Conventional wisdom among German soldiers, members of the SS and SD, as well as police personnel, held that any order given by a superior officer should be obeyed under any circumstances.

Failure to comply with such an order would result in a threat to life and physical integrity or possibly serious danger to loved ones.

Would a German soldier have any chance of refusing to participate in the capture and murder of groups such as Jews, gypsies, suspected partisans, or Soviet prisoners of war without facing serious consequences such as being shot, sent to a concentration camp, or putting his family in danger.

There are more than 100 cases of individuals whose moral scruples were put to the test and were not found deficient.

These individuals made the choice to refuse to participate in the shooting of unarmed civilians or prisoners of war.

What happened to them? Dr.

Albert Battle, a lawyer and army reserve major, defied Nazi orders during World War II by acting to protect Jews from execution in premisile in 1942.

He convinced superiors to shelter the Jews under his responsibility in military barracks, preventing their capture by the SS.

Although temporarily successful, battle eventually had to hand them over to the SS, facing reprimand and transfer to the front line.

Himmler planned to arrest him after the war, but Battel escaped.

His actions were recognized in Israel, showing direct resistance to the genocidal policies of the SS and SD.

Although he did not suffer serious consequences, Bernhard Griezu was able to resist involvement in the execution of Jews by following his military lines of authority and immediately protesting to his superior.

Born in 1887 in Ribnets, he had already retired in 1936 as a major of the Shutz Palitzai.

reactivated at the beginning of the war.

He was the interim commander of the Shutz Pulitzi in Rostock and trained a battalion of recruits in Tilsit at the beginning of 1941.

Over time, Greu was personally requested by an SD officer to provide men for an execution of Jews in the Jorgensburg area.

Greu immediately ordered his senior captain to represent him at his headquarters and did not allow any of his police battalions to be used in the proposed execution without his direct order.

He immediately traveled to his headquarters in Koigsburg and arranged to obtain a written order stating that Greu should only provide men to the SD if they could provide him with a written order from his commanding officer in Koigsburg.

With his action to obtain this order, Greu refused the SD’s request to have his men participate in the execution of Jews in his area.

In fact, the SD shot the 365 Jews while he was traveling to and from Koigsburg.

However, the SS and police initiated an investigation into his refusal to cooperate after Greo testified before first lieutenant Dr.

stud who came especially from Berlin to investigate the matter.

This investigation was closed.

Shortly after this refusal, Greu received the iron cross.

In a similar case during the summer of 1941, an ordnong politai officer called Rudolph Miller Bonik, chief of staff of the BDO in Kov and explained, “I have just received an order from the SS and police leader Globachnik, that I must execute Russian prisoners of war and Jews.

What should be my action? I do not wish to participate.

” He received the response from Miller Bernick that he should not comply with this order as the role of the Ordinong Pulitzi was not to execute people.

Major General Rean, the BDO in Kov and Mueller Bonick’s superior agreed and called back the police officer telling him that in the case of a new execution order, the SS and police leader, Globachnik, should be informed that the Ordnong’s Pulitzai was not the execution servant for the SS, SD, and security police.

The chief of the Ordnong’s Pulitzai in Berlin informed of Ria’s orders, shared this opinion and informed Himmler, who agreed that the Ordnungs Pulitzai units should not be included in executions.

Globnik filed a complaint about this incident, which led within 2 months to the replacement and transfer of police major general Ria to Prague.

No other negative outcome was experienced by the police officer who received the original order or by Miller Bernick.

A major of the Schutz Pulitzai, possibly Anton Per stationed in Sunumi before February 1942, received an order from a superior SS leader to use his police battalion to execute Jews.

He refused to do so and demanded that a legal court sentence be shown against those to be executed.

He also demanded the presence of a judge and a prosecution representative at the proposed execution.

He also refused to follow a renewed order for the execution.

Instead, he informed his regiment of his refusal.

The officer was not punished.

From this incident, an order came for all Shutz Pulitzai units that they should not be involved in executions.

In 1941 after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, two German officers Friedrich Darren and Untertorm Furer Shriber refused to allow their unit the Reichkes Furer Begllight Battalion Zumbre Pinefur Zenia to participate in executions of Jews and Poles.

Shriber, a company leader, reported to Durn that his unit had been used for these executions, but he refused to continue.

Durn, in a report to Berlin, unequivocally refused further execution orders for his unit.

A few days later, the battalion was dissolved and its companies were transferred to different SS regiments.

Durn was censured for his refusal, but did not suffer consequences in his career.

He was promoted and commanded other units until the end of the war.

An additional case involving a German policeman Hedman Shafts Fuer of the Jearmmorary German police shows that advanced thinking and decisions on how to react helped a man remain firm in his decision to reject these illegal orders despite all efforts to persuade him to change his mind.

Walter Entrich born in 1908 in Berlin was transferred to Lutk Ukraine in midApril 1943 to command five police area leaders there.

His superior officer was Ober Litnant, Lieutenant Colonel Helmet Reebstein of the police with whom Entrich frequently discussed the execution of Jews and others that had occurred before his arrival.

The pair fully agreed that should such measures occur in the future, they would disassociate themselves, and their units would reject such actions as illegal.

They had these discussions and made their decisions in part because 450 Jews still lived in the district of Vladimir Volinsk.

They assumed that sooner or later an order would come for the execution of these Jews.

Later, when the front began to retreat toward their area during the late autumn of 1943, Entrech was asked by Gunther, the SS and police leader for Volhinia and Podolia, whether he would be prepared to liquidate the several hundred Jews still living there.

Due to his previous discussions with Reebstein, Entrich refused to accept this task, calling it illegal.

His personal judgment was that such executions were criminal.

Gunther tried to persuade Entric otherwise, but he remained firm in his decision.

Even though Entrich refused to carry out the task requested by SS leader Gunther, there were no negative consequences.

Reebstein praised Entri’s attitude and fully supported his decision.

There were no further attempts to involve either officer in executions.

One of the cases of an officer who refused to participate in the execution of Russian prisoners of war deserves closer attention.

In this case, the officer was sent to a concentration camp for about 3 years.

The officer was Dr.

Urus Nicholas Ernst France Hornik, an overloitant first lieutenant in the Vermacht who was later transferred to a police battalion because he had previously served in the police forces before his army service.

In October 1941, he was sent east as a platoon leader.

On November 1st, 1941, Hornig received an order from his battalion commander, Major D, to execute 780 Russian prisoners of war who had been separated from Stalag 325.

They were to be killed with a shot to the neck in a small forest between Lublin and Lemburgg.

Fron told his commander that he could not comply with this order because of his training as a jurist, Catholic, and army officer.

He gathered his officers and men and informed them of his refusal to carry out this order.

France informed them in his own commentary that shooting defenseless people not only constituted a crime, but also resembled the methods of the GPU, referring to the notorious Soviet secret police.

None of Fran’s men participated in the shootings, although his unit was used to seal the outer perimeter of the execution site.

Dr.

Hornick then left the execution site, and his battalion commander searched for him in vain.

France was charged in his first trial with refusal to obey orders and above all with attempting to undermine the fighting spirit of his troops, Verzettum, through his speech and example.

His refusal to shoot Russian prisoners of war became a secondary issue in the trials.

The first trial in November 1942 resulted in a sentence of 3 to 4 years in prison for Vercraft Zeretsum.

A second trial which took place only in March 1945 resulted in a sentence of 6 to 7 years again for Vercraft Zeretszum.

During the course of these proceedings and at least from November 1942 until the end of the war, Dr.

Hornig was sent to Bukhanvald concentration camp.

Dr.

France was sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison for Vercraftetsum in November 1942 and to 6 to 7 years in March 1945.

But the sentences were not executed because Hinrich Himmler did not sign them.

Hornik was sent to Bukinvault where he remained until the end of the war retaining his officer rank and salary.

Statistical analysis of the refusers.

A survey revealed that in the Ludvigsburg Central Archives, there are at least 85 separate cases of one or more people who refused to engage in the murder of civilians or Russian prisoners of war.

These range from generals in the army and police to officers in the Vafen SS SD and the Einats group, the actual execution units to enlisted soldiers in all these branches of service and party officials.

Most often they were refusing participation only for themselves.

But there were at least 12 cases in which officers also refused to allow their units to participate in these killings.

If we take a look at this table, we see that the analysis of motivation for these refusals revealed that 41 of the 85 individuals, almost half, did not give specific personal reasons.

More than a quarter of the total cited humanitarian or religious reasons, moral revulsion, and conscience as motivating factors.

Among them was one who could not carry out an execution order because of the appeal of a Jew among the lined up victims who personally knew him to shoot straight.

Only one in six men considered the executions illegal and refused for that reason.

Others reasoned that the killings would harm the men carrying them out or create emotional disturbances.

An equal number believed that such executions were not within their military or police role or that their professional ethos as soldiers or civil police officials prevented them from participating.

Two stated that such murders were politically disadvantageous.

The methods of refusal or evasion of orders during times of conflict were diverse and reveal a range of strategies adopted by individuals and military or police units.

In an analysis of 85 cases, more than half involved direct refusals by those involved with some cases where individuals reported their refusal to superiors as a precautionary measure.

Some evasion tactics involved claims of physical or emotional harm, reasons of conscience or religion, while others feigned insanity or incompetence.

Knowledge of military law and chains of command allowed many officers to successfully press their refusals with approximately 67.

1% of the cases involving officers.

Additionally, some innovative legal tactics included requiring the presence of judges and prosecution representatives before participating in executions, as seen in a case involving a major of the Schutz Pulitzi.

Other methods involved requesting transfers to avoid duties involving executions or hiding during the events.

There were cases in which soldiers refused to carry out execution tasks, pointing out that this was not the responsibility of their unit, while others used economic arguments or threats of force to avoid participation.

Some more extreme tactics involved collective refusal by groups or entire units, as well as the exchange of prisoners for wounded soldiers.

These examples demonstrate the complexity and variety of strategies adopted by those who refused to carry out orders during periods of conflict, revealing a mixture of moral, legal, and practical considerations.

What were the consequences for those who refused? The author’s study of these 85 cases found no evidence that anyone lost their life for refusing to kill civilians and prisoners.

49 reported no negative consequences and as we have seen several were even promoted after their refusal.

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