At 0317 on the morning of November 29, 1944, Commander Joseph Enight watched through his periscope as a warship longer than three football fields turned broadside,400 yd ahead of his submarine, 34 years old.

United States Naval Academy, class of 1933.

Zero confirmed sinkings.

The Japanese had commissioned the largest warship ever built.

And 10 days later, she was steaming through waters where Enright commanded USS Archerfish, 72,000 tons, 872 ft long.

Super carrier Shinano, designed to survive 20 torpedo hits.

Enright’s submarine carried 24 torpedoes total.

His commanding officers had nearly lost him to desk duty 11 months earlier.

The other submarine skippers at Midway called his first patrol command a textbook failure.

When he had let carrier Shukaku slip past USS Dace on November 15, 1943, Enright blamed himself and requested to be relieved.

He spent 6 months behind a desk while other men hunted targets.

He requested another command in September of 1944.

The Navy gave him ArcherFish, a Balo class submarine that had completed four war patrols with minimal success.

This was Enright’s second chance, the kind the submarine force rarely granted.

Enight had assumed command of USS Dace in July of 1943.

Fresh construction from Electric Boat Company in Grotton, Connecticut.

The submarine was commissioned on July 23rd with Enright as her first commanding officer.

This was the command every submarine officer wanted.

A new boat, experienced crew, assignment to the most target-rich waters in the Pacific.

Dace departed New London in September of 1943, transited the Panama Canal, and arrived at Pearl Harbor on October 3rd.

Enright received his patrol orders on October 17th, Japanese home waters, southeast coast of Honshu, approaches to Nagoya.

Intelligence reports indicated heavy merchant traffic in the area.

Dace departed Pearl Harbor on October 20th for her first war patrol.

The patrol started well.

On November 7th, Enright detected a large freighter sailing unescorted through his patrol area.

He maneuvered Dace into attack position and fired four torpedoes.

Three hit.

The freighter was severely damaged but did not sink.

Japanese patrol craft arrived before Enright could fire finishing shots.

Dace was forced to break off and go deep to evade depth charge attack.

Enright surfaced after dark and searched for the damaged freighter.

He found debris and an oil slick, but no ship.

Intelligence later confirmed the freighter reached port and was repaired.

Damaged but not sunk.

Not a kill.

Not a credit toward Enright’s combat record.

Then came November 15th.

Ultra Intelligence, the codebreaking operation that gave American forces advanced warning of Japanese ship movements, transmitted a message to all submarines operating near Honshu.

Aircraft carrier Shokaku departing Yokosuka.

Course south, speed 18 knots, destination unknown.

Shoku was one of the six carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941.

She had participated in nearly every major carrier battle of the Pacific War, Coral Sea, Eastern Solomon’s Santa Cruz.

She was Japan’s most experienced carrier with a veteran crew and a combat record that made her a priority target.

Sinking Shukaku would be the achievement of the war for any submarine captain.

Enright calculated Shukaku’s projected course.

The carrier would pass through D’s patrol area within 12 hours.

Enright positioned his submarine along the most likely track.

He waited at periscope depth, scanning the horizon every 5 minutes.

Dawn came.

No carrier.

Enright remained at periscope depth.

The carrier could be delayed.

Could have changed course.

could pass at any time.

At 0830 hours, Lookout spotted a large warship on the horizon.

Range 12,000 yds.

Silhouette matched Shukaku.

This was the target.

Enight began his approach.

Standard doctrine for attacking a carrier was to get ahead of the target, submerge, wait for the carrier to close range, then fire a spread of torpedoes.

Enright followed doctrine precisely.

He surfaced briefly to gain speed, moved ahead of Shukaku’s projected course, submerged, and waited.

But the carrier did not appear where Enright expected.

Shukaku had zigzagged, changing course 30° to port.

The carrier was now on a track that would pass 3,000 yd to the east of D’s position.

Too far for an effective torpedo shot.

Enright had two choices.

surface, reposition, try again, or stay submerged, fire longrange torpedoes with low probability of hitting.

Enright chose to surface and reposition.

He brought dace to the surface and ran at flank speed to regain attack position, but daylight was approaching.

Carrier lookouts would spot a surfaced submarine.

Enright had minutes, not hours.

At 0940 hours, Enright was still not in attack position.

The sun was rising, visibility increasing.

Shukaku’s destroyer escort would detect Darce if she remained on the surface.

Enright made his decision.

He ordered Dari to dive.

The attack was aborted.

Shoku steamed past, untouched.

Unaware that an American submarine had been tracking her for 3 hours.

Enight remained submerged until dark.

He surfaced and searched for Shukaku.

The carrier was gone, disappeared into the vast Pacific.

Enight radioed his patrol report to headquarters.

Shukaku contact made.

Attack aborted due to unfavorable geometry and approaching daylight.

No damage inflicted.

The response from headquarters was professional but cold.

Acknowledged.

Continue patrol.

Dace spent the next 3 weeks searching for targets in her assigned area.

She found a tanker on November 23rd.

Enright maneuvered into attack position and prepared to fire.

Japanese escort ships appeared and forced Dace deep with depth charge attack.

The tanker escaped.

No damage inflicted.

The patrol ended on December 11th when Dace returned to Midway.

49 days at sea.

Zero confirmed sinkings.

One damaged freighter.

One missed opportunity against the most important carrier target in the Pacific theater.

Enright knew what was coming.

The patrol report would be reviewed by Admiral Charles Lockwood, Commander Submarine Force Pacific.

Lockwood was known for giving his submarine captains significant freedom to make tactical decisions.

He was also known for relieving commanders who failed to sink ships.

Enight did not wait for Lockwood’s judgment.

On December 12th, Enight submitted a formal request.

I was responsible for an unproductive patrol and request to be relieved by an officer who can perform more satisfactorily.

The request reached Lockwood’s desk on December 14th.

Lowood granted it immediately.

Enright was relieved of command of Dace.

He was assigned to administrative duties at the Midway submarine base.

Dace received a new commanding officer.

Under the new commander, Dace went on to sink multiple Japanese ships and earned a presidential unit citation.

The submarine was successful.

Enight had been the problem.

Or so it seemed to everyone at Midway.

Enight spent 6 months processing patrol reports, coordinating logistics, assigning repair schedules, desk work, paperwork, the kind of duty that ended submarine careers.

Officers who failed in command rarely received second chances.

The submarine force had more qualified commanders than available submarines.

Failed commanders were transferred to surface ships or shore duty.

Their submarine days were finished, but Enright refused to accept this outcome.

In June of 1944, he requested a meeting with Admiral Lockwood.

The meeting lasted 15 minutes.

Enright argued that his failure on Dace had been due to excessive caution, following doctrine too rigidly, not trusting his instincts.

He had learned from the failure.

He requested another submarine command.

Lockwood listened.

He reviewed Enright’s record.

Naval Academy class of 1933, upper third of his class, 3 years service on battleship Maryland.

Submarine qualification in 1936.

8 years submarine experience before the war.

Commands of USS10 and USS Dace.

Zero sinkings but zero major errors except the Shokaku incident.

Lockwood made his decision.

Enright would get his second chance, but not immediately.

Enright remained at Midway until September.

Finally, in late August, Lockwood summoned him.

USS Archerfish needs a new commanding officer.

Her fourth patrol just ended with no sinkings.

The crew is experienced but frustrated.

They need a commander who will be aggressive.

Can you be that commander? Enlight said yes.

On September 1st, 1944, Commander Joseph Enright assumed command of USS Archerfish.

November 28, 1944, 2048 hours.

Archerfish was running on the surface 60 mi south of Tokyo Bay.

Enright had been assigned lifeguard duty positioned to rescue downed B-29 bomber crews during raids on Tokyo.

The raids had been cancelled that morning.

Enright was free to hunt.

The radar operator called out a contact.

Two ships 12 mi away bearing north.

Large radar returns.

Enright ordered flank speed and moved to intercept.

At 2200 hours, lookout spotted the contacts visually.

One massive vessel with three destroyer escorts.

The destroyers were running close formation.

The large ship appeared to be a tanker.

Enright studied the silhouette through binoculars.

The profile was wrong for a tanker.

Too much super structure, too much height.

This was a warship, possibly a battleship, possibly a carrier.

Enright’s executive officer estimated the targets length at over 800 ft.

Whatever it was, it was the largest Japanese warship Enright had encountered.

The destroyers complicated the approach.

They were running anti-ubmarine patterns, forcing the task group to zigzag at irregular intervals.

Enright tracked the formation from 12,000 yd, watching, calculating speed, and heading.

The Japanese ships were making 20 knots.

Archer fish could make 20 knots on the surface, but barely.

Enright could not overtake them on a straight course.

He had to predict their zigzag pattern and cut the angle.

The chase began in earnest at 2130 hours.

Enright ordered all four diesel engines to maximum output.

ArcherFish’s engines were rated for sustained operation at 1,600 horsepower per engine.

Flank speed required pushing them to 1,800 horsepower.

The chief engineer warned that sustained operation at this power level risked engine damage.

Enright accepted the risk.

Missing this target was not an option.

The engine room crew monitored temperatures, pressures, fuel consumption.

The diesels roared.

Black smoke poured from the exhaust ports.

On the surface in darkness, the smoke was invisible to Japanese lookouts, but the sound carried across the water.

Enight kept archer fish at least 8,000 yards behind the Japanese formation, close enough to track, far enough to avoid detection.

The Japanese ships maintained their zigzag pattern.

Every 12 minutes, the formation turned 30° left or right.

Enright timed the intervals precisely.

12 minutes between turns, 30° angle.

The pattern was consistent, predictable.

Enright used this information to calculate his intercept course.

If the Japanese maintained this pattern, they would zigzag within 5,000 yds of Archerish’s position at approximately 0230 hours.

That would put Enright ahead of the formation in position to submerge and execute a classic ambush attack.

But only if the Japanese maintained their pattern.

Any deviation would ruin the geometry.

At 2230 hours, Enright was 10,000 yd behind the Japanese formation.

The gap was closing slowly.

Archerfish was making 20.

3 knots.

The Japanese formation was making 20.

0 knots.

a 3/10enth KN advantage.

At this rate, Enright would be in position in 3 hours.

At 2300 hours, the Japanese formation turned back toward the northwest.

This turn brought them closer to Archerfish.

The range decreased to 7,000 yd.

Enright’s sonar operator detected propeller sounds.

The Japanese ships were close enough that acoustic detection was possible.

Enright ordered his crew to remain quiet.

No unnecessary movement, no loud conversation.

Sound carried through water far better than through air.

A careless noise could alert Japanese sonar operators.

At 2330 hours, Enright recalculated his intercept solution.

The Japanese zigzag pattern had changed slightly.

The turns were still every 12 minutes, but the angle had decreased to 25°.

This smaller angle meant the formation was covering more distance in each leg of the zigzag.

Enright adjusted his course to compensate.

At midnight, Enright was 6,000 yd behind the formation, still closing, but slowly.

The chief engineer reported engine temperatures were approaching maximum safe limits.

Enright ordered a brief reduction to 1700 horsepower to allow the engines to cool.

Archer fish’s speed dropped to 19.

5 knots.

The Japanese formation maintained 20 knots.

The gap began to widen.

Enright watched the radar screen.

7,000 y 8,000 y.

He was losing ground.

At 00030 hours, Enright ordered power back to 1,800 horsepower.

The engines responded.

Archerfish accelerated back to 20.

3 knots.

The gap stabilized at 8,000 yd, then began to close again.

7,500 yd.

7,000 y.

At 0100 hours, the Japanese formation executed another turn.

This time they turned southwest directly away from Archerfish.

The geometry worsened.

Enright was now chasing them from directly a stern.

This was the worst possible position for an intercept.

The Japanese ships could maintain this course indefinitely, and Archerfish would never close the distance.

Enright considered his options.

He could break off and search for other targets.

He could radio headquarters and request support from other submarines in the area.

He could continue the chase and hope for another zigzag that would improve the geometry.

Enright decided to continue.

This target was too valuable to abandon.

If this was a carrier, and Enright believed it was, thinking it would justify every risk.

At 0130 hours, the Japanese formation maintained their southwest course.

Enight paralleled them at 8,000 yd.

His fuel state was becoming a concern.

Running at flank speed consumed fuel at three times the normal rate.

Archerfish had enough fuel for another 6 hours.

At this speed, then she would need to reduce power to conserve reserves for the return voyage to base.

6 hours.

Enright checked his watch.

It was 0135 hours.

By 0730 hours, he would have to break off the chase or risk running out of fuel before reaching friendly waters.

At 0200 hours, the Japanese formation zigzagged again.

They turned northwest back toward their original course.

The geometry improved instantly.

Enright was now 7,000 yd behind and slightly to port of the formation.

If they maintained this course for another 30 minutes, Enright would be ahead of them.

At 0230 hours, Enright recalculated his position.

He was 6,000 yd behind the formation, but more importantly, he was ahead of their baseline course.

If the Japanese zigzagged southwest again, they would pass within 5,000 yd of Archerfish.

Time to prepare for submerged attack, Enright briefed his officers.

When the Japanese turn southwest, we submerge.

We position ourselves across their track.

We wait for them to close range.

We fire all six bow tubes, one spread, all torpedoes.

This target is too big to waste shots on multiple attacks.

We fire everything.

Dive deep.

Evade.

Understood.

The officers understood.

This was the moment Enright had been training for since he took command of Archerfish 2 months earlier.

At 0256 hours, the Japanese formation turned southwest.

The geometry was perfect.

Enright ordered dive.

Archer fish slipped beneath the surface smoothly, quietly.

Ballast tanks flooded.

The submarine descended to periscope depth.

60 ft below the surface.

Enright raised the periscope and scanned the area.

The Japanese formation was 7,000 yd away, closing at 20 knots.

Time to contact approximately 17 minutes.

Enright lowered the periscope.

No point keeping it raised.

Periscope wakes could be spotted by alert lookouts.

Better to stay hidden until the last possible moment.

The crew rigged for silent running.

All unnecessary equipment shut down.

Ventilation fans off.

Machinery that made noise was isolated.

The only sounds were a quiet hum of electric motors and the breathing of 81 men.

At 0300 hours, Enright raised the periscope for a quick look.

The Japanese formation was 5,000 yd away.

The massive ship was clearly visible now.

flight deck, island superructure, carrier, definitely a carrier.

Enright could see aircraft on the deck or what appeared to be aircraft.

Actually, these were ochre rocket bombs, but Enright had no way to identify them at this distance.

He made quick sketches, noting every detail, length, beam, superructure configuration.

These details would be crucial for intelligence analysis.

After the patrol, Enright lowered the periscope.

The Japanese ships turned southwest at 2230 hours.

Enright ordered course change to intercept.

The task group turned back northwest at 2300 hours.

Enright adjusted again.

This was not blind luck.

This was mathematics.

Speed, bearing, interval between turns.

Enright tracked the pattern for 3 hours.

At 0130 hours, he had calculated the zigzag intervals.

The Japanese commander was turning every 12 minutes, alternating 30° left and right from base course.

Predictable, fatal.

At 0200 hours, Enright was 8,000 yd behind the Japanese formation.

Still too far for a submerged attack, he needed to get ahead of them to position archer fish across their path so he could submerge and fire from ambush.

Surfaced attacks against destroyer escorts were suicide.

Enright kept archer fish on the surface, running at flank speed, engines straining, diesel smoke trailing into the darkness.

The Japanese lookouts never saw him.

They were watching for submarines ahead of their formation, not behind.

Enight was pursuing them from a stern, a tactic submariners called an end around.

If the Japanese maintained course, Enright would never catch them.

But if they zigged at the wrong moment, they would turn directly into his path.

At 0256 hours, the Japanese formation turned southwest, straight toward Archerfish.

Enright had cut the angle.

He was now 5,000 yd ahead of the task group.

Time to submerge.

Enright ordered dive and Archerish slipped beneath the surface.

Silent running.

All non-essential equipment shut down.

The Japanese destroyers had sonar.

One active ping would reveal Archer Fish’s position.

The crew moved through the submarine on rubber sold shoes.

Every man knew his job.

Every action was deliberate, quiet, precise.

Enright raised the periscope and studied the approaching warship through the eyepiece.

The target was huge, far larger than any carrier he had seen in recognition manuals.

Flight deck, island superructure, massive hull.

This was definitely an aircraft carrier.

Unknown class, unknown identity.

Enright made sketches on a notepad.

He would need these for the patrol report.

Naval intelligence would want details.

At 0304 hours, Enright realized the carrier was going to pass north of Archerfish.

Wrong position.

He needed the carrier to expose her broadside.

A bow or stern shot against a target this large would require perfect angle and perfect luck.

Enright did not believe in luck.

He believed in geometry.

At 0312 hours, the carrier turned south.

Course change 30°.

The zigzag pattern continued, but this turn put the carrier on a collision course with Archerish.

The geometry was perfect.

Enright ordered final approach.

Archerish crept forward at 2 knots.

Range closed to 2,000 yd, 1,500 yd, 1,200 yd.

The destroyers were spread in a screen 300 yd ahead of the carrier.

If Archerfish got any closer, the destroyers would detect her.

Enright had to fire now.

1,400 yd.

Enright marked his firing solution.

All six forward torpedo tubes ready.

He set the torpedoes to run at 10 ft depth shallow.

The carrier’s draft would be at least 30 ft.

Standard doctrine was to aim torpedoes at 15 to 20 ft depth to explode beneath the water line.

Enright ignored doctrine.

A carrier this large would have anti- torpedo bulges below the waterline, armored compartments designed to absorb explosions.

Enright wanted his torpedoes to hit higher above the bulges where the hole plating was thinner.

If the torpedoes ran deeper than set, they would still hit below the waterline.

If they ran true, they would punch holes in the carrier’s side 10 ft below the surface.

Either way, she would flood.

Enright called out firing sequence.

Tube one fire 8-second interval.

Tube two fire 8 seconds.

Tube three fire 8 seconds.

Tube 4 5 6 fire.

Six torpedoes running hot, straight, and normal.

Enright kept his eye pressed to the periscope.

He watched the first torpedo track close the distance.

45 seconds to impact.

The torpedo ran true.

No deviation, no porposing.

It struck the carrier’s starboard side amid ships at 0317 hours.

A massive fireball erupted from the point of impact.

The explosion sound traveled through the water.

A deep booming crack that reverberated through Archerish’s hull.

Enright saw the second torpedo hit 8 seconds later.

Another fireball.

Another explosion.

The crew cheered.

Enright kept watching.

Torpedo three hit near the stern.

Torpedo four hit forward of a midship.

Four hits confirmed.

Torpedoes five and six ran under the carrier or missed wide.

Enright did not see them detonate.

He had no time to confirm.

The destroyers were turning toward Archerfish.

They had pinpointed the torpedo wakes, calculated the launch point.

Depth charges were coming.

Enright ordered dive to 400 ft.

Archerfish dropped like a stone, venting ballast, flooding tanks, descending fast.

400 ft was close to crush depth for a Bala class submarine.

Archerish was rated for test depth of 312 ft.

Operational maximum 400 ft.

Below that, the pressure hull would fail.

Enright was gambling that the Japanese depth charges were set for shallower detonation.

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Back to Enright.

ArcherFish reached 400 ft at 03 23 hours.

The crew rigged for silent running.

No talking, no movement, no machinery except essential systems.

They waited in darkness listening.

The first depth charge detonated at 03 26 hours.

The explosion was distant, at least 500 yardds away.

The destroyers were attacking where Archerfish should have been, not where she was.

13 more depth charges followed over the next 12 minutes.

None came close.

The Japanese destroyers were guessing, dropping charges in a pattern that covered the area where the torpedo tracks originated.

But Archer Fish had moved 400 yd south and gone deep.

The geometry saved them again.

At 0347 hours, the depth charge attack stopped.

The destroyers had lost contact.

Enight kept Archerfish at 400 ft for another hour.

He listened through the hydrophones, monitoring the sounds of the surface battle.

The carrier’s engines had stopped.

He could hear breaking up noises, loud metallic groaning and cracking, bulkheads collapsing, compartments flooding.

The carrier was dying.

The breaking up noises continued for 47 minutes.

Enright’s sonar operator timed them precisely.

47 minutes of destruction sounds, then silence.

Enright assumed the carrier had sunk.

He recorded the time as 04 34 hours.

He was wrong.

The carrier was still afloat, but Enright had no way to know this.

Submarines running at 400 ft cannot see surface vessels.

Enright had to rely on sound and the sounds told him the carrier was finished.

At 0500 hours, Enright brought Archerfish to periscope depth.

Cautiously, the destroyers might still be hunting.

He raised the scope for 3 seconds.

Quick look.

360° sweep.

No contacts, no destroyers, no carrier, no wreckage, empty ocean.

Enright lowered the scope and descended back to 200 ft.

He set course south away from Tokyo Bay.

ArcherFish had survived.

Whether the carrier had sunk or remained afloat, Enright would not know until the patrol report was filed and naval intelligence assessed the attack.

He estimated his target as a Hayataka class carrier, approximately 28,000 tons.

He was wrong.

The carrier displaced 72,000 tons.

And at 0500 hours, when Enright checked his periscope, she was still steaming south at 18 knots with four torpedoes holes flooding her hull.

The Japanese called her Shinano.

The name meant the longest river in Japan, a designation reserved for capital ships of strategic importance.

Shinano had been laid down as a battleship, third of the Yamato class.

Construction began in May of 1940 at Yokosuka Naval Arsenal.

The Yamato class battleships were the most powerful warships afloat.

18in main guns, 72,000 ton displacement.

Armor thick enough to withstand any naval gun in the world.

Japan planned to build five Yamato class battleships.

Only two were completed as battleships.

Yamato and Mousashi.

The third hull, designated hull number 110, sat incomplete at Yokosuka when the Battle of Midway ended on June 7, 1942.

Japan lost four fleet carriers at Midway.

Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu.

All sunk in one day.

The Imperial Japanese Navy faced a carrier shortage it could not quickly replace.

Construction of fleet carriers took 3 years minimum.

Japan did not have 3 years.

The Americans were building carriers faster than Japan could sink them.

Naval architects proposed converting Hull 110 from battleship to aircraft carrier.

The conversion would take 2 years, but it was faster than building a new carrier from the keel up.

The proposal was approved in June of 1942.

Shinano’s battleship hull was partially complete with armor belt installed and lower decks framed.

The conversion required removing the battleship superructure and replacing it with a flight deck and hanger bays.

The armor belt remained.

The hull structure remained.

Shinano would be a carrier built on a battleship’s foundation, combining the striking power of a carrier with the survivability of a battleship.

At least that was the theory.

Construction continued through 1943 and into 1944.

The work was conducted in absolute secrecy.

American reconnaissance flights over Tokyo Bay photographed the Yokosuka yard regularly, but Shinano’s construction slip was covered with camouflage netting.

American naval intelligence knew Japan was building something large at Yokosuka, but they did not know what.

On November 1st, 1944, a B-29 bomber on reconnaissance photographed Shinano during sea trials.

The photographs showed a carrier, but American analysts could not identify the class.

The silhouette matched no known Japanese carrier.

Naval intelligence added the ship to their list of unidentified targets, but they had no idea of its size or capabilities.

Shinano was commissioned on November 19th, 1944.

Captain Toshio Abbe commanding.

The ceremony was brief.

The ship was not ready for combat operations.

Watertight doors were not installed.

Pumps were missing in critical compartments.

The crew was inexperienced.

Most had never served on a carrier.

Abe requested two more months to complete fitting out and train his crew.

He was denied.

American B-29 bombers were striking Tokyo with increasing frequency.

Shinano was vulnerable at Yokosuka.

The carrier needed to be moved to Kur Naval Base in the inland sea where she could complete fitting out under better protection.

The voyage from Yokosuka to Kur was 300 m, approximately 17 hours at cruising speed.

Abe wanted to wait for better weather and a larger destroyer escort.

He was ordered to depart immediately with whatever escort was available.

Three destroyers were assigned.

Isokazi, Yukazi, Hamakazi, good ships, experienced crews.

Not enough.

A carrier the size of Shinano required at least six destroyer escorts for adequate protection.

Three was barely sufficient.

Abe protested.

He was overruled.

Shinano departed Yokosuka at 13:30 hours on November 28, 1944.

Captain Toshio Abbe commanding the task group cleared Tokyo Bay approaches at 18:30 hours and set course southwest for Kur Naval Base in the inland sea.

9 days after commissioning, the carrier’s cargo hold contained 50 Yokosuka MXY7 ochre rocket bombs.

Kamicazi weapons destined for bases in Kyushu.

Six Shinoy suicide boats were lashed to the flight deck.

The hanger bays were empty.

Shinano carried no operational aircraft.

She was a ferry, not a fighting ship.

Not yet.

The task group steamed south at 20 knots.

Abe ordered standard anti-ubmarine zigzag pattern, 30° turns every 12 minutes.

American submarines were active in this area.

Abee’s intelligence briefing listed three confirmed submarine contacts in the past week.

One of those contacts was Archerfish.

Abe did not know the submarine’s designation, but he knew it was out there.

At 2048 hours, Shinano’s radar detected a surface contact 12 mi south.

Abe assumed it was an American submarine.

He ordered course change to avoid contact.

The task group turned southwest.

The radar contact paralleled their course.

Abe ordered speed increased to 22 knots.

The radar contact maintained distance but did not close.

Abe studied the situation.

If this was a submarine, it was tracking Shinano, radioing position reports to other submarines in the area.

Abe believed he was facing an American Wolfpack.

multiple submarines coordinating their attack.

Standard doctrine was to evade, to outrun the submarines and clear the area before they could establish an attack position.

Abe had a twot speed advantage.

He could outrun any American submarine on the surface.

He ordered flank speed, but the order was countermanded by engineering.

The starboard outboard propeller shaft bearing was overheating.

Running at flank speed risked damaging the shaft.

Engineering recommended reducing speed to 18 knots until the bearing cooled.

Abe had no choice.

At 23 22 hours, Shinano reduced speed to 18 knots, the same speed Archer fish could make on the surface.

Enright was no longer falling behind.

He was keeping pace.

Abee’s executive officer recommended launching aircraft to search for submarines.

Shinano carried no operational aircraft.

The hanger bays were empty except for cargo.

Abee’s operations officer recommended illuminating the area with search lights to force any submarines on the surface to dive.

Abe refused.

Search lights would reveal Shinano’s position to every submarine within 20 m.

The operations officer recommended requesting air cover from land-based naval aircraft.

Abe refused.

Radio transmissions would reveal Shinano’s position to American codereers.

Abe was trying to slip past the submarines through stealth and speed.

He did not realize that stealth was already compromised and speed was no longer an option.

At 0256 hours, Shinano turned southwest.

This turn placed Archerish 5,000 yd directly ahead of Shinano’s projected course.

AB’s lookout spotted nothing.

Archerfish had submerged.

At 0315 hours, four torpedoes struck Shinano’s starboard side.

The first torpedo hit near the stern, flooding the refrigerated storage compartments and one empty aviation gasoline tank.

Engineering personnel sleeping in the compartments above were killed instantly.

The bulkheads separating the flooded compartments from adjacent spaces held initially, but they were not designed to withstand sustained pressure.

The second torpedo hit the starboard outboard propeller shaft.

The same shaft that had been overheating.

The shaft tunnel flooded immediately.

The outboard engine room flooded within 3 minutes.

The third torpedo hit boiler room number three.

Every man on watch was killed.

The boiler room flooded completely within 2 minutes.

Structural failures caused the two adjacent boiler rooms to flood as well.

Three boiler rooms lost.

Half of Shinano’s power generation gone.

The fourth torpedo hit the starboard air compressor room.

The explosion destroyed the compressed air systems that powered damage control equipment.

Magazines for anti-aircraft guns adjacent to the compressor room flooded.

The damage control teams responded immediately.

They closed watertight doors, activated pumps, and attempted to contain the flooding, but the watertight doors were not finished.

Gaps remained between the door frames and the bulkheads.

Water poured through the gaps.

The pumps were insufficient.

Shinano’s designers had planned to install additional pumps, but the pumps had not arrived before the ship departed Yokosuka.

Damage control teams used portable pumps, bucket brigades, anything available.

It was not enough.

Abe assessed the damage at 0330 hours.

Four compartments flooded, three boiler rooms lost, multiple leaks through incomplete watertight doors.

Shinano was taking on water faster than the pumps could remove it.

The carrier was listing 7° to starboard.

Abe had three options.

He could order counter flooding to correct the list.

He could reduce speed and focus all efforts on damage control.

He could attempt to beat Shinano on the nearest coast, approximately 60 mi distant.

Abbe chose none of these options.

He ordered Shinano to maintain maximum speed toward the nearest Japanese naval base.

He believed speed would reduce the time available for additional submarine attacks.

He believed the carrier could survive long enough to reach port.

He was wrong.

Maintaining speed increased water pressure against the damaged hull.

The incomplete watertight doors could not hold.

Water flooded through the gaps into undamaged compartments.

The list increased to 10° by 0400 hours.

14° by 0500 hours.

The engineering officer reported to ARB at 0530 hours.

The flooding could not be contained.

The pumps were losing.

Shinano would sink unless immediate action was taken.

Abe ordered counter flooding.

Too late.

The list had already exceeded the angle where counter flooding would be effective.

The engineering officer recommended reducing speed to allow damage control teams time to shore up bulkheads and seal leaks.

Abe agreed.

At 0600 hours, Shinano reduced speed to 12 knots.

The list stabilized at 14°.

The damage control teams worked through the compartments, sealing leaks, reinforcing bulkheads, activating every available pump, but the design flaws were fatal.

Postwar analysis by American naval engineers determined that Shinano had serious structural weaknesses.

The joint between the waterline armor belt and the underwater anti- torpedo bulge was poorly designed.

Enright’s torpedoes had struck along this joint.

The force of the explosions had dislodged an I-beam in one of the flooded boiler rooms.

The I-beam punched a hole into an adjacent boiler room, creating an additional leak that could not be sealed.

The executive officer reported to ARB at 0700 hours.

The carrier was doomed.

The list was increasing despite all efforts.

Abe refused to accept this assessment.

He ordered all non-essential personnel to assemble on the port side of the flight deck.

The weight of 12,200 men might counterbalance the list.

It did not.

By 0800 hours, the list had reached 18°.

Water was flooding into spaces that had been dry 2 hours earlier.

The carrier’s speed had dropped to 6 knots.

The destroyers remained in formation, ready to pick up survivors if Shinano sank, but Abe still believed the carrier could be saved.

At 0900 hours, the list reached 25°.

Personnel on the lower decks could no longer stand upright.

Equipment broke loose and slid into the starboard bulkheads.

Abe finally acknowledged reality.

He ordered all non-essential personnel to abandon ship.

1,200 sailors and civilian workers moved to the flight deck.

The destroyers closed alongside to take on survivors.

But the carriers list made transfer difficult.

Rope ladders were rigged from the flight deck to the destroyer decks.

Men climbed down slowly, carefully.

The transfer took 90 minutes.

At 10:30 hours, Shinano’s list reached 40°.

The carrier was rolling onto her side.

Abe ordered all remaining personnel to abandon ship.

800 men still aboard.

They jumped from the flight deck into the water.

The destroyers moved in to pick them up.

At 1057 hours, Shinano capsized and sank.

Final position 33° 45 minutes north.

137° 4 minutes east.

Approximately 65 mi southeast of Cape Shiono.

1,435 men died.

1,080 were rescued.

Captain Abe went down with his ship.

Shinano had been commissioned for 10 days.

She had steamed approximately 170 mi from Yokosuka.

She never launched a single aircraft in combat.

She never fired her guns at an enemy.

Four torpedoes from one American submarine ended the largest warship ever built.

Enright knew none of this.

Archerfish continued south, clearing the area at standard speed.

Enright surfaced at 0800 hours and transmitted a contact report to Pacific Fleet headquarters.

Enemy carrier attacked at 0317 hours.

Four torpedo hits observed.

Target believed sunk.

position 34 degrees north, 138 degrees east.

Enright estimated the carrier at 28,000 tons based on his periscope observations.

He had no reference for a carrier as large as Shinano.

Nothing in the recognition manuals matched what he had seen.

Pacific Fleet acknowledged the report.

Naval intelligence reviewed Enright’s sketches and compared them to known Japanese carrier classes.

No match.

They assumed Enright had sunk a merchant conversion carrier, possibly a tanker hull converted to carry aircraft.

28,000 tons seemed reasonable for such a vessel.

Enright was credited with sinking a higher class carrier, pending postwar confirmation.

Archerish continued her patrol for another 2 weeks.

She encountered no additional targets of significance.

On December 8th, she attacked two Japanese escort vessels with four torpedoes.

No hits were obtained.

On December 15, ArcherFish ended her fifth war patrol at Guam.

48 days at sea.

One carrier sunk.

Enright filed his patrol report and submitted his sketches to Naval Intelligence.

The analysts remained skeptical.

A carrier that large would have been detected by reconnaissance flights.

American photo interpreters had cataloged every Japanese carrier afloat.

None matched Enright’s description.

Enright’s executive officer supported the claim.

Lookouts supported the claim.

The son supported the claim.

47 minutes of breaking up noises confirmed the target had sustained catastrophic damage, but without photographic evidence or prisoner confirmation.

Naval intelligence could not verify the sinking.

Enright was credited with a carrier type unknown.

Tonnage estimated at 28,000.

He received the Navy Cross.

ArcherFish received a presidential unit citation.

The citation read, “For extraordinary heroism in action during the fifth war, patrol against enemy Japanese combatant units in restricted waters of the Pacific.

” Relentless in tracking an alert and powerful hostile force which constituted a potential threat to our vital operations in the Philippine area, the Archerfish culminated a dogged six and 1/ halfhour pursuit by closing her high-speed target, daringly penetrated the strong destroyer escort screen and struck fiercely at a large Japanese aircraft carrier with all six of her torpedoes finding their mark to sink this extremely vital enemy ship.

The citation was accurate in every detail except one.

Only four torpedoes had found their mark.

Six had been fired.

The Navy did not correct the citation.

Close enough.

Enright returned to sea in January of 1945 for Archer Fish’s sixth war patrol.

The submarine operated as part of a Wolfpack in the South China Sea.

Enright commanded the group.

On February 14, ArcherFish attacked what Enright believed was a Japanese submarine.

The target submerged before visual confirmation.

Enright fired torpedoes and claimed a kill.

Postwar records could not confirm the sinking.

The sixth patrol ended on March 3rd, 3 days early.

Archerish experienced mechanical problems with her forward diving planes.

She returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs.

Enright was promoted to commander and reassigned to staff duties.

His time as a submarine captain was finished.

Archerfish continued operations under a new commander.

She survived the war and was decommissioned in June of 1946.

She was recommissioned in March of 1952 for Cold War service, then decommissioned again in October of 1955.

She was recommissioned a second time in August of 1957 and reclassified as an auxiliary submarine.

Her final decommissioning came in May of 1968.

On October 19th, 1968, Archerish was sunk as a target by USS Snook off the coast of California.

The submarine that sank the largest warship in history was now target practice.

Enright’s career continued after the war.

He commanded submarine division 31, USS Fulton, and submarine squadron 8 through the 1950s.

He served as chief of staff for the submarine force of the United States Atlantic Fleet and commanded USS Boston before retiring in 1963 with the rank of captain.

After retirement, Enight worked for Northrup Corporation on the Omega navigation system.

He lived quietly in Fairfax, Virginia, rarely speaking publicly about Shinano during the immediate post-war years.

The Navy had not confirmed the identity of the carrier he sank.

The official record listed his achievement as sinking a 28,000 ton carrier, type unknown.

That changed in 1949 when American occupation forces in Japan gained access to Imperial Japanese Navy records.

The records documented every warship commissioned by Japan during the war.

One entry stood out.

Shinano aircraft carrier Hull 1110.

Commissioned November 19, 1944.

Sun sunk November 29, 1944.

Position 33° 45 minutes north, 137° 4 minutes east.

Cause torpedo attack by American submarine.

Displacement 72,000 long tons.

The position matched Enright’s attack coordinates.

The date matched.

The cause matched.

Enright had not sunk a 28,000 ton carrier.

He had sunk a 72,000 ton super carrier, the largest warship afloat at the time.

Naval intelligence revised Enright’s combat record.

The carrier designation changed from Hayataka class to Shinano.

The tonnage estimate changed from 28,000 to 72,000.

Enright’s achievement became official.

He had sunk the largest warship ever destroyed by a submarine.

The record stands today, 80 years later.

No submarine has sunk a larger warship.

Enright’s Navy cross citation was not amended.

The original citation remained in his file, but the achievement was recognized by naval historians and submarine veterans.

Enright had accomplished what no other submarine commander had achieved before or since.

In 1987, Enright published a memoir.

The book was titled Shinano: The Sinking of Japan’s Secret Super Ship.

Enright wrote the book with assistance from naval historian Robert Underbrink.

The book documented the patrol in detail, including transcripts from Archer Fish’s patrol report, interviews with surviving crew members, and analysis of Japanese records captured after the war.

Enright described the moment he saw the first torpedo hit.

I saw a huge fireball erupt near the stern of the target.

Then we heard the noise of the first hit carried to us through the water.

“Got them,” I yelled.

As I continued to peer into the periscope, I saw the second explosion rip the targets hull 8 seconds later.

“Yahoo!” I cried to myself.

The book became required reading at the Naval Submarine School in Grotin, Connecticut.

Submarine officers studied Enright’s tactics.

His patience during the six-hour surface chase, his decision to fire shallow running torpedoes, his dive to 400 ft to evade depth charges.

The patrol was textbook perfect.

Aggressive tracking, calculated risk, disciplined execution.

Enright’s redemption was complete.

The officer who had requested relief from command after failing to sink Shukaku had destroyed the largest warship in the world 11 months later.

The failure on Dace had taught him lessons.

Do not hesitate.

Trust your instincts.

Do not follow doctrine when doctrine does not fit the situation.

Enight applied those lessons on archerish.

The shallow running torpedoes violated standard procedure, but they worked.

The dive to 400 ft risked crushing the submarine, but it saved them.

Enright died on July 20th, 2000 at his home in Fairfax, Virginia.

He was 89 years old.

He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors.

Submarine veterans from across the country attended the funeral.

The eulogy noted his service, his achievements, his redemption.

Joseph Francis Enright, graduate of the United States Naval Academy, class of 1933, submarine officer for 27 years, commander of USS Archerfish during the patrol that sank the Japanese aircraft carrier Shinano, the largest warship ever sunk by a submarine.

Enright’s widow donated his Navy cross and presidential unit citation to the Naval Submarine Museum in Groton.

The medals are displayed alongside Archerfish’s battle flag, photographs from the fifth war patrol, and Enright’s sketches of Shinano.

This is the patrol that proved a submarine captain who had failed once could succeed when given a second chance.

This is the patrol that demonstrated patience and calculation could defeat size and armor.

Shinano remains on the ocean floor 65 mi southeast of Cape Shiono.

Japanese maritime law prohibits diving on war graves.

Sonar scans conducted by Japanese research vessels in 1978 confirmed the wreck’s position in approximately 4,000 meters of water.

The hull is intact but inverted with the flight deck resting on the seabed.

1435 men are in tmbed inside.

The three destroyer escorts that picked up survivors, Yukazi, and Hamakazi had different fates.

Isocazi was sunk by American carrier aircraft on April 7th, 1945 during the battle of Okinawa.

Hamakazi was sunk the same day in the same battle.

Yuki Kazi survived the war and was transferred to the Republic of China Navy as war reparations.

She served until 1966 and was scrapped in 1969.

The last witness to Shinano’s sinking.

Archerfish’s crew remained in contact after the war, holding reunions every 5 years.

Enright attended every reunion until his death in 2000.

By 2010, most of the crew had died.

The last surviving crew member from the fifth war patrol passed away in 2015.

The story survives through written records, through Enright’s memoir, through the patrol report filed in December of 1944.

The USS Archerfish Association continues to maintain the submarine’s history.

They preserve documents, photographs, and artifacts.

They conduct outreach to schools and museums.

They ensure that younger generations understand what happened on November 29, 1944.

A submarine crew of 81 men tracked a Japanese task force for 6 hours, maneuvered into attack position, fired six torpedoes, and sank the largest warship ever built.

The action took less than one minute.

The consequences lasted 72 years.

Shinano was Japan’s last hope for carrier superiority in the Pacific.

Her loss removed any possibility of challenging American carrier task forces.

Japan’s carrier fleet was finished.

The kamicazi campaign would continue, but without carrier support.

The outcome of the war was no longer in question.

Japan would lose.

The question was only how long the fighting would last.

Shinano’s sinking did not end the war, but it shortened the war.

Every day the war continued.

Thousands died.

Every week the war continued.

Cities burned.

Shortening the war by even one week saved thousands of lives.

Enright’s patrol on Archerfish contributed to that outcome.

Not directly, not dramatically, but measurably.

One submarine, six torpedoes, four hits.

The largest warship ever sunk by a submarine.

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