radio transmissions between Harter, Hake, and Hado during the Palawan Bay attack.

They knew the Wolfpack was operating somewhere off Dasal Bay.

Hake’s captain immediately ordered his submarine deep and silent.

He watched through his periscope as the two Japanese ships closed in on Harter.

At 0520, Hake’s radio operator tried to warn Harter.

There was no response.

Either Harter’s radio was off, or she was already preparing to dive.

At 0530, Harter crash-dived.

The Japanese ships were less than 2,000 yards away.

Dei had seen them at the last possible moment.

He took Harter down fast, ordering flank speed and maximum dive angle.

The submarine descended at 35 degrees, her diesel engine still running as she submerged, leaving a massive bubble trail on the surface that pinpointed her exact location.

CD22’s sonar operator had a perfect contact: range 1,200 yards, depth approximately 200 feet.

Still diving, the escort ship’s captain ordered an immediate depth charge attack.

At 0547, CD22 made her first pass over Harter’s position and dropped a full pattern of depth charges set to detonate at 250 feet.

The explosions bracketed Harter perfectly.

At least three detonated within 50 feet of her hull.

The submarine’s pressure hull cracked near the after torpedo room, and seawater flooded in at tremendous pressure.

Harter’s stern flooded completely within 90 seconds.

The submarine’s bow rose sharply as the stern dragged her down.

Dei ordered all ballast blown in an attempt to surface.

The compressed air system fought against the flooding, but there was too much water in the stern compartments.

Harter couldn’t reach the surface.

At 0552, CD22 made a second depth charge run.

This pattern hit even closer.

The explosions ruptured Harter’s main pressure hull in multiple locations.

The control room flooded, and all electrical power failed.

Emergency lighting went dark.

At 600 feet—well below her maximum operating depth—Harter’s hull began to implode.

Bulkheads collapsed under pressure, and compartments crushed like tin cans.

The submarine was gone in less than three minutes from the first depth charge impact.

At 0600, CD22 and PB102 reported a successful kill.

Large quantities of oil, wood debris, and cork floated to the surface.

The Japanese ship circled the area for two hours, dropping additional depth charges to ensure the submarine was destroyed.

They recovered no survivors.

All 79 men aboard Harter died.

Commander Samuel Dei, radioman Calvin Bull—who had earned a Bronze Star for the destroyer kills in June—and every officer and sailor who had helped make Harter the most feared submarine in the Pacific were lost.

USS Hake remained submerged until nightfall.

Her captain filed a contact report describing Harter’s loss.

The message reached Admiral Lockwood at 0800 on August 25.

Lockwood immediately suspended all submarine operations in the Dasal Bay area and ordered every boat to withdraw to safer waters.

The news reached the United States in early September.

The Navy Department announced that USS Harter was presumed lost with all hands.

No additional details were provided; submarine operations were classified.

The American public wouldn’t learn the full story of Harter’s fifth patrol until after the war ended.

But the Japanese knew.

Admiral Toyota received the report on August 26.

The submarine that had terrorized his destroyer fleet for three months was finally gone.

He ordered a commendation for CD22’s crew.

What Toyota didn’t know was how much damage Dei had already done and how his four days in June had changed everything.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea began on June 19, 1944—nine days after Harter sank her fourth destroyer off Tawi Tawi.

Admiral Ozawa’s mobile fleet engaged Admiral Spruance’s Fifth Fleet in what would become the largest carrier battle in history.

Fifteen American carriers faced nine Japanese carriers, with 900 American aircraft against 430 Japanese aircraft.

The battle lasted two days.

American pilots shot down 376 Japanese aircraft while losing only 30 of their own.

American pilots called it the Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot.

Three Japanese carriers sank: Taiho, Shokaku, and Hiyo.

Two battleships were damaged, and one cruiser was sunk.

The Imperial Japanese Navy lost 75% of its carrier air groups and would never recover.

But the battle might have gone differently if Admiral Ozawa had arrived on schedule.

His original plan called for the mobile fleet to depart Tawi Tawi on June 15.

That would have given his reconnaissance planes four days to locate the American fleet before the battle began.

His carriers would have been fully supplied, his destroyer screens properly organized, and his battle plan coordinated with land-based aircraft from the Philippines.

Instead, Harter forced him to leave six days early.

Ozawa arrived in the Philippine Sea on June 14 with his fleet scattered across 200 miles of ocean.

His reconnaissance aircraft had burned through their fuel reserves during the early departure and couldn’t conduct proper searches.

His destroyers were still regrouping from anti-submarine patrols around Tawi Tawi, and his supply ships were three days behind schedule.

When American carrier aircraft found Ozawa’s fleet on June 19, his carriers were still launching aircraft.

His combat air patrol was undermanned, and his fleet formation was disorganized.

The Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot happened because Ozawa wasn’t ready.

And Ozawa wasn’t ready because Dei had sunk four destroyers in four days, convincing the Japanese that Tawi Tawi was too dangerous.

Admiral Lockwood understood this immediately.

In his postwar memoir, he wrote that Harter’s fifth patrol was the most strategically important submarine operation of the Pacific War.

Four destroyers sunk meant four fewer escorts protecting Japanese carriers.

But forcing the mobile fleet to depart early meant the entire Japanese battle plan collapsed before the first shot was fired.

Between December 1941 and August 1944, American submarines sank 1,314 enemy ships totaling 5.3 million tons.

These included Japanese merchant vessels, cargo ships, tankers, and troop transports, but only 29 warships.

Most submarine captains avoided warships, deeming them too dangerous, too well-armed, and too fast.

Dei proved that submarines could hunt warships successfully.

His down-the-throat tactic worked because it violated every assumption Japanese destroyer captains made about submarine behavior.

Submarines weren’t supposed to charge destroyers; they were supposed to run.

When Harter charged, Japanese captains hesitated.

That hesitation cost them 12 seconds.

And 12 seconds was enough time for torpedoes to close the range and strike.

By the war’s end, American submarines using Dei’s tactics had sunk 214 Japanese warships, including four aircraft carriers, one battleship, nine cruisers, and 38 destroyers.

The rest were submarines, escorts, and patrol craft.

Japan started the war with 63 destroyers and built 49 more during the war.

American submarines sank 38 of them, with Harter accounting for four in just four days.

On March 27, 1946, President Harry Truman presented Commander Samuel Dei’s Medal of Honor to his widow, Edwina Dei, in a ceremony on the White House lawn.

The citation read in part, “This remarkable record of five vital Japanese destroyers sunk in five short-range torpedo attacks attests to the valiant fighting spirit of Commander Dei and his indomitable command.”

The Navy named a destroyer escort after him: USS Dei, commissioned in 1954.

She served until 1972.

Harter received the Presidential Unit Citation for her first five war patrols and six battle stars for World War II service.

Her motto, “Hit him harder,” became legendary throughout the submarine force.

But her real legacy was the tactical revolution she started.

Before Harter’s fifth patrol, submarine doctrine emphasized stealth and evasion.

If a destroyer detected you, you ran.

You went deep, rigged for silent running, and hoped the depth charges missed.

Engaging destroyers in direct combat was considered suicide; the math simply didn’t work.

Destroyers were faster, better armed, and designed specifically to kill submarines.

Dei changed that math by understanding one critical fact about destroyer captains: they expected submarines to run.

When a submarine charged instead, the destroyer captain had to make an instant decision with incomplete information.

Turn left, turn right, maintain course, fire guns—all while torpedoes closed the range at 46 knots.

Most captains chose wrong.

By the time they realized their mistake, the torpedoes were already hitting.

Between June and December 1944, 12 American submarines adopted Dei’s aggressive tactics.

USS Tang sank two destroyers, USS Trigger sank one, and USS Barb sank one destroyer and damaged another.

USS Flasher sank three escort vessels using down-the-throat attacks.

The tactic’s success rate was 63%.

For every five attacks, submarines sank three destroyers and damaged one more.

Only one in five attacks failed completely.

Japanese destroyer captains adapted.

By late 1944, they developed counter-tactics.

When a submarine charged, destroyers would turn away and circle back, forcing the submarine to expose her broadside to torpedo attacks from other destroyers in the formation.

Or they would slow down deliberately, letting the torpedoes pass ahead while closing for a ram.

The tactic still worked, but the success rate dropped to 40%.

American submarine losses increased.

Between August and December 1944, nine submarines were lost to destroyer attacks.

Tang sank on October 24 when her own torpedo circled back and hit her.

Harter went down on August 24.

Darter ran aground on October 23 while pursuing a destroyer.

But even with higher losses, submarines were sinking more enemy ships than ever before.

The aggressive tactics worked.

Admiral Lockwood faced a difficult choice: recall all submarines and return to defensive tactics, or accept higher losses in exchange for completely destroying Japan’s convoy system.

He chose aggression.

Between January and August 1945, American submarines operating under aggressive patrol doctrines sank 437 Japanese merchant ships and 53 warships.

By August, Japan had less than 25% of the merchant tonnage it started the war with.

The home islands were starving, factories shut down for lack of raw materials, and the Imperial Japanese Navy couldn’t fuel its remaining ships.

Dei never saw any of this.

He died three months after his greatest victory, killed by the same type of escort ship he had spent a year learning to destroy.

But his tactics continued.

Every submarine commander in the Pacific studied Harter’s patrol reports.

Every attack plan referenced the down-the-throat doctrine.

Every torpedo solution included calculations for charging destroyers.

On May 22, 2024, 80 years after she sank, an underwater exploration team led by Tim Taylor and the Lost 52 project discovered Harter’s wreck in the South China Sea.

She sits upright on the seafloor at a depth of 3,750 feet, 12 miles west of Daol Bay, where she made her last dive.

Her pressure hull remains mostly intact, except for depth charge damage near the conning tower.

The wreck is a protected war grave; no salvage operations are permitted.

But finding Harter meant something more than locating a shipwreck.

It meant bringing closure to families who had waited 80 years for answers and honoring the 79 men who changed naval warfare forever.

Today, Harter’s story lives on in unexpected ways.

At the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, submarine tactics instructors still teach the down-the-throat attack as a case study in aggressive warfare.

Not because modern submarines use the same tactic—modern torpedoes are wire-guided and don’t require close-range attacks—but because Dei’s approach demonstrates a fundamental principle: when your enemy expects you to run, charging often works better than hiding.

The Naval History and Heritage Command maintains Harter’s complete patrol reports in their archives.

Every radio message, every torpedo firing solution, every depth charge attack.

Researchers studying submarine warfare in the Pacific can trace exactly how Dei developed his tactics across six war patrols.

His reports show a commander who learned from every encounter, refined his approach constantly, and never stopped looking for ways to sink more enemy ships.

Commander Dei’s grave is at Arlington National Cemetery in Section 59, Grave 874.

His headstone lists his rank, his dates of service, and one line: Medal of Honor, Destroyer Killer.

Families of Harter’s crew visit every year on August 24, the anniversary of her sinking.

They place flowers and share stories about grandfathers and great uncles who died at 22, 25, or 37, fighting a war most of them never expected to survive.

The 79 men aboard Harter came from 38 states—farm boys from Iowa, factory workers from Michigan, and college graduates from California.

They volunteered for submarine duty, knowing the casualty rates: 22% of submariners who served in World War II died, the highest percentage of any branch of the American military.

They knew the odds, yet they served anyway.

Calvin Bull, the radioman who earned a Bronze Star for his role in sinking five destroyers, was just 24 when he died.

John Mau, who survived Harter’s sinking and later became an admiral, spent 50 years telling their story.

He died in 2010 at age 90.

The last survivor of Harter’s crew, Paul Bryce, died in 2022 at age 98.

With his death, no one who served aboard Harter remains alive to tell their story firsthand.

That’s why stories like this matter.

These men left behind patrol reports, radio messages, and Medal of Honor citations.

But those documents can’t convey what it felt like to charge a destroyer at flank speed, hear depth charges exploding overhead, or watch your captain make decisions that meant life or death for everyone aboard.

The official history tells us Harter sank four destroyers in four days.

It doesn’t tell us about the fear, exhaustion, or absolute certainty that this patrol might be your last.