America produced military genius in World War II.
Patton’s Third Army killed over a million enemy soldiers.
Bradley commanded the largest American force in history without losing a single planned battle.
But for every genius, there was a disaster.
Five American generals proved that incompetence wears stars just as easily as brilliance.
Five commanders whose decisions killed thousands of Americans that better leadership would have saved.
This is the definitive ranking of the five worst American generals of World War II.
Number five, ignored every warning and paid with many American lives.
Number one, hid in a bunker 70 mi behind his lines while 6,500 soldiers were slaughtered.
These generals didn’t just lose battles, they betrayed every man who believed rank meant competence.
Number five, Lieutenant General Walter Short, the general who parked his planes in rows.
When the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor 231, American aircraft sat parked wing tip to wing tip in perfect rows at the center of three airfields, not dispersed for protection, not hidden in revetments, arranged like dominoes, so one strafing run could destroy dozens.
Lieutenant General Walter Short made this decision and his choice to prioritize sabotage prevention over air defense killed 2,43 Americans in two hours.
Short stood in his headquarters at Fort Shatter watching the sky fill with Japanese aircraft, 183 bombers and fighters in the first wave, 170 in the second.
They attacked every American military installation on Aahu.
Short commanded 43,000 army troops and 231 aircraft tasked with defending Hawaii.
He had been warned multiple times that Japanese attack was likely.
Instead, he parked aircraft in tight rows for easier guard duty.
He left ammunition locked in storage.
He didn’t activate radar stations.
He didn’t deploy anti-aircraft batteries.
When the Japanese came, his forces were destroyed on the ground.
188 American aircraft destroyed.
155 damaged.
The worst defeat in American military history.
Walter Campbell Short was born in Illinois in 1880.
West Point class of 1902.
By February 1941, he commanded the Hawaiian Department.
His job was defending Pearl Harbor from attack.
Short had every resource needed.
radar stations that could detect aircraft 130 mi away.
Fighter aircraft anti-aircraft artillery 43,000 trained soldiers.
What he lacked was imagination.
Short believed the primary threat was sabotage by Japanese civilians on Aahu.
This consumed his attention.
He ordered aircraft parked close together so guards could watch them better.
He kept ammunition locked to prevent theft.
He restricted radar to training exercises.
Ivery decision optimized defense against sabotage.
Every decision left Hawaii vulnerable to air attack.
Washington sent multiple warnings.
The 27th of November 1941, hostile action possible at any moment.
Implement defensive measures.
Short interpreted this as sabotage warning.
He moved to alert level one, defense against internal threats, not alert.
Level three, defense against external attack.
His staff questioned this.
Lieutenant Colonel Kendleieler recommended full defensive measures.
Short overruled him.
On the 7th of December, radar operators detected incoming Japanese aircraft at 7:02 a.m.
1:32 mi north.
Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, the duty officer, assumed they were American Bminus 17s and dismissed the report.
The Japanese Armada flew undetected until bombs fell at 7:48 a.m.
Short was relieved the 17th of December, 1941.
The Roberts Commission cited him for dereliction of duty and errors of judgment.
He was reduced to major general and forced to retire in February 1942.
He died in 1949 at age 69, never exonerated.
Short had command, resources, and warnings.
He failed to prepare for the most obvious threat, air attack on a Pacific naval base.
Number four, Major General John P.
Lucas, the general who hesitated at Anzio.
The beaches at Anzio were empty when 40,000 Allied troops landed the 22nd of January, 1944.
No German defenders, no resistance.
The road to Rome lay open 30 mi inland.
Highway six and Highway 7 were lightly defended.
Intelligence reported German confusion.
For 48 hours, nothing stood between American forces and cutting off the German 10th Army.
Churchill called it a wildcat landing.
Strike fast.
Create chaos.
End the Italian campaign early.
Major General John Lucas called it too risky.
For 7 days, he didn’t advance a single mile.
Lucas stood on USS Biscane watching his troops land unopposed, then ordered them to fortify the beach head instead of advancing.
While Lucas built defenses, Germans rushed eight divisions to Anzio.
The Wildcat became a siege.
4 months of brutal fighting.
43,000 Allied casualties.
Lucas was relieved the 22nd of February for failure to exploit initial success.
Joan Porter Lucas was born in West Virginia in 1890, West Point class of 1911.
By 1943, he commanded Vissy Corps in Italy.
Lucas was cautious.
He believed in thorough planning and adequate resources.
These qualities made him an excellent trainer, but a poor choice for Anzio.
Operation Shingle required aggressive action.
Land behind German lines.
Move fast.
Force them to retreat.
Success depended on speed.
Lucas received these orders and immediately expressed doubts.
He believed 40,000 troops weren’t enough.
He needed 90,000.
His superior.
Lieutenant General Mark Clark told him to execute as planned.
Lucas obeyed, but his pessimism infected his staff.
That the 22nd of January landings were nearly unopposed.
German forces numbered fewer than thousand troops.
Allied forces outnumbered them 40 to1.
Highway 6 and highway 7 were open.
Lucas had a 48 window before German reinforcements arrived.
Instead of driving inland, Lucas fortified the beach head.
He established supply dumps, positioned artillery, prepared defensive positions.
His reasoning was logical.
If he advanced too fast and got cut off, the force would be destroyed.
But while Lucas built defenses, the Germans moved eight divisions to Enzio.
By the 29th of January, the situation had reversed.
Germans surrounded the beach head.
On the 16th of February, they launched a massive assault.
Two Panzer divisions, four infantry divisions.
Allied lines buckled.
Lucas called for naval gunfire.
The counterattack stalled, but the beach head remained surrounded.
Lucas was relieved the 22nd of February 1944.
Major General Lucian Truscott replaced him and immediately went offensive, but the opportunity was lost.
The Anzio beach head remained static until late May.
The campaign that should have ended in January didn’t conclude until June.
Lucas returned to the United States commanding fourth army until retirement in 1946.
He died in 1949 at age 59.
His failure at Anzio became a case study of what happens when a commander prioritizes caution over aggression in situations requiring bold action.
Number three, Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, the general killed by his own Air Force.
The highest ranking American officer killed in combat during World War II didn’t die fighting the enemy.
He died when,500 American heavy bombers dropped their payload on American positions.
Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, commander of Army ground forces who trained 90 divisions for combat, was killed instantly by American bombs along with 111 other American soldiers.
The worst friendly fire incident in American history.
But McNair’s death wasn’t just tragic, it was symbolic.
His training methods had been killing American soldiers for two years.
McNair stood in a forward observation trench near St.
Ble France watching American heavy bombers approach operation Cobra the breakout from Normandy McNair wanted to observe how his training performed in combat.
The bombs fell short.
His trench took a direct hit.
Lely James McNair was born in Minnesota in 1883.
West Point class of 1904 first in his class.
By 1942, he commanded army ground forces responsible for training all army ground combat units.
McNair’s philosophy emphasized speed and aggression.
Infantry should attack immediately without waiting for artillery or air support.
His armored tactics emphasized light tanks over heavy tanks.
Believing American industry couldn’t produce heavy tanks fast enough, these theories look good in training.
They failed in combat.
German forces used heavy tanks, Panthers, Tigers.
Their armor was thicker, guns, more powerful.
American light tanks couldn’t penetrate German armor, but German tanks destroyed American tanks easily.
At Casarine Pass, German tanks decimated American armor.
At Normandy, the pattern repeated.
Sherman tanks faced Panthers and Tigers.
Kill ratios favored Germans 3:1.
McNair’s light armor doctrine was killing American tankers.
His infantry tactics were worse.
McNair believed aggressive infantry charges could break defensive positions.
He deemphasized combined arms coordination.
This worked against poorly trained opponents.
It failed against veteran German units.
American infantry divisions suffered casualty rates 40% higher than British divisions because British forces used extensive artillery preparation.
American forces trained by McNair attacked with minimal artillery support.
The operation Cobra friendly fire incident exemplified McNair’s failures.
He’d requested short bomb runs.
Bombers flying low, dropping bombs yards from American lines.
Air Force planners warned this was dangerous.
McNair insisted he wanted to observe American forces exploiting the bombing.
Instead, he was killed by it along with 111 Americans who died because McNair’s theories prioritized aggression over coordination.
McNair’s death was kept secret for 6 weeks.
Finally announced in September 1944, he was postumously promoted to full general and buried in Normandy American cemetery.
His training methods were gradually replaced as the war continued.
Combined arms doctrine replaced infantry centric tactics.
Heavier tanks entered production, but 90 divisions had been trained using McNair’s flawed theories.
Those divisions paid the price in blood.
Number two, Major General Edwin Forest Harding, the general who lost Buna.
Douglas MacArthur didn’t relieve generals lightly, but on the 30th of November 1942, he flew to Buna, New Guinea, watched American troops attack for 10 minutes, then turned to Major General Edwin Harding and said one sentence, “You are relieved.
No explanation, no hearing.” Harding’s 32nd Infantry Division had been attacking for 17 days.
7,000 American troops against 3,000 Japanese defenders.
They’d gained 200 yards, lost 492 killed, and 1552 wounded.
MacArthur gave Harding’s replacement, Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, explicit orders.
Take Buna or don’t come back alive.
Harding watched his unprepared division attack Japanese positions they had no idea how to defeat.
Edwin Forest Harding was born in Michigan in 1896.
By September 1942, he commanded the 32nd Infantry Division, a National Guard Division from Wisconsin and Michigan.
They’d trained in Louisiana for swamp warfare, then shipped to Australia for jungle preparation.
Harding had 6 weeks to prepare his division for jungle combat.
He didn’t use the time effectively.
The 32nd arrived in New Guinea with minimal jungle training.
Most soldiers had never operated in tropical conditions.
They didn’t know how to navigate jungle, maintain weapons in humidity, or prevent disease.
Within two weeks, malaria cases exceeded combat casualties.
By December, 30% of the division was sick.
Harding hadn’t prioritized medical preparation.
The division’s equipment was wrong.
Heavy steel helmets in humidity.
Wool uniforms causing heat exhaustion.
Leather boots that rotted in days.
Insufficient ammunition with resupply nearly impossible in jungle terrain.
These were leadership failures Harding should have identified during training.
The tactical failures were worse.
Harding’s attack plan at Buna was World War I doctrine, frontal assault, infantry advancing in waves, no air support coordination, minimal artillery.
The Japanese had built bunkers from coconut logs.
American machine gun fire couldn’t penetrate.
Hand grenades bounced off.
Infantry attacks were slaughtered.
Harding didn’t adapt.
He repeated the same attacks with the same results.
After nine days of failure, MacArthur sent Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland to investigate.
Southerntherland reported Harding was not aggressive enough and had lost control of his division.
MacArthur flew to Buna and relieved Harding immediately.
Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger took command and changed everything.
New tactics, combined arms coordination, close air support, flamethrowers against bunkers.
Within 5 weeks, Buna fell.
Eichelberger’s tactics worked.
Hardings didn’t.
The 32nd Division suffered 9688 casualties at Buuna.
3,95 killed or wounded.
6593 disease casualties.
One division, one battle nearly destroyed.
Harding bore responsibility for unpreparedness that caused thousands of casualties unnecessarily.
Harding returned to the United States commanding training divisions.
He retired in 1946 as brigadier general.
He died in 1970 at age 73.
The 32nd division recovered under different leadership fighting through New Guinea and the Philippines, but they never forgot Buuna.
Division veterans blamed Harding for failures that killed their friends.
Number one, Major General Lloyd Fredendle, the general who built a bunker while his men died while 40,000 American soldiers fought Raml’s Africa corpse in Tunisia.
Their commanding general sat 70 mi behind the lines in an underground bunker, ordering engineers to make his private quarters more comfortable.
Major General Lloyd Fredendel commanded two core.
His soldiers were dying at Casarine Pass in America’s worst defeat in the European theater.
Fredendel worried about whether his bomb-proof shelter had adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
He’d spent 3 weeks ordering an entire engineer battalion to blast tunnels into a ravine wall.
Meanwhile, he issued orders in a personal slang code nobody could understand and refused to visit his troops.
The result was 6,500 American casualties, 4,000 captured, and Fredendel’s name becoming synonymous with incompetence.
Fredendel sat in his underground fortress reading reports that German forces were destroying his core.
Lloyd Rston Fredendle was born in Wyoming in 1883.
He failed out of West Point twice, finally receiving his commission in 1907.
By December 1939, he was brigadier general.
By October 1940, Major General his rise was rapid.
General George Marshall called him one of the best and recommended him to Eisenhower for major command in North Africa.
Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, began the 8th of November 1942.
Fredendle commanded the central task force landing at Orin.
The landing succeeded.
Fredendel was promoted to command two core with the mission of advancing through Tunisia and capturing Tunis.
Fredendle should have prepared defenses.
Instead, he focused on his headquarters.
He ordered the 19th Engineer Regiment to blast tunnels into a ravine wall 70 mi behind the front.
for a bomb-proof command post.
Engineers spent three weeks on construction.
Meanwhile, Fredendle issued bizarre orders using personal slang code.
One order read, “Move your command, i.e.
the walking boys, pop guns, Baker’s outfit, and the outfit, which is the reverse of Baker’s.” Nobody understood.
He bypassed chain of command, issuing orders directly to battalion commanders.
His division and regimental commanders were cut out.
This created chaos.
Units received conflicting orders.
Fredendel also refused to coordinate with French forces and insulted British commanders, destroying cooperation that could have stopped Raml.
On the 14th of February 1943, Raml attacked with 140 tanks and four infantry battalions.
American positions at FAD Pass collapsed in hours.
Fredendel sent reinforcements peace meal one unit at a time no coordination.
German forces destroyed them individually.
On the 19th of February, Raml attacked Casarine Pass.
American defenders were outnumbered and outgunned.
They fought bravely but without coordinated support.
They were overwhelmed.
By the 22nd of February, Germans had penetrated 50 mi into Allied territory.
Eisenhower visited the front.
the 13th of February and was appalled.
Fredendel’s headquarters was 70 mi from the fighting.
Fredendel never visited forward positions, never saw his troops, never understood the tactical situation.
British forces were rushed to reinforce the line.
American units were pulled back and reorganized.
After Casserine, Eisenhower relieved Fredendle on the 6th of March 1943.
George Patton took command of two core.
Within 10 days, Patton restored discipline and morale.
Within two months, two core won decisively at Elgatar.
Fredendel returned to the United States, promoted to lieutenant general in June 1943.
Given command of second army, a training command, he never saw combat again.
He retired in 1946 and died in 1963 at age 79.
His obituary praised his service but didn’t mention Casserine Pass.
Military historians remember Fredendall is universally considered the worst American general of World War II.
Incompetent, cowardly, focused on personal comfort while his soldiers died.
The Battle of Casarine Pass cost 6,500 American casualties, most preventable with competent leadership.
These five generals failed when their country needed them most.
Short didn’t prepare for obvious threats.
Lucas hesitated when aggression was required.
McNair trained divisions using flawed tactics.
Harding led unprepared troops into combat.
Fredendel hid in a bunker while his men died, but their failures taught lessons.
The army learned from these mistakes.
Later commanders studied what went wrong.
Thousands of American lives were saved because future generals learned from the catastrophic failures of these five men.
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