He had been told by his superiors that American troops were soft, that they relied on firepower because they would not close with the enemy, that they were good at defense but poor at offense.

Everything he experienced around Bastonia contradicted those assumptions.

The Americans attacked with skill and determination.

They took casualties and kept attacking.

They fought at night in snow in conditions that should have stopped offensive operations.

Wise’s diary entry for December 26th is brief.

Bastonia relieved.

We have failed.

He did not elaborate.

He did not need to.

The German soldiers who survived the fighting around Bastonia carried those memories for the rest of their lives.

In postwar interviews and memoirs, they consistently described the battle as a turning point in their understanding of the war.

Before Bastonia, many still believe Germany might achieve a stalemate or negotiated peace.

After Baston, they knew they were fighting a losing war.

This psychological shift is hard to quantify but impossible to ignore in the historical record.

The German army that retreated from the Arden in January 1945 was not the same army that had launched the offensive in December.

It had lost more than men and equipment.

It had lost confidence in its leadership and faith in its mission.

The relief of Baston became in German military memory a symbol of that loss.

It was the moment when the last offensive failed, when the last gamble came up short, when the reality of Germany’s situation became undeniable, even to those who had refused to see it.

Patton characteristically had no patience for German excuses.

When told after the war that German generals had considered his relief of Bastonia operationally impossible, he reportedly said that was because they were thinking like losers.

winners, he said, do not worry about whether something is possible.

They figure out how to do it and then do it.

Whether Patton actually said this is uncertain, it sounds like him, and it captures his philosophy, but the quote appears in multiple sources with slight variations, suggesting it may be apocryphal.

What is certain is that Patton’s actions spoke clearly enough.

He had promised to attack in 48 hours.

He attacked in 48 hours.

He had promised to relieve Bastonia.

He relieved Bastonia.

The German generals trained in the same military tradition that had produced Patton’s hero Frederick the Great could appreciate the achievement even as they suffered from it.

Von Manturfl in his final assessment of the Battle of the Bulge wrote that Patton’s relief of Bastonia was an operation that will be studied in militarymies as long as there are soldiers.

He meant it as a compliment, though it was a bitter one.

The last word perhaps belongs to Field Marshall Model.

In April 1945, as his army group disintegrated in the Rur Pocket, Model gathered his staff and told them he would not surrender.

He had been a field marshal of Germany.

He had commanded armies in great battles.

He would not end his life as a prisoner.

On April 21st, he walked into a forest near Doober and shot himself.

Among his personal papers found after his death was a map of the Arden.

Someone, presumably model, had marked the map with annotations.

The route of Patton’s advance from the south was traced in red pencil.

Next to Baston in Modell’s handwriting were two words in German.

Zushnell too fast.

That was the German general’s final verdict on Patton’s relief of Bastonia.

Not that it was impossible, not that it was lucky, just that it was too fast for them to counter, too fast for their plans to adapt, too fast for their army to survive.

In war, sometimes too fast is fast

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