At 0100 hours on November 15th, 1942, USS Washington’s radar operators watched a large contact appear on their SG surface search radar scope, range 8,400 yd, bearing 330°.

The target was a battleship.

She was moving slowly through Iron Bottom Sound, unaware that American guns were tracking her through the darkness.

Four American destroyers were already sinking or burning.

USS South Dakota, the other battleship in Task Force 64, had been battered by Japanese gunfire after electrical failures knocked out her systems.

Japanese search lights swept the water, searching for more targets, but they couldn’t find USS Washington.

The Japanese battleship Kiroshima had no radar.

Her lookout strained to see through pitch darkness.

Her optical rangefinders were useless without light.

Her fire control officers had no idea an American battleship was less than 5 mi away.

Guns trained on their ship, waiting for to the order to fire.

On Washington’s bridge, Rear Admiral Willis Augustus Lee stood next to Captain Glenn Benson Davis.

Lee had been tracking the Japanese force on radar for 20 minutes.

He knew exactly where every enemy ship was.

The Japanese knew nothing.

Lee had spent years preparing for this moment.

He understood radar better than any flag officer in the United States Navy.

Now he would prove that electronics could defeat experience, training, and superior numbers.

What happened in the next 7 minutes would change naval warfare forever.

Night naval combat in 1942 was dominated by the Imperial Japanese Navy.

For two decades, the Japanese had perfected tactics that made darkness their ally.

Intensive training in low light conditions.

Superior optical equipment.

Aggressive doctrine built around rapid torpedo attacks and close-range gunnery.

Japanese destroyermen practiced night maneuvers until they could fight blind.

Their commanders understood a fundamental truth.

Darkness neutralized American advantages in firepower and industrial strength.

This doctrine had produced devastating victories.

In August 1942, at the Battle of Seavo Island, Japanese cruisers surprised an Allied force and sank four heavy cruisers in 32 minutes.

American ships had early radar systems, but commanders didn’t trust the technology.

By the time Lookouts made visual identification, Japanese long lance torpedoes were already in the water.

The battle became a case study in what went wrong when radar was available but not properly used.

USS Chicago had SC air search radar.

The operator detected contacts at 43,000 yd, but the information took too long to reach the bridge.

By the time the captain was informed, Japanese ships were already within visual range.

The radar warning provided no advantage.

USS Ralph Tolbert, serving as a radar picket, detected Japanese ships, but reported them as friendly.

The formation commander didn’t trust the radar data and didn’t order his ships to battle stations.

The Japanese achieved complete surprise despite American radar detecting them miles away.

In October at Cape Esperance, American forces achieved surprise using radar, but then lost control when the formation maneuvered into confusion.

Rear Admiral Norman Scott had positioned his cruisers and destroyers in column formation.

When radar detected Japanese ships, Scott maneuvered to cross their tea, a classic tactical advantage.

But in darkness, with ships maneuvering independently, the formation fell apart.

Ships fired at contacts without knowing if they were friendly or enemy.

USS Duncan engaged what she thought were Japanese ships.

Some were friendly.

Duncan was hit by American shells, then hit by Japanese shells and sank.

USS Boise was illuminated by Japanese search lights and took multiple hits before American ships could support her.

The Americans won tactically, sinking a Japanese heavy cruiser and destroyer.

But the battle revealed how easily radar advantages could be lost through poor coordination.

On November 13th, the first phase of the naval battle of Guadal Canal became a point blank brawl.

American cruisers and destroyers engaged Japanese battleships at ranges under 3,000 yards.

Ships fired at muzzle flashes.

Search lights blinded gun crews.

USS Atlanta took 19 shell hits and a torpedo.

USS Juno limped away damaged only to be torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine hours later.

Rear Admiral Daniel Callahan and Rear Admiral Norman Scott both died in the action.

They were the only two American admirals killed in surface combat during the entire Pacific War.

The Americans had stopped the Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field, but at catastrophic cost.

Four destroyers sunk, two light cruisers sunk, multiple ships damaged, over 700 American sailors dead.

The tactical victory came at a price that couldn’t be sustained.

The cruiser force was shattered.

Most at surviving ships needed repairs.

Henderson Field had been saved for one more night, but the Japanese were coming back.

The Japanese lost battleship Hay, crippled in the engagement and finished by aircraft on November 13th and two destroyers, but they were preparing another attempt.

Vice Admiral Noatake Condo was bringing battleship Kiroshima South with cruisers and destroyers to shell Henderson Field on the night of November 14th.

If the airfield was destroyed, Japanese reinforcements could land unopposed and retake Guadal Canal.

The strategic situation was desperate.

Guadal Canal represented the first American offensive of the Pacific War.

If it failed, the entire strategy of island hopping toward Japan would be called into question.

The Marines on Guadal Canal were exhausted.

They’d been fighting for 3 months with inadequate supplies and constant Japanese attacks.

Henderson Field was their lifeline.

Aircraft from Henderson provided air cover for supply ships and attacked Japanese reinforcement convoys.

Without Henderson, the Marines couldn’t hold.

Admiral William Holsey had almost nothing left to stop Condo’s bombardment force.

The cruiser force was shattered.

He had one operational aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, but carrier aircraft couldn’t fight at night.

Hse option was to strip Enterprise of her battleship escorts and send them into Iron Bottom Sound for another night engagement.

It was a calculated risk.

If the battleships were sunk, Enterprise would be vulnerable.

But if Henderson Field was destroyed, Guadal Canal would be lost anyway.

The problem was that night engagements favored the Japanese.

American ships had better radar than they’d had at Tsavo Island or Cape Espirants, but radar alone hadn’t prevented disasters.

The technology had to be used correctly.

It had to be integrated into tactics and command decisions.

Most American flag officers in November 1942 still thought of radar as an interesting experimental tool, not a weapon that could dominate combat.

They’d been trained in an era when visual spotting and optical rangefinders were the only way to fight.

Radar challenged decades of doctrine and experience.

Most admirals were cautious about relying on it completely.

Admiral Willis Lee was different.

Lee understood radar because he’d studied it.

He’d worked with engineers developing fire control systems.

He’d examined British reports on radar directed gunnery.

He trained his crews to fight using radar as their primary sensor.

When other admirals said radar was unproven, Lee said radar would decide who controlled the Pacific.

Willis Augustus Lee was 54 years old in November 1942.

Born in Kentucky in 1888, he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1908.

His expertise wasn’t in traditional naval skills.

Lee was a marksman.

At the 1920 Antworp Olympics in Belgium, he won seven medals in shooting competitions, five gold, one silver, one bronze.

He was the most successful athlete at those games.

His Olympic performance remained a record for 60 years until it was equaled in 1980.

His specialty was longrange rifle shooting where tiny variations in wind, temperature, and distance determined hits or misses.

Lee understood that hitting targets at distance required precise measurement and calculation.

Small errors accumulated over range.

Wind drift had to be calculated.

Temperature affected powder burn rates.

Barometric pressure affected bullet trajectory.

Lee became expert at measuring all these variables and incorporating them into his shooting.

Lee understood precision.

He saw battleship guns as instruments that required the same attention to variables that rifle shooting demanded.

Range, speed, wind, ship motion, shell ballistics.

Every factor had to be calculated correctly.

For decades, navies had relied on optical rangefinders and visual spotting to provide that data.

Lee recognized that radar could provide better data more accurately.

Optical rangefinders measured range by comparing images from two lenses separated by several meters.

The operator adjusted the images until they aligned, then read range from a scale.

The process required good visibility, steady hands, and practice.

Accuracy was typically 1% of range at best.

At 10,000 y, the error could be 100 yard or more.

In darkness or poor visibility, optical rangefinders were nearly useless.

Radar measured range by timing radio wave reflections.

Radio waves traveled at the speed of light.

The radar transmitted a pulse, measured how long until the echo returned, and calculated range from the time delay.

The measurement was electronic, instantaneous, and unaffected by darkness, smoke, or weather.

The Mark III fire control radar on Washington could measure range to within 40 yard plus.

1% of range.

At 10,000 yd, the error was less than 54 yd.

This was twice as accurate as optical rangefinders in daylight and infinitely better than optical rangefinders at night.

Between the wars, Lee served as director of fleet training at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

He worked on gunnery development and fire control systems.

When radar technology emerged in the late 1930s, Lee immediately understood its implications.

Radar could measure range more accurately than optical rangefinders.

Radar could track targets in darkness, fog, or smoke.

Radar could see over the horizon.

If properly integrated with fire control computers, radar could revolutionize naval gunnery.

Lee pushed for radar development and integration into fleet operations.

He studied British reports on radar use in the Atlantic.

He attended technical briefings on radar equipment.

He visited research facilities developing radar systems.

By the time radar equipped ships began deploying to the fleet in 1941 and 42, Lee probably understood radar capabilities better than anyone at flag rank.

Lee was given command of battleship division 6 in August 1942.

The division consisted of two new North Carolina class battleships, USS Washington and USS South Dakota.

Both ships carried nine 16-in guns in three triple turrets.

Both had advanced radar systems.

Both were fast, capable of 28 knots.

Lee made Washington his flagship and immediately began training his crews in radar directed gunnery.

Lee’s approach was radical.

Traditional doctrine said radar was a backup to visual systems.

Use radar to find targets, then switch to optical control for firing.

Lee made radar the primary sensor.

He reorganized Washington’s fire control procedures.

So, radar operators worked directly with the gun directors and plotting rooms.

Information flowed from radar to fire control without going through layers of bridge officers who might question or delay the data.

Lee drilled his crews constantly.

Track targets on radar.

Calculate firing solutions from radar data.

Fire without visual confirmation.

Trust the electronics.

USS Washington fired her main battery at night twice in January 1942 during training exercises in Casco Bay, Maine.

Both times the gunnery was directed entirely by radar.

No visual sighting of the targets, no optical range finding, just radar providing data to the fire control computer.

The results convinced Lee that radar could control accurate fire at ranges where visual spotting was impossible.

Washington’s shells landed close enough to the target sleds that Lee knew the system worked, but convincing the Navy required proving it in combat against a shooting enemy.

Training exercises were one thing.

Combat with ships maneuvering and shooting back was entirely different.

The test came on November 14th, 1942.

Intelligence reports indicated Vice Admiral Noutake Condo was bringing a bombardment force to Guadal Canal.

The force included battleship Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, light cruisers Sai and Nagara, and nine destroyers.

Their mission was to destroy Henderson Field and land reinforcements.

The Japanese had tried this twice in the previous two nights and been turned back both times.

Now they were coming with overwhelming force.

Holy ordered Lee to take Task Force 64 and stop them.

Lee had USS Washington, USS South Dakota, and four destroyers, USS Walk, USS Benham, USS Preston, and USS Gwyn.

It was everything available.

Most other American warships in the area were damaged or low on fuel or ammunition.

Lee knew the odds.

Six ships against one battleship, four cruisers, and nine destroyers.

The Japanese had overwhelming numerical superiority.

They had more guns.

They had more torpedoes.

They had better night fighting experience.

They had the tactical initiative because they knew where they were going and when they needed to arrive.

Lee would have to intercept them in waters.

The Japanese knew intimately.

Lee’s only advantage was radar.

He intended to use it completely.

His plan was simple.

Position his force to intercept the Japanese as they approached Guadal Canal.

Use the destroyers as a screen to deal with Japanese destroyers and absorb the initial torpedo attacks.

Keep the battleships back in darkness where Japanese visual spotting couldn’t find them.

Use radar to track Japanese capital ships.

Wait until the range was right, then open fire with radar directed salvos.

The plan required perfect radar performance, perfect fire control calculations, and enough luck to avoid being hit by torpedoes or found by Japanese search lights.

Lee accepted these risks because any other approach meant fighting on Japanese terms, and fighting on Japanese terms meant losing.

Task Force 64 approached Guadal Canal from the south on the afternoon of November 14th.

Japanese reconnaissance aircraft spotted the formation and reported the sighting.

The Japanese identified the force as one battleship, one cruiser, and four destroyers.

The identification was wrong, but close enough to alert Condo that American ships were in the area.

Both sides knew a battle was coming.

The question was who would gain advantage when the fighting started.

At 2300 hours, Lee’s force rounded the western tip of Guadal Canal and headed north into Iron Bottom Sound.

The passage between Guadal Canal and Tsavo Island was about 8 mi wide.

It was a confined space for battleship operations.

Maneuvering room was limited.

The water was filled with wrecks from previous battles.

Survivors from earlier engagements were still in the water on rafts.

The tactical situation was as bad as it could be for capital ships.

But Lee had no choice.

If he stayed outside the sound, the Japanese would bombard Henderson Field unopposed.

He had to engage them here.

The night was dark.

No moon.

Low clouds blocked starlight.

Visibility was less than one mile.

The sea was f calm with a light chop.

The air was hot and humid.

Temperature was about 85°.

The smell of jungle vegetation drifted across the water from Guadal Canal.

Occasional lightning flashed in distant thunderstorms.

It was perfect weather for radar and terrible weather for visual spotting.

Washington’s SG radar began picking up contacts beyond Tsavo Island at 2305 hours.

Multiple groups of ships moving south.

Lee watched the radar plot display.

He counted contacts.

More than a dozen vessels in three groups.

The Japanese bombardment force was approaching on schedule.

Lee positioned his destroyers in line ahead of the two battleships.

Walker, Benham, Preston, Gwyn.

The destroyers would screen against torpedo attacks and engage enemy destroyers.

The battleships would hang back and use their radar advantage to engage the larger enemy units from distance.

Lee sent a message over the TBS radio to all ships.

This is Lee.

We’re going into a big fight.

Keep your heads.

Stay alert.

Trust your instruments.

The technology that gave Washington her advantage had a remarkable history.

Radar development in the United States began in the 1930s, but early systems were primitive.

The breakthrough came from Britain.

In September 1940, a British technical mission arrived in the United States carrying a black box containing the cavity magnetron.

This device could generate microwave frequency radio waves at power levels useful for radar.

British scientists had invented it at Birmingham University.

They shared the technology with America in exchange for American industrial capacity to mass-roduce radar systems.

The radiation laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology received the Magnetron in November 1940.

Within months, engineers developed the first microwave radar prototypes.

The SG Surface Search radar emerged from this work.

It operated at approximately 3,000 megahertz using 10 cm wavelength.

This was revolutionary.

Earlier radars used wavelengths measured in meters.

The SC air search radar that many ships carried operated at 200 megahertz with a wavelength of 1.

5 m.

The shorter wavelength of the SG provided much better resolution.

Contacts appeared as distinct points rather than fuzzy blobs.

The SG had another innovation, the plan position indicator display.

Previous radars showed returns as spikes on an oscilloscope.

The operator watched a horizontal line sweep across the screen.

When the radar pulse hit something, a spike appeared on the line.

The operator had to interpret the spike height and position to determine bearing and range.

It required training and concentration.

The PPI display was completely different.

It was a circular screen 9 in in diameter showing a map-like view.

Washington appeared at the center as a bright dot.

North was at the top.

Contacts appeared as bright points of light at their actual bearing range relative to Washington.

The display updated continuously as the antenna rotated at 15 revolutions per minute.

An operator could see the entire tactical situation at a glance.

Formation positions were obvious.

Contact courses could be determined by watching how the points moved.

Multiple contacts were easy to track.

It was intuitive and required less training than the oscilloscope displays.

USS Augusta received the first operational SG radar in April 1942.

Washington received hers during her August 1942 refit at Philadelphia Navy Yard.

By November, fewer than 50 American warships had SG radar.

It was still cuttingedge technology.

Many officers viewed it skeptically.

The equipment was complex and could malfunction.

The vacuum tubes failed regularly and had to be replaced.

The antenna motors sometimes jammed.

In rough seas, the mast head motion could affect the antenna position.

Officers who’d served their entire careers without radar weren’t convinced it was worth depending on.

The SG antenna was mounted on the forward face of Washington’s main tower structure.

The antenna was a rectangular frame about 2 feet by 3 ft containing the transmitter and receiver.

It rotated continuously, scanning 360°.

The mounting position on the forward tower gave excellent forward and side coverage, but created a blind sector to the rear.

Contacts directly a stern might not be detected.

Lee accepted this limitation because most contacts would be ahead of Washington as she advanced into the engagement area.

Maximum range on battleship-sized targets was approximately 30 mi in good conditions.

Smaller ships like destroyers could be detected at 15 to 18 mi.

Light cruisers appeared at around 20 m.

The bearing accuracy was within one degree.

Range accuracy was within 100 yards at maximum range, improving to within 50 yard at closer ranges.

These were impressive specifications, but the real advantage was that radar worked in complete darkness.

Visual lookouts were limited to a mile or less in these conditions.

Radar could see six to eight times farther.

Washington also carried Mark III fire control radar on her main battery directors.

Two Mark 38 directors controlled the main battery.

One director was mounted on top of the forward tower structure.

The second was mounted on a tower aft of the second funnel.

Each director had a Mark III radar antenna mounted directly on it.

The Mark III operated at a different frequency than the SG, approximately 100 megahertz.

It was specifically designed for gun laying, not search.

The antenna was smaller and focused its energy in a narrow beam.

This gave precise ranging but covered only the area where the director was pointed.

The Mark III measured range with exceptional accuracy within 40 yard plus.

1% of the range.

At 8,000 y the total error was less than 50 yard.

At 15,000 y the error was about 190 y.

This was far better than optical rangefinders.

Navy optical rangefinders were typically 26 ft long using the maximum separation possible on a ship.

In ideal daylight conditions with a clear target, a skilled operator might achieve 1% ranging accuracy.

At 10,000 yard, that meant errors of 100 yard.

At night with a dark target, errors could be several hundred yard.

Many times the optical rangefinder simply couldn’t get a reading at all.

The Mark III radar worked in any visibility conditions and provided consistent, accurate ranging.

The Mark III fed range data to the Mark 8 rangeeper, an analog mechanical computer weighing several tons.

The rangeeper was installed in the plotting room below the armored deck.

It was essentially a room-sized calculator built from gears, cams, and servo motors.

The machine was about 12 ft long, 6 feet wide, and 7 ft tall.

It required three operators to input data and monitor its operation.

The rangekeeper accepted inputs for own ship course and speed, target bearing, target range, target course, target speed, wind direction, wind speed, air temperature, and dozens of other variables affecting shell trajectory.

From these inputs, it calculated where to point the guns.

So shells fired now would intersect with the targets future position when they arrived.

The calculation had to account for shell flight time, typically 20 to 30 seconds.

During that time, both Washington and the target would move.

The shells would follow a ballistic arc affected by wind, air density, and the Earth’s rotation.

All these factors had to be continuously recalculated.

The rangekeeper updated continuously as radar provided new range data every few seconds.

The computer recalculated as Washington maneuvered.

The computer compensated for the change in bearing and relative motion.

The gun orders went electronically to the turrets where motors trained the guns in bearing and elevated the barrels.

The entire process from radar measurement to gunpointing took seconds.

Human rangefinder operators and manual calculators needed minutes to achieve the same result, assuming they could see the target at all.

The system worked when properly integrated, but it had limitations that Lee understood perfectly.

The Mark III radar couldn’t distinguish shell splashes from the target return.

During daylight gunnery, spotters in the directors watched where shells landed through optical instruments.

They called corrections, up, down, left, right.

The rangekeeper adjusted the solution and the next salvo landed closer.

This process of firing and spotting produced accurate shooting within a few salvos.

In darkness, spotting was impossible.

Washington would fire calculated salvos without being able to observe where they landed.

The only feedback would be if shells hit and started fires visible to lookouts.

Otherwise, Lee would simply trust that the radar ranging was accurate and the fire control solution was correct.

This was the gamble.

Lee was betting everything on electronics that had never been fully tested in combat this way.

If the radar lost track of the target, the guns would fire at empty ocean.

If the fire control computer made an error in the calculations, shells would miss by hundreds of yards.

If Japanese ships maneuvered unpredictably, the solutions would be wrong by the time the shells arrived.

If the radar data was slightly off, the entire firing solution would be degraded.

Lee accepted these risks because fighting without radar meant certain blindness.

Fighting with radar meant at least having a chance to see and shoot first.

In night combat, shooting first usually meant winning.

At 2317 hours, Washington’s SG radar detected multiple contacts emerging from behind Tsavo Island, range 18,000 yards.

The contacts were moving south in two groups.

Lee ordered his formation to battle stations.

General quarters had already been set hours earlier, but Lee’s message emphasized that contact was imminent.

The four destroyers were arrayed in column ahead of the battleships.

Walker leading, then Benham, Preston, and Gwyn.

The destroyers were spaced about 600 yardds apart.

Washington followed about 2,000 yards behind Gwyn.

South Dakota was supposed to follow Washington by another 2,000 yd, but Captain Gat maneuvered independently, and South Dakota’s position varied throughout the engagement.

Commander Thomas Fraser on Walker had the most advanced radar in the destroyer force.

His SG radar, similar to Washington’s, picked up the Japanese destroyer screen at 12,000 yd.

Fraser was an experienced destroyer commander who understood radar capabilities.

He recognized the contacts as enemy destroyers and reported to Lee.

Fraser requested permission to launch torpedoes at the torpos contacts.

Destroyers carried 10 torpedoes in two quintupal mounts.

Launching early would allow the torpedoes to run toward the enemy formation.

Some might hit.

More importantly, Japanese ships detecting incoming torpedoes would maneuver to avoid them, disrupting their formation.

Lee refused the request.

He had a specific reason.

He didn’t want American torpedoes and Japanese torpedoes running in the same water space.

In darkness, with multiple ships maneuvering, nobody could be certain where all the torpedoes were.

An American ship might maneuver to avoid Japanese torpedoes and run into American torpedoes instead.

Friendly fire from torpedoes was a real danger in night combat.

Lee ordered the destroyers to engage with guns only and maintain their screening position.

Hold fire until the enemy was close.

Keep the formation between the Japanese and the battleships.

Absorb the initial attacks.

The destroyers understood their mission.

They were expendable.

The battleships weren’t.

The Japanese spotted the American destroyers first.

Destroyer Iron Army leading the Japanese destroyer screen detected ships ahead at approximately 11,000 yards.

The Japanese had no radar, but their optics were excellent, and their lookouts were rigorously trained for night combat.

Japanese destroyers carried powerful optical rangefinders and excellent binoculars.

The lookouts had been dark, adapted for hours.

They could see farther than most people would think possible.

Ayanami’s commander, Lieutenant Commander Sato Tomokatsu, immediately identified the contacts as enemy warships and made his decision.

He would attack with torpedoes first, then illuminate with search lights and open fire.

Iron Army launched a spread of type 93 torpedoes.

The type 93 called Long Lance by the Americans was the best torpedo in the world.

It was 24 ft long and weighed 2 tons.

The warhead contained 1,000 lb of high explosive.

The torpedo was powered by oxygen enriched kerosene which produced no visible wake.

American torpedoes left white trails of bubbles that could be seen from miles away.

The long lance was nearly invisible.

The torpedo ran at 48 knots with a range of 20 m at that speed.

American torpedoes typically ran at 45 knots with a range of 6,000 yd.

The long lance could hit from three times farther away at higher speed.

It was a devastating weapon that gave Japanese destroyers a huge advantage in night combat.

Iron army launched eight torpedoes in a spread pattern.

The torpedoes entered the water and accelerated to speed.

They would take about 8 minutes to reach the American formation at current ranges.

Sarto then ordered his search light operators to illuminate the lead American destroyer.

A powerful search light snapped on, its beam stabbing across the dark water.

The light found Waler immediately.

She was illuminated perfectly, silhouetted against the darkness.

Iron Army opened fire with her.

5-in guns at a range of 8,000 yd.

Light cruiser Nagara following behind the destroyer screen also opened fire.

Within seconds, multiple Japanese ships concentrated on the illuminated target.

Walker was being hit before Fraser could fully react.

Commander Fraser ordered hard left rudder to evade torpedoes and returned fire.

Walk’s 5-in guns engaged arami.

Several hits were observed on the Japanese destroyer.

Ayonami’s search light went out, knocked out by American shells.

But more Japanese shells were hitting Walkie.

Her forward superructure was struck repeatedly.

Fires started on the bridge.

The forward 5-in mount was knocked out by a direct hit.

Fraser launched all 10 torpedoes to clear his tubes and continued firing with his remaining guns.

The situation was desperate.

Walk was heavily engaged against multiple enemy ships.

Fires were spreading.

Casualties were mounting.

At 23 26 hours, a shell penetrated Walk’s forward magazine.

The magazine contained several tons of ammunition for the 5-in guns and smaller weapons.

The explosion was catastrophic.

The entire forward section of the ship from the bow to the bridge disintegrated in a massive fireball.

The blast killed everyone forward instantly.

Walk broke in two.

The forward section sank immediately.

The aft section remained afloat for perhaps 30 seconds before capsizing and sinking.

Commander Fraser died instantly.

Most of the crew died in the explosion or went down with the ship.

76 men were killed.

Approximately 60 survivors went into the water wearing life jackets.

They would spend hours in the darkness waiting for rescue.

Preston was second in line about 600 yd behind Walk.

Lieutenant Commander Max Storms saw Walker explode ahead.

He continued forward toward the enemy.

Preston’s radar showed multiple Japanese ships.

Storms ordered his guns to engage the nearest contacts.

Preston’s 5-in battery opened fire at destroyer Ionami and light cruiser Nagara.

Japanese destroyers Uranami and Shikinami returned fire.

Preston was hit almost immediately.

Multiple shells struck within seconds.

One hit destroyed the SG radar antenna.

Another penetrated the after engine room.

High-press steam lines ruptured.

Superheated steam filled the compartment, killing everyone inside instantly.

Preston lost power to her after guns and half her propulsion.

More shells hit.

The pattern was consistent with multiple ships firing at Preston simultaneously.

Her bridge was struck, killing several officers, including the executive officer.

Communications were cut between the bridge and the rest of the ship.

Fires spread amid ships where fuel oil tanks had been ruptured.

The ship was dying.

At 2330 hours, a type 93 torpedo slammed into Preston’s starboard side amid ships.

The massive explosion broke the destroyer’s keel.

The ship’s back was literally broken.

She began settling rapidly.

Storms ordered abandoned ship.

He stayed on the bridge helping men escape.

Less than 30 seconds after the abandoned ship order, Preston rolled over to starboard and sank Bow first.

116 men died, including Captain Storms.

About 90 men survived and went into the water.

Benham was third in line.

Lieutenant Commander John Taylor saw both lead destroyers sinking ahead.

Explosions lit up the darkness.

Burning fuel oil spread on the water.

Taylor ordered emergency turn to starboard to avoid collision with wreckage and survivors.

As Benham turned, a type 93 torpedo struck her bow.

The torpedo hit at the water line about 30 ft back from the stem.

The explosion was enormous.

The entire forward section from the bow back to the bridge was blown off.

The forward gun mounts simply disappeared.

The bow structure vanished.

anchor chains, cable lockers, forward crew birthing spaces, forward magazines, all gone.

About 60 ft of the ship ceased to exist.

But the torpedo hit forward of the main watertight bulkhead.

The bulkhead held.

Water rushed in through the destroyed bow section, but stopped at the bulkhead.

Benham’s stern section from the bridge aft remained intact and watertight.

Taylor managed to stabilize the ship.

The engines still worked.

Steering was functional using the rudder, but Benham could only make five knots with her bow gone.

The water resistance was too great.

She was out of the fight.

Taylor withdrew south toward Guadal Canal, hoping to beach the ship for emergency repairs.

Remarkably, Benham stayed afloat all day November 15th.

She attempted to reach Guadal Canal, but couldn’t make headway.

Finally, at 1938 hours, after nearly 20 hours a float with her bow missing, Benham was scuttled by gunfire from USS Gwyn.

All crew members survived.

Nobody was killed by the torpedo hit.

It was the only good news from the destroyer engagement.

Gwyn was fourth and last in line.

Lieutenant Commander John Fellows saw three to lead destroyers hit ahead.

Explosions and fires indicated the destroyer screen was being overwhelmed.

Fellows ordered Gwyn to engage with all guns and prepare to maneuver independently.

Gwyn’s 5-in battery fired at multiple Japanese targets.

At 2332 hours, a Japanese shell hit Gwyn’s after engine room.

The explosion killed several men in the engineering spaces and disabled one engine, but Gwyn remained operational on her remaining engine.

She could still make about 20 knots.

Fellows continued engaging until Lee ordered the surviving destroyers to withdraw at 0045 hours.

In 15 minutes, the American destroyer screen had been effectively destroyed.

Two destroyers sunk with heavy loss of life.

One crippled and withdrawing with her bow blown off, one damaged, but still operational.

The Japanese destroyer and cruiser screen had executed their night combat doctrine perfectly.

They’d engaged aggressively with torpedoes and gunfire.

They’d overwhelmed the American destroyers with concentrated fire.

They’d broken through the screening force and cleared the way for Kirishima and the heavy cruisers to engage the American battleships.

This was exactly what Japanese destroyer doctrine called for.

Destroy the screening units, then allow the capital ships to engage the enemy battle line.

This was exactly the scenario Lee had feared but accepted as unavoidable.

His destroyers couldn’t match Japanese destroyers in night combat.

The Japanese had better torpedoes, better training, better tactics, and more experience.

But Lee had positioned his destroyers to absorb the initial attack and protect the battleships.

The destroyers had done their job at terrible cost.

Now it was up to Washington and South Dakota to complete the mission.

Everything depended on the battleships using their radar advantage before the Japanese found them.

USS South Dakota had maneuvered independently when the destroyer action started.

Captain Thomas Gatch was an aggressive officer who wanted to close with the enemy.

He moved South Dakota ahead of Washington to engage.

At 2338 hours, South Dakota’s SC air search radar picked up surface contacts at 18,000 yd.

The SC radar was less capable than the SG, but it could detect large ships at long range.

Gatch ordered his main battery to prepare to engage.

The gun crews loaded armor-piercing shells.

The fire control team began tracking the contacts.

South Dakota was preparing to fire when disaster struck.

South Dakota’s electrical system failed.

The failure was caused by human error compounded by poor design.

During the afternoon, electrical repairs were being conducted.

A circuit breaker tripped.

The chief engineer manually reset the breaker while it was still under load.

Navy regulations prohibited this because it could cause cascading failures.

That’s exactly what happened.

Resetting the breaker under load caused it to trip again.

When it tripped, caused other breakers in the circuit to trip.

The failures cascaded through the electrical distribution system.

Within seconds, the entire ship lost power.

Everything went dark.

Radar screens went black.

Gun directors lost power.

Fire control computers shut down.

Communications went dead.

Ventilation stopped.

Even emergency lighting failed in some compartments.

Damage control teams worked frantically in complete darkness trying to restore power.

They had flashlights and battle lanterns, but resetting breakers and troubleshooting electrical systems in darkness was nearly impossible.

The engineering crew managed to restore partial power within about 5 minutes, but the damage was done.

South Dakota’s combat capability was shattered at the worst possible moment.

Without radar, South Dakota was blind.

Her lookouts could see the burning American destroyers a stern, but they couldn’t see Japanese ships ahead.

Without fire control power, her main battery couldn’t be aimed.

Without communications, Captain Gat couldn’t coordinate with Lee or with his own gun crews.

South Dakota continued moving forward on momentum and manual steering.

She was heading directly toward the Japanese force without sensors or working weapons.

It was a nightmare scenario.

At 0001 hours, power was partially restored.

Some radar systems came back online.

Fire control systems rebooted, but the ship had drifted during the power failure.

South Dakota had sailed to within 5,000 yds of the Japanese force, far closer than Gat intended.

Japanese cruiser Atargo detected the American battleship at close range and illuminated her with a search light.

The powerful beam found South Dakota immediately.

She was perfectly silhouetted by the burning American destroyers behind her, backlit by the fires.

Every Japanese ship in range opened fire.

Kirishima fired her main battery of 14-in guns at a range of 5,500 yds.

This was pointblank range for battleship guns.

The Japanese shells crossed the distance in about 8 seconds.

Heavy cruisers Atarago and Takao fired their 8-in guns.

Light cruiser Sendai fired 6-in guns.

Multiple destroyers fired 5-in guns.

South Dakota was hit by shells of every caliber.

The ship was struck at least 27 times in 3 minutes.

Most hits came from 8 in, 6 in, and 5-in guns.

These shells couldn’t penetrate South Dakota’s armored belt or turret faces, but they destroyed everything topside.

The forward main battery director took a direct hit from a 14-in shell.

The shell didn’t penetrate the armored director, but the impact destroyed the optics and knocked out the crew inside.

Men were killed by concussion even though the shell didn’t explode.

The radar antennas were shattered by shell fragments.

Gun mounts were hit.

The number three turret took an 8-in shell hit on the barbette, but the shell didn’t penetrate.

Fires started in multiple locations.

The superructure was riddled with holes.

39 men were killed.

59 were wounded.

The ship looked like she’d been through a scrap metal shredder.

South Dakota’s armor did its job.

None of the hits penetrated vital spaces.

The engines kept running.

The ship maintained speed.

The main battery turrets could still fire in local control without the directors.

But South Dakota was effectively out of the fight.

She couldn’t use radar.

She couldn’t use centralized fire control.

She was partially blind and heavily damaged.

Captain Gat ordered an emergency turn to Starboard to escape the Japanese formation.

South Dakota turned hard and disappeared back into darkness, heading south away from the enemy.

Her sacrifice had achieved one critical result.

She’d drawn every Japanese ship’s attention.

While South Dakota was being pounded, USS Washington was invisible in the darkness, tracking Japanese ships on radar, preparing to fire.

The Japanese thought they’d won.

In less than 20 minutes, they’d destroyed or driven off every American ship they’d engaged.

Four destroyers sunk or crippled.

One battleship damaged and retreating.

Admiral Condo on cruiser Atargo congratulated his force on their success.

He ordered the formation to reform and proceed north to bombard Henderson Field.

The primary mission could now proceed unopposed.

Japanese commanders didn’t know that USS Washington existed.

Every Japanese ship had been focused on the destroyers and South Dakota.

Washington had stayed back in darkness, tracking everything on radar, waiting for the perfect moment.

In Washington’s plotting rooms and directors, the radar operators and fire control teams had complete information.

The SG radar showed all Japanese ship positions clearly.

The returns were distinct and easy to track.

The Mark III fire control radar on the forward director was locked onto the largest contact, tracking it continuously.

The radar measured range every few seconds.

The Mark 8 range keeper computed the firing solution continuously updating as both ships moved.

Target bearing, target range, target course and speed estimated from radar plot tracking.

Own ship course and speed.

Wind, all the variables fed into the computer.

The solution was ready.

All turrets were loaded with armor-piercing shells.

The guns were trained on target and elevated to the calculated angle.

Everything was ready.

Washington just needed permission to fire.

Admiral Lee stood on the bridge with Captain Davis.

Lee wore a headset connected to the radar plot and fire control circuits.

He could hear everything the operators were saying.

He watched the radar plot display showing the tactical situation.

He could see the Japanese battleship clearly on the screen.

Range 8,400 yd.

The target was moving slowly northwest heading toward Henderson Field.

The Japanese ship had no idea Washington existed.

Lee had the perfect setup.

His ship was invisible.

His target was fully illuminated on radar.

His guns were ready.

This was the moment everything had been building toward.

Lee looked at Captain Davis and said simply, “Stand by Glenn.

Here they come.

” Davis gave the order that changed everything.

Main battery commence firing at 0100 hours.

Exactly 1:00 in the morning of November 15th, 1942, USS Washington opened fire.

All nine 16-in guns in three triple turrets fired together in a single massive salvo.

The sound was indescribable.

The blast pressure was so intense it could rupture eard drums.

The muzzle flash lit up the entire sky like lightning.

The ship shuddered and healed slightly to starboard from the recoil force.

Nine shells weighing 2,700 lb each flew toward Kiroshima at 2600 ft pers.

That’s about 1,800 mph.

The shells were in the air for approximately 20 seconds while they covered 8,400 yd.

Each shell was ozer, an armor-piercing projectile.

The shell body was forged steel.

The nose was hardened to penetrate armor.

Inside was about 40 lb of high explosive with a base detonating fuse.

The fuse was designed to explode after penetration, not on impact.

The shell would punch through armor plate, travel into the ship, then explode inside where it would cause maximum damage.

The ballistic trajectory was carefully calculated.

The shells left Washington’s guns at 45° elevation.

They arked upward to a peak height of about 20,000 ft, then descended at a steep angle toward the target.

The steep angle meant the shells would penetrate Kirishima’s deck armor, which was thinner than her side armor.

The Japanese on Kirishima had no warning.

They couldn’t see Washington.

Their lookouts were focused forward toward Henderson Field.

The first indication they had of danger was when nine shells arrived.

The first salvo hit Kirishima’s superructure and for deck.

Two shells struck the forward superructure.

Both exploded.

The bridge area was smashed.

The rangefinder on top of the bridge tower was destroyed.

Fire control equipment was wrecked.

Communications lines were cut.

Electrical cables were severed.

Fires started immediately as fuel lines and hydraulic lines ruptured.

Hiroshima’s captain, Sanji Iwabuchi, was on the bridge when the shells hit.

He was knocked down by the concussion but survived.

Most of the bridge crew was killed or wounded.

Iwabuchi got to his feet and tried to assess the damage.

Smoke filled the bridge.

Electrical power flickered.

Communications to other parts of the ship were cut.

He couldn’t determine where the firing was coming from.

He ordered return fire, but wasn’t sure what target to fire at.

The gun crews could see muzzle flashes off to the south, but the range was unknown.

Washington’s gun crews were already reloading.

The hydraulic rammers pushed new shells into the breaches.

Each shell was mechanically lifted from the magazine below, brought up through the turret structure, and loaded.

Powder bags followed.

Each gun required six powder bags.

The breaches closed and locked automatically.

The entire loading cycle took about 30 seconds.

The second salvo was ready to fire.

The fire control solution had been updated based on the latest radar ranging.

Washington fired again at 01030.

This salvo hit Kiroshima forward and amid ships.

One shell penetrated the armored deck near turret number one, the forwardmost turret.

The shell went through the deck and exploded in a compartment just above the forward magazines.

The explosion caused fires and flooding.

Damage control parties immediately flooded the magazines to prevent detonation.

This saved the ship from catastrophic explosion, but it also disabled turret number one.

With the magazine flooded, the turret couldn’t be supplied with ammunition.

Another shell hit the forward superructure and destroyed the backup fire control position.

A third shell hit the formast and brought down the main fire control director.

The director fell onto the deck, crushing men below.

Kirishima’s main battery fire control was now effectively destroyed.

Kirroshima tried desperately to return fire.

Her aft turrets, turrets three and four, were still operational.

The local gun captains in those turrets could see muzzle flashes from Washington’s guns.

They trained their turrets toward the flashes and fired.

Kirishima got off several salvos of 14-in shells at Washington, but without working fire control systems and without radar, the Japanese gunners had no accurate range.

They estimated Washington was about 10,000 yd away based on the brightness of the muzzle flashes.

They were close.

Washington was actually at 8,600 yd, but close wasn’t good enough.

The Japanese shells flew toward where Kiroshima’s gunners thought Washington was.

The shells passed over Washington’s masts, missing by perhaps 200 ft.

One witness on Washington said, “They must have been mighty close, but close doesn’t count.

” Washington’s third salvo fired at 0101.

All nine guns again.

This salvo concentrated amid ships.

Three shells hit Kiroshima’s machinery spaces.

One shell penetrated the side armor and exploded in the forward engine room.

The explosion was devastating.

Boilers were ruptured.

Steam lines burst.

Turbines were damaged.

The engineering crew was killed or driven out by superheated steam.

Another shell hit near the after engine room with similar results.

Kiroshima started losing power.

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