Why This ‘Bizarre’ British Rocket Launcher Fired 60 Rockets In Seconds And Levelled Entire Positions

North Africa, 1943.

A vehicle that shouldn’t exist rumbles across 600 miles of open desert, carrying eight men, four machine guns, and enough fuel to drive from Cairo to Libya without resupply.

It’s built on a truck chassis.

It weighs 5 tons fully loaded.

It has no roof, minimal armor, and a top speed that makes it slower than a jeep.

And yet, for nearly 3 years, this ugly, ungainainely machine became the most requested vehicle in British special operations.

This is the longrange Desert Group Chevrolet patrol truck.

The vehicle that proved you don’t need speed or armor when you have range, reliability, and the ability to appear 400 m behind enemy lines when nobody expects you.

But here’s what makes no sense.

The SAS already had armed jeeps by 1942.

faster, more maneuverable, better arms per ton of vehicle weight.

So why did SAS commanders keep requesting LRTG Chevrolet trucks for specific operations all the way through the North African campaign and beyond? The answer reveals something fundamental about desert warfare that most people miss.

Let me show you what they were working with.

The LRTG didn’t start with Chevrolets.

When Major Ralph Bagnalt formed the Long Range Desert Group in June 1940, he needed vehicles that could cross the Libyan Sand Sea, a region Colonial Maps still marked as impossible.

Bagnold had spent the 1930s exploring the Sahara in modified Ford Model A, and had learned something critical.

Two-wheel drive trucks with the right modifications could travel farther on less fuel than any four-wheel drive vehicle than available.

The British Army initially provided 30C16-speed T Chevrolet WB trucks.

Canadianbuilt commercial vehicles with 3.5 L six-cylinder engines producing 85 horsepower.

Standard payload was rated at 300 weight, roughly 1,500 kg.

What the LRTG did to them violated every maintenance manual the army possessed.

First, they stripped every unnecessary component.

Doors came off, roofs came off, half the bodywork disappeared.

A standard military truck weighed approximately 2200 kg empty.

By the time LRTG fitters at Cairo workshops finished, the base weight dropped to under 1,900 kg.

Then they added back what mattered.

A steel channel welded across the truck bed created mounting points for a Vicar’s K machine gun at the front, a Lewis gun in the middle, and a Bren gun covering the rear arm.

Some trucks mounted a captured braider machine gun as well because in the D- desert you used whatever worked.

The radiator received critical modifications.

Bagnold designed a condensing system that captured steam from the radiator overflow, cooled it through a series of copper pipes, and fed the water back into the cooling system.

This sounds simple.

It was revolutionary.

In the Libyan interior, daytime temperatures exceeded 50° C.

A standard military truck consumed roughly one gallon of water every 50 mi, just keeping the engine cool.

The condenser cut water consumption by 2/3, extending operational range by hundreds of miles.

Fuel capacity increased from the standard 70 L to 290 L through the addition of multiple jerry cans racked across the vehicle.

With careful driving, a single LRTG Chevrolet could travel over 600 m without resupply.

Navigation equipment was equally essential.

The Backnol Sun Compass, a graduated metal disc with a vertical shadow casting pin, provided continuous accurate bearing regardless of magnetic interference from the truck’s engine.

A sextant allowed celestial navigation at night.

Distances were calculated using a modified odometer.

There were no roads where these trucks operated, no landmarks.

Navigation relied on dead reckoning, astronomical observation, and mathematical precision across featureless sand.

Now, here’s where it gets interesting.

By mid1942, the SAS had their own jeeps.

Faster, more maneuverable.

Better powertoweight ratio.

The armed jeep could hit 65 mph on flat ground and weave between parked aircraft at speed.

So, why did SAS commanders still request LRTG transport for certain operations? The answer comes down to range, payload, and something nobody talks about, mechanical reliability under sustained operation.

A Willis Jeep carried approximately 60 L of fuel in its standard tank.

With modifications, SAS jeeps could carry up to 120 L in additional jerry cans.

Maximum range was roughly 400 m before refueling.

That sounds impressive until you map the distances involved.

from British lines near Cairo to access airfields at Benghazi was approximately 650 mi.

A jeep-based operation required pre-position fuel dumps or resupply by air.

Both options introduced operational complexity and risk.

The LRTG Chevrolet carrying 290 L could make the round trip without resupply.

More importantly, it could carry passengers.

A standard LRTG patrol consisted of two trucks with five men each.

patrol commander, navigator, driver, gunner, and wireless operator.

But these trucks could carry additional personnel.

When David Sterling needed to insert SAS teams deep behind access lines for the early foot raids in late 1941 and early 1942, LRTG Chevrolets delivered them.

The trucks would drive 300 m into enemy territory, drop the SAS team near their target, withdraw to a rendevous view point, and collect survivors days later.

This capability didn’t disappear when the SAS acquired Jeeps.

Certain operations still required the Chevrolet’s unique combination of range and carrying capacity.

Let me give you a specific example that shows why this mattered.

In September 1942, the SAS planned a simultaneous raid against Benghazi Harbor and Barci airfield, Operation Bigamy.

The targets were 30 mi apart and over 500 m behind Axis lines.

The plan required inserting roughly 200 men from multiple SAS sections, plus attached commandos and Royal Navy personnel.

Jeeps could reach the target area, but not while carrying the additional personnel, demolition equipment, and supplies needed for a complex multi-day operation.

LRTG Chevrolet patrols delivered the force.

According to the LRTG war diary, patrol trucks carried passengers in addition to crew transported kayaks for the harbor raid and provided navigation across trackless desert to precise coordinates.

The operation itself achieved mixed results.

Benghazi proved too heavily defended, but 30 axis aircraft were destroyed at Bas.

What mattered was proving that a force of that size could be delivered and recovered from extreme range.

The mechanical reliability question is less dramatic, but equally important.

Jeeps were brilliant machines, but they were also stressed beyond their design limits.

A standard Willys MB was rated for 800 lb of cargo.

SAS modifications pushed operational weight to nearly 4,200 lb fully loaded.

Suspension components failed regularly.

Engines overheated despite modifications.

The four-cylinder flathead engine produced 60 horsepower, adequate for the vehicle’s intended use.

marginal when doubled in weight and driven flat out across sand.

The Chevrolet six-cylinder engine produced 85 horsepower while carrying proportionally less weight per horsepower.

More importantly, commercial truck components were designed for sustained load, not the light duty cycle of a staff car.

LRTG mechanics reported that properly maintained Chevrolet trucks could operate for months in the desert with minimal spare parts.

The trucks were slower, but they broke down less.

When your nearest friendly base is 400 m away across open desert, reliability matters more than speed.

Here’s something the historical accounts often skip.

The LRTG and SAS had fundamentally different missions that required different vehicles.

The LRTG was a reconnaissance unit.

Their job was observation, intelligence gathering, and guiding other forces to targets.

Stealth and endurance mattered more than firepower.

LRTG patrols would spend weeks behind enemy lines, watching roads, reporting convoy movements, and mapping terrain.

The Chevrolet trucks, painted in pink beige desert camouflage, were designed to be invisible at distance and capable of sustained operations far from support.

The SAS conducted direct action raids, hit hard, destroy targets, withdraw before the enemy could react.

Speed and firepower were paramount.

The Jeep excelled at this, but when the SAS needed to reach targets beyond jeep range or required sustained operations with larger teams, they called the LRTG.

The numbers tell the story.

According to records from the LRTG Association, LRTG patrols drove approximately 500,000 m across North Africa between 1940 and 1943.

They lost fewer than 30 trucks to mechanical failure across the entire campaign.

Most vehicle losses came from enemy action or accidents, not breakdowns.

That reliability record under those conditions is extraordinary.

The historical record shows continued cooperation between LRTG and SAS throughout the North African campaign despite the SAS having their own vehicles.

In January 1943, LRTG patrols provided navigation and support for SAS raids into Junisia.

In late 1942, LRTG trucks transported SAS teams for operations around the Mammarica region.

If Jeeps could do everything the Chevrolet could do, this cooperation would have ended.

It didn’t.

After North Africa, the story gets even more interesting.

The LRTG reformed in 1944 for operations in the AGN and Balkans.

They traded their Chevrolets for Willies Jeeps.

The terrain had changed.

Island operations required smaller, more portable vehicles that could be landed from small boats.

The vast desert distances that made the Chevrolet essential no longer existed.

The SAS, meanwhile, continued using Jeeps for operations in France, Italy, and Northwest Europe.

Both units had adapted their vehicle choice to the operational environment.

In the desert, range was survival.

In Europe, maneuverability and concealment mattered more.

But here’s what really shows the Chevrolet’s legacy.

When the SAS needed a long range patrol vehicle for operations in Omen during the 1950s and 1960s, they didn’t use jeeps.

They used Land Rovers modified with extended fuel capacity, condensing radiators, and longrange navigation equipment.

The design philosophy came directly from Bagnel’s Chevrolet modifications two decades earlier.

The Pink Panther Land Rovers that served from 1968 through the 1991 Gulf War carried 100 gallons of fuel, used sun compasses and celestial navigation, and were specifically built for sustained operations in desert environments beyond resupply range.

Modern British special operations vehicles like the Supercat Jackal can operate for 36 hours without resupply and carry enough fuel for extended autonomous operations.

Every one of these design decisions traces back to lessons learned in Chevrolet trucks crossing the Libyan sand sea.

Let me show you what this actually meant in practice.

In December 1941, LRTG Patrol G1, commanded by Captain Jake Eenmith, drove 1,100 m in 16 days from Siwa Oasis to Murzuk in southern Libya, raided the Italian fort there, and returned.

The round trip was further than driving from London to Rome.

They did it in trucks that looked like they’d been assembled from scrap metal, navigating by the stars, carrying everything they needed on their backs and in their vehicles.

Zero resupply, zero external support once they left British lines.

The LRTG lost one man killed during the raid itself, Captain Michael Kryton Stewart.

But every truck completed the journey.

That operational radius simply didn’t exist in military doctrine at the time.

Staff officers planning desert operations calculated movements in tens of miles, maybe a hundred if pushing logistics to the limit.

The LRTG was operating at 10 times that scale.

The intelligence value alone justified the entire program.

LRTG patrols reported access convoy movements, identified new airfields, mapped terrain, and provided targeting information for RAF strikes.

In September 1942, LRTG observation posts hidden in the Jebel Actal Mountains tracked German supply convoys heading to RML’s frontline forces.

The intelligence went directly to RAF bomber command.

Convoy losses increased.

RML’s logistic situation, already critical, deteriorated further.

No battles, no dramatic raids, just men in trucks watching roads reporting numbers.

But the strategic impact was measurable.

Every ton of German supplies destroyed before reaching the front line weakened Raml’s ability to sustain offensive operations.

Here’s the cost comparison that military historians often miss.

Building and maintaining one LRTG patrol of two Chevrolet trucks required approximately £2,000 in 1942 currency for vehicles, weapons, radio equipment, and modifications.

Personnel costs were minimal.

These were existing soldiers, not new hires.

Fuel and supply costs for a typical two-week patrol ran roughly £200.

A single RAF bombing raid against Axis positions consumed fuel worth approximately £1,500 required aircraft maintenance costing thousands more wrist trained air crew and often achieved limited results against dispersed desert targets.

The LRTG could observe those same targets continuously, report their exact positions, and guide strike aircraft to precise coordinates.

The return on investment was extraordinary.

Now contrast this with what the Germans had.

The Vermar used Volkswagen, cubal wagon, and various truck types for desert operations, but never developed an equivalent long-range reconnaissance capability.

German intelligence about British movements in the deep desert was consistently poor throughout the campaign.

They knew LRTG patrols existed.

German intelligence reports from 1942 specifically mentioned British truck patrols operating far behind the front line.

But they never created their own equivalent unit.

The operational doctrine simply didn’t exist.

German special operations focused on deception and direct assault, not sustained reconnaissance at extreme range.

The Americans, despite having the industrial capacity to build anything they wanted, also lacked an LRTG equivalent.

US doctrine emphasized overwhelming material superiority and firepower.

Small unit operations deep in enemy territory for weeks at a time without resupply didn’t fit their operational model.

The entire concept required a level of self-sufficiency and improvisation that ran counter to American military culture.

When US forces needed longrange desert reconnaissance during the North African campaign, they relied on British LRTG support.

So, why did this ugly modified truck become the SASSE’s favorite raider for certain operations? Because it solved a problem Jeeps couldn’t, reaching targets beyond the edge of what was considered possible, carrying enough personnel and equipment to make the raid worthwhile and returning home without requiring elaborate logistics chains.

The Chevrolet wasn’t faster than a Jeep.

It wasn’t better armed per ton.

It wasn’t more maneuverable, but it could reach targets Jeeps couldn’t carry loads Jeeps wouldn’t, and keep running when jeeps broke down.

In special operations, the ability to appear where the enemy thinks you can’t be is worth more than speed.

The LRTG Chevrolet gave British commanders a weapon that extended operational reach by hundreds of miles and forced Axis commanders to defend everywhere instead of concentrating forces at the front.

That modified truck stripped down and rebuilt in Cairo workshops became essential because it turned the desert from an impassible barrier into an operational highway.

Every extra Jerry can of fuel extended British reach.

Every mile traveled meant one more mile Axis forces had to defend.

Germany spent resources building coastal defenses and guarding frontline positions.

Britain spent almost nothing driving past them.

That’s not luck.

That’s operational innovation.

Taking a commercial truck nobody wanted and turning it into a strategic asset nobody else conceived