The morning of August 17th, 1943.
Boram airfield, New Guinea.
400 miles northwest of Allied positions.
The tropical sun had just broken the horizon when 60 Mitsubishi G4M Betty bombers sat in perfect rows along the runway.
Their engines already turning over.
Flight crews were aboard.
Fuel tanks were full.
The mission briefing had been clear.
strike the new American airfield at Marilenan before the Americans could use it as a staging ground.
What none of these Japanese aviators knew was that in precisely 12 minutes, their world would explode into chaos.
The warning system they relied upon visual spotters scanning the horizon would give them no time to react.
The American B-25 Mitchell Strafers were already screaming toward them at treetop level, hidden by the jungle canopy, moving at 270 mph.
By that morning, the Japanese Fourth Air Army would cease to exist as an effective fighting force.
170 aircraft would be destroyed or damaged beyond repair in just 5 days.
The Imperial Japanese Army’s air superiority over New Guinea would be shattered in a series of failure attacks so devastating that Japanese commanders would later call it the death blow to their New Guinea campaign.
But the catastrophe didn’t begin with the American attack.
It began with a deception so simple, so audacious that Japanese intelligence fell for it completely.
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The stage for disaster was set 3 weeks earlier in late July 1943 when Allied construction crews began work on two airfields south of Wiiwac near the town of Marilinan.
Or rather, they appeared to begin work.
Small crews of engineers created enormous clouds of dust using trucks and graders.
They cleared minimal jungle.
They marked out what looked like runways.
They built nothing functional.
These were dummy airfields.
Elaborate deceptions designed to make Japanese reconnaissance aircraft believe the Allies were establishing forward air bases dangerously close to Japanese positions.
And the Japanese responded exactly as American planners hoped they would.
Throughout early August, Japanese bombers from Wiiwak launched raid after raid against these phantom airfields.
They dropped hundreds of bombs on empty jungle.
They strafed wooden decoys.
They reported successful destruction of American construction efforts.
Their commanders, believing they had stopped an Allied advance, felt confident that Wiiwac remained secure.
What they didn’t realize was that while they wasted bombs and fuel on fake targets, the Americans were conducting intensive aerial reconnaissance of Wiiwac itself.
Photoplanes flying at extreme altitude, mapped every installation, counted every aircraft, noted every detail of the four major airfields clustered around Wiiwac, the main base at Wiiwac itself, and three satellite fields at Boram, Dagua, and But the man orchestrating this elaborate trap was Major General George Kenny, commander of the fifth air force in the southwest Pacific.
Kenny was not a conventional military thinker.
He was a prophet of low-level attack aviation, a believer that bombers could be transformed into devastating ground attack weapons if properly modified and tactically employed.
And Kenny had the perfect weapon for the mission he was planning.
The North American B25 Mitchell medium bomber had started the war as exactly what its designation suggested.
A medium alitude level bomber designed to deliver moderate bomb loads more accurately than heavy bombers from safer altitudes than dive bombers.
Powered by two right two 600 cyclone 14 radial engines producing 3,400 horsepower combined the Mitchell could carry 3,000 lb of bombs at 270 mph over 1300 m but in the hands of an innovative engineer named Paul Irvin Gunn the Mitchell had been transformed into something entirely different.
Major Gun, a former Navy enlisted pilot who had received a wartime commission in the Army Air Forces, looked at the Mitchell and saw not a bomber, but a gun platform.
Working with ground crews in Australia, Gun had stripped out the bombardier’s position in the nose of B25 C and D models and packed the space with machine guns.
Four 50 caliber Browning M2 machine guns pointing straight ahead.
Then he added more guns in blister packs on the fuselage sides.
two more in a dorsal turret, one in each waist position, one in the tail.
By the time gun finished, a single Mitchell Strafer carried up to 1450 caliber machine guns, eight pointing forward, firing in coordinated bursts that could soar an enemy aircraft in half or shred a ground target with overwhelming firepower.
A 12 plane squadron of these strafers carried more 50 caliber machine guns than four infantry regiments.
The concentrated forward firepower was the key innovation.
When all eight nose guns fired simultaneously, they created a cone of destruction approximately 30 ft wide at 200 yd.
The convergence pattern meant that anything in the front of the aircraft for a distance of up to 600 yd was in the kill zone.
The rate of fire, approximately 800 rounds per minute per gun, meant that in a 3-second burst, each strafer could send more than 300 rounds down range against lightly armored Japanese aircraft parked wing tip to- wing tip on an airfield.
This firepower would be absolutely devastating.
Gun strafers had already proven their effectiveness at the Battle of the Bismar Sea in early March 1943.
12 modified Mitchells from the third bomb group combined with skip bombing tactics developed with help from the Royal Australian Air Force had sunk four cargo vessels and two destroyers in the first 15 minutes of combat.
Naval historian Admiral Samuel Elliot Morrison called it the most devastating attack of the war by airplanes against ships.
But the Bismar Sea had been a naval target.
Wiiwick would be different.
Wiiweek would test whether low-level strafing could destroy an entire enemy air force on the ground before it could react.
By mid August 1943, Japanese intelligence reported approximately 200 aircraft concentrated at the four Wiiwac airfields.
This represented the entire strength of the newly formed Fourth Air Army established in June specifically for the New Guinea campaign.
But of those 200 aircraft, only 130 were actually operational and ready for combat.
The reasons for this low readiness rate were numerous and interconnected.
Widespread illness among air crews, malaria, deni, fever, dissentry kept pilots grounded.
Maintenance problems plagued the forward bases.
Spare parts were scarce.
Quality runways were almost non-existent.
heavy equipment for construction and repair was unavailable.
The fuel supply was uncertain.
Most critically, the Japanese had virtually no protection for their aircraft.
Unlike allied airfields which dispersed planes widely and constructed revetments and shelters, the Japanese parked their aircraft in tight formations along runway edges.
The theory was that concentration allowed better security against ground infiltration and made maintenance easier with limited personnel.
What this really meant was that aircraft sat exposed, vulnerable, arranged in perfect targets for strafing attack.
Japanese air defense at Wiiwak relied on visual warning systems.
Spotters positioned around the airfields watched for approaching aircraft.
When enemy planes were sighted, runners would alert the airfields, giving pilots time to scramble or take cover.
The system worked reasonably well against high alitude bomber formations which could be seen from miles away.
It would be completely useless against low-level attackers hidden by jungle terrain until they were already over the target.
Colonel Kazuo Tanekawa, an eighth area army staff officer stationed near Wiiwac, would later testify to the complacency that pervaded Japanese defenses in mid- August.
In his postwar interrogation, he stated, “At the time of the air attacks on Wiiwac on 17 and 18 August, our defenses were not alert.
We did not expect the Americans to reach Wiiwac with fighter escorts.
We thought our airfields were beyond the range of enemy fighters.” This assumption was based on accurate intelligence.
Allied fighters did not have the range to escort bombers to WAC from existing bases around Lei and Port Morsby.
The distance was approximately 400 mi, well beyond the combat radius of standard fighter aircraft without external fuel tanks.
What Japanese intelligence failed to account for was American industrial capacity and innovation.
The Loheed P38 Lightning with drop tanks could reach Weiwac.
The heavily armed Mitchell Strafers didn’t need fighter escort their defensive armorament and speed made them formidable opponents even when intercepted.
And American planners were willing to accept losses if the attack achieved its objective.
General Kenny’s battle plan was methodical and multi-layered.
The attack would come in waves over multiple days, preventing the Japanese from recovering between strikes.
The first wave would catch the Japanese completely unprepared.
Subsequent waves would destroy whatever survived and prevent repairs and reinforcement.
The deception at Marilinan would continue, keeping Japanese attention focused in the wrong direction.
Photo reconnaissance on August 16th confirmed that Japanese aircraft remained concentrated at Wiiwac, seemingly unaware of the impending attack.
Everything was ready.
On the evening of August 16th, briefing officers at Allied air bases around Port Moresby and Doadura outlined the mission to assembled air crew.
The target was Weiwek.
Four airfields, approximately 200 enemy aircraft.
Expected opposition heavy.
Expected casualties significant.
Expected results decisive.
Bomber crews checked their aircraft.
Gunsmiths loaded ammunition.
Thousands of rounds of 50 caliber ammunition for the strafers.
Bombs for the heavy bombers.
Mechanics topped off fuel tanks and inspected engines.
Intelligence officers distributed target photographs showing the layout of each airfield, the location of aircraft parking areas, defensive positions, and escape routes.
The attack would begin at dawn.
47 B24 Liberator and B17 Flying Fortress.
Heavy bombers would strike first, hitting from high altitude to catch any aircraft attempting to take off.
Then the strafers would come in more than 30 Mitchell bombers flying just above the treetops, escorted by more than 80p 38 lightnings.
The timing was critical.
The heavy bombers needed to create chaos without destroying the parked aircraft those would be left for the strafers.
The strafers needed to arrive while the Japanese were still reacting to the first attack before fighters could get airborne before ground crews could scatter the parked aircraft.
Coordination would be essential.
communication would be difficult.
The margin for error was razor thin.
Lieutenant William Ben, pilot of a B-25 Strafer from the third attack group, recalled the tension in his crew during the pre-mission briefing.
His bombardier turned forward, gunner would control four of the nose guns.
The top turret gunner would handle two more.
Ben himself would fire the remaining nose guns using a button on his control yolk.
Eight guns total, all firing forward.
The bombardier asked the obvious question.
What if they’re ready for us? The intelligence officer’s answer was blunt.
Then we’ll take heavy losses, but the mission proceeds regardless.
The Japanese air force in New Guinea must be destroyed.
This is our best opportunity.
That night, few air crew slept well.
They understood the talk stakes.
New Guinea was the stepping stone to the Philippines, and the Philippines were the stepping stone to Japan.
But every mile of advance required air superiority.
As long as the Japanese Fourth Air Army operated from Wiiwac, Allied ground operations were constrained.
Supply lines were vulnerable.
Amphibious landings were risky.
Wewac had to fall.
Not through ground assault that would take months and cost thousands of lives.
Wiiwac would fall from the air in a matter of hours through devastating application of firepower against unprepared targets.
At 0300 hours on August 17th, ground crews began final pre-flight checks.
Engines coughed to life across multiple airfields.
The sound of radial engines echoed through the tropical night.
Pilots checked instruments.
Gunners test fired weapons.
Navigators plotted courses.
At 0430, the first wave launched.
47 heavy bombers climbed into the pre-dawn darkness, formed up, and headed northwest toward Weiwak.
Behind them, the Strafers waited for their turn.
The P38 escorts were already airborne, climbing to altitude where they would provide top cover against Japanese interceptors.
The flight to Wiiwac would take approximately 90 minutes for the bombers.
The strafers flying low and fast would take slightly longer but would time their arrival to coincide with the bomber attack.
Everything depended on precision timing.
Aboard the bombers.
Crew members settled into the routine of long-d distanceance flight.
Gunners scanned the sky for enemy fighters.
Navigators checked and rechecked their courses.
Pilots fought fatigue and maintained formation.
The tropical sun began to rise, painting the jungle below in shades of green and gold.
At Wiiwac, the morning routine proceeded normally.
Japanese ground crews performed pre-flight inspections.
Pilots attended briefings.
At Boram airfield, the orders were clear.
Prepare for a maximum effort strike against the American positions at Marilinan.
60 Betty bombers were to launch a coordinated raid that would crater the runways and destroy any construction equipment.
The irony was perfect.
While Japanese bombers prepared to attack a Phantom American airfield, real American aircraft were approaching to destroy them.
At , flight crews began boarding the Betty bombers at Boram.
Engines started.
The distinctive sound of 18 cylinder radial engines filled the morning air.
One by one, the bombers came to life.
Pilots ran through pre-flight checklists.
Navigator verified bomb loads.
Gunners checked their weapons.
The bombers sat in two long rows parallel to the runway, engines warming up.
Standard procedure called for a 20inut warm-up before takeoff.
The mission was scheduled to launch at 0800.
Everything was proceeding according to plan.
At 0745, the first wave of American heavy bombers appeared over Wiiwac.
They came from the south flying at 15,000 ft, well above effective anti-aircraft range.
The visual spotters saw them immediately and sounded the alarm.
Air raid sirens wailed across the four airfields.
At Boram, the reaction was confusion rather than panic.
The bombers at altitude were clearly targeting Wiiwac main base several miles away.
The standing orders for Borum were clear.
Continue the mission preparation.
The American bombers were too high to threaten the concentrated aircraft effectively.
By the time they could maneuver for a bombing run, the Japanese bombers would be airborne and safely away.
This assessment was catastrophically wrong.
The heavy bomber’s primary mission wasn’t to destroy aircraft at Boram.
It was to create noise, confusion, and distraction.
to focus every Japanese eye upward toward the sky, toward the obvious threat, to ensure that nobody was looking at the jungle to the south, where 30 plus Mitchell Strafers were approaching at treetop level, hidden by terrain, invisible to the visual spotters, traveling at maximum speed.
At 0752, the strafers burst from the jungle canopy like a swarm of angry hornets.
They came in just above the palm trees so low that their prop wash kicked up dust and debris.
They came in line a breast eight aircraft wide covering the entire width of Borum airfield.
Behind them more strafers approached in successive waves.
The Japanese crews aboard the 60 Betty bombers had perhaps 5 seconds of warning.
Some saw the approaching aircraft and assumed they were friendly.
the silhouette of a bee.
25 Mitchell was not yet familiar to Japanese airmen.
Some realized the danger and tried to evacuate their aircraft.
Most never had time to react at all.
At 200 yd, the Strafers opened fire.
850 caliber machine guns per aircraft.
32 aircraft in the first wave.
256 machine guns firing simultaneously.
Approximately 170,000 rounds per minute of combined fire.
The sound was indescribable, a continuous roar like thunder that would not end.
The effect on the densely parked Japanese bombers was apocalyptic.
50 caliber rounds punched through the thin aluminum skin of the Betty bombers like paper.
Fuel tanks ruptured.
Ammunition exploded, engines disintegrated, aircraft literally came apart under the concentrated fire.
The Betty bomber, officially designated the Mitsubishi G4M, was known to American pilots by a darker nickname, the flying lighter.
The design prioritized range over protection.
Fuel tanks were not self-sealing.
There was no armor protection for the crew.
The fuel system used volatile high octane fuel.
When hit, Betty’s didn’t just catch fire, they exploded.
At Borum, in the span of 30 seconds, 60 Betty bombers transformed into 60 funeral pers.
Pilots who had started their engines to taxi for takeoff died in their cockpits, cut down by 50 caliber rounds before they could process what was happening.
Ground crews who ran toward the aircraft trying to fight fires were caught in secondary explosions as fuel tanks detonated and ammunition cooked off.
The neatly organized parking areas became scenes of absolute carnage.
Lieutenant William Ben Strafer was in the second wave over Boram.
His afteraction report filed 3 days later describes what he saw.
The first thing visible was smoke.
Enormous columns of black smoke rising from what had been the parking area.
As we came over the treeine, the entire airfield was visible.
Every single aircraft we could see was either burning or already destroyed.
Pieces of aircraft were scattered across hundreds of yards.
Some bombers had exploded so violently that wreckage was found a quarter mile from where the aircraft had been parked.
Ben Strafer made its attack run anyway, firing at anything that might still be functional.
His forward gunner reported that they expended more than 2,000 rounds in a single 30-second pass.
They saw no intact aircraft.
Nothing was moving except flames and smoke.
The strafers didn’t stop at Boram.
While one group devastated that field, other formations struck.
Wewake main base and Dagua airfield simultaneously.
The pattern was the same everywhere approach at maximum speed and minimum altitude.
Achieve complete surprise.
Open fire at close range with overwhelming firepower.
Destroy everything visible.
At Wiiwak Maine, the targets were different fighter aircraft rather than bombers.
Nakajima Ki 43 Oscar fighters and Kawasaki Ki 61 Tony fighters sat in neat rows.
These aircraft were more modern, faster, and more maneuverable than the Betty bombers, but they were just as vulnerable on the ground.
The Strafers came in from multiple directions, crossing paths over the airfield, firing continuously.
The fighter aircraft constructed of lightweight materials to maximize maneuverability offered even less resistance to 50 caliber fire than the bombers.
Wings separated from fuselages.
Fuel tanks exploded.
Ammunition detonated in spectacular cascades of secondary explosions.
A few Japanese pilots managed to reach their aircraft and attempt takeoff.
It was futile.
Strafers caught them during their takeoff roll.
when they were completely vulnerable, unable to maneuver, struggling to gain speed.
50 caliber rounds, shredded tires, punctured fuel tanks, destroyed engines.
Aircraft that managed to lift wheels off the ground were shot down within seconds, crashing back onto the runway in balls of flame.
The P38 Lightning escorts, circling overhead at altitude, watched the destruction unfold beneath them.
Their job was to intercept any Japanese fighters that managed to get airborne and threaten the strafers.
No interception was necessary.
Nothing got off the ground at Wiiwok that morning except American aircraft.
The entire attack from first strafer over Boram to last strafer departing Wiiwick Maine lasted approximately 15 minutes.
15 minutes of sustained, devastating, overwhelming firepower applied against targets that could not defend themselves and could not escape.
As the Strafers withdrew, they left behind scenes of utter devastation.
Borum airfield was a smoking ruin.
60 bombers destroyed.
Wiiwacmain had lost approximately 40 fighters destroyed or damaged beyond repair.
Dagua and But airfields reported similar catastrophic losses.
The visual spotters who were supposed to provide early warning had failed completely.
The Japanese air defense system predicated on visual detection of high alitude threats had been circumvented by lowaltitude tactics.
The concentration of aircraft in tight formations had transformed defensive efficiency into suicidal vulnerability.
But the Americans weren’t finished.
Not even close.
General Kenny’s plan called for sustained attacks over multiple days.
The objective wasn’t just to damage the fourth air army.
It was to destroy it completely to render it incapable of recovery, to eliminate Japanese air power in New Guinea as a factor in future operations.
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The morning of August 18th, 1943 dawned over New Guinea with smoke still rising from the ruins of Weiwax airfields.
Japanese ground crews had worked through the night attempting to clear wreckage, extinguish fires, and assess the catastrophic damage.
The accounting was grim.
Out of 200 aircraft that had been stationed at the four Wiiwak airfields before the American attack, 120 were confirmed destroyed.
Another 30 were damaged beyond local repair capability.
Colonel Kazuo Tanekawa surveying the devastation at Boram understood immediately that something fundamental had changed in the air war over New Guinea.
The Americans had not simply attacked an airfield.
They had demonstrated a capability the Japanese had not anticipated.
Low-level strafer attacks delivered with overwhelming force against concentrated targets were virtually unstoppable with existing Japanese defenses.
But the full horror of the situation had not yet revealed itself.
What the Japanese defenders did not know as they labored to recover from the first attack was that American bombers were already in the air approaching for a second devastating strike.
General Kenny’s plan was methodical and relentless.
The first attack had achieved tactical surprise and inflicted massive initial damage.
The second attack would prevent recovery and destroy anything that had survived.
Subsequent attacks would ensure that Wiiweek could not function as an operational air base for weeks or months.
The second wave launched from Allied bases at dawn on August 18th.
This time the composition was different.
46 heavy bombers B 24 liberators and B17 Flying Fortresses would attack from high altitude through predicted weather, while 53 B25 Mitchell Strafers would come in low once again.
This time loaded not just with machine guns, but with a devastating new weapon.
Each Strafer carried 12 clusters of 323lb paraffrag bombs.
These were small fragmentation bombs fitted with small parachutes that allowed them to be dropped from extremely low altitude without endangering the attacking aircraft.
When released at 100 ft altitude, parachute slowed the bomb just enough that the dropping aircraft could escape the blast radius before detonation.
The paraphrag was the perfect weapon for airfield attack.
scattered across a target area.
The small bombs would explode in a carpet of shrapnel, destroying any aircraft, vehicles, fuel, dumps, or personnel caught in the open.
Unlike larger bombs which created craters but might miss concentrated targets, paraphrags covered entire areas with lethal fragmentation.
The weather on August 18th was deteriorating.
Tropical storms had moved into the weiwac area during the night.
Heavy clouds, rain squalls, and reduced visibility complicated the high alitude bombing mission.
The heavy bombers lost formation in the clouds.
Bombing through the rainstorm, they scattered their ordinance with minimal effect.
But below the weather, visibility was better.
The Strafers came in once again at treetop level, navigating by terrain features, following rivers and coastlines to their targets.
This time the Japanese were marginally better prepared.
Anti-aircraft guns were manned and alert.
Fighter aircraft that had survived the first attack or had been flown in overnight from other bases were ready to scramble.
It made little difference.
The third attack group assigned to hit Wiiwac and Borum fields came in from the east at 0900 hours.
The approach was identical to the previous day.
Maximum speed, minimum altitude, no warning.
But this time, instead of machine guns alone, they released their paraf frags over the target areas.
Hundreds of small parachutes blossomed over Boram airfield.
For approximately 3 seconds, the scene had an almost peaceful quality.
Dozens of small bombs drifting gently downward on olive drab parachutes.
Then the first bomb detonated.
The paraphrag bombs exploded in a rippling cascade across the entire airfield.
Each bomb contained approximately 4 lb of high explosive surrounded by a scored steel casing designed to fragment into hundreds of razor-sharp pieces.
The shrapnel spread in a lethal radius of approximately 100 ft.
Aircraft that had survived the previous day’s attack pushed to the edges of the field covered with camouflage netting thought to be protected disintegrated under the shrapnel barrage.
Ground crew attempting repairs were caught in the open.
Fuel trucks exploded.
Ammunition dumps detonated in sympathetic explosions that sent shock waves across the entire base.
The 38th Bomb Group, meanwhile, struck Dagua and butt airfields to the west.
Their target was different.
These fields housed the remaining operational fighters of the fourth air army.
Aircraft that had been dispersed and hidden after the first attack.
Finding dispersed targets was more difficult than attacking concentrated formations.
The Strafer pilots had to identify individual aircraft hidden under camouflage, often positioned under tree cover or in revetments, but the sheer volume of firepower made searching unnecessary.
The Strafers simply saturated suspected hiding areas with machine gun fire and paraffrags.
Captain Garrett Middlebrook, piloting a B-25 from the 405th Bomb Squadron, the Green Dragons, had experienced mechanical problems during the first attack and missed the initial strike.
He was determined not to miss the second mission.
When his auxiliary fuel tank refused to jettison before the attack run, most of his squadron mates turned back, unwilling to risk the tank becoming a fireball if hit by anti-aircraft fire.
Middlebrook’s turret gunner solved the problem by literally jumping up and down on the tank until it broke free.
Middlebrook continued the mission, one of only three aircraft from his squadron to actually strike the target that day.
His attack runover Daguar was later described in the squadron after action report coming in at 50 ft above the jungle canopy.
His aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire that punched holes in the wings and fuselage but missed critical systems.
His forward guns rad a line of key43 Oscar fighters parked under camouflage netting.
His bombardia released the paraffrags directly over a suspected ammunition dump.
The resulting explosion was visible from 10 mi away.
The ammunition dump detonated with such force that the shock wave nearly knocked Middlebrook Strafer out of the sky.
Secondary explosions continued for more than 30 minutes as stored ordinance cooked off in the fires.
But the second attack on August 18th came at a cost that the first attack had not.
Japanese anti-aircraft gunners, now alert and positioned, engaged the low-flying strafers with everything available.
Light and medium anti-aircraft guns fired at point blank range as the Mitchells flashed overhead.
Small arms fire from infantry positions added to the defensive barrage.
Several strafers were hit.
One B-25 from the third attack group took a direct hit from a 40mm anti-aircraft shell that detonated in the bomb bay, destroying the aircraft instantly.
The Mitchell exploded in midair, scattering wreckage across Boram airfield.
All six crew members were killed instantly.
Another strafer, heavily damaged by ground fire, struggled to maintain altitude as the pilot attempted to reach Allied territory.
The aircraft made it approximately 80 mi south of Wiiwake before the damaged engines failed.
The pilot made a controlled crash landing in the jungle.
Four of the six crew members survived the crash and were eventually rescued by Allied coast watchers and native guides after 3 weeks in the jungle.
Despite these losses, the second attack achieved its objectives.
By midm morning on August 18th, the fourth air army had been reduced to approximately 30 operational aircraft.
Wewax four airfields were littered with burning wreckage.
Runways were cratered by bomb hits.
Fuel dumps were destroyed.
Ammunition stores were expended in sympathetic detonations.
Repair facilities were in ruins.
The Japanese command structure in the area was in chaos.
Communications between the various airfields had been disrupted.
Supply lines were under constant threat from allied aircraft that now operated with virtual impunity.
Morale among surviving air crews was shattered.
Major General Kenny, receiving reconnaissance reports and pilot debriefings at his headquarters, understood that the moment had come to finish the job completely.
Two more attacks were scheduled, one on August 20th and a final strike on August 21st.
The pattern for these attacks was now established.
High alitude bombers would create distraction and hit infrastructure targets, runways, buildings, fuel storage.
Low-level strafers would hunt for any surviving aircraft and prevent any attempt at recovery or reinforcement.
The attack on August 20th encountered minimal opposition.
Japanese fighters that attempted to intercept were engaged by the P38 Lightning escorts and shot down in quick succession.
The Fifth Air Force claimed 20 Japanese aircraft destroyed on this day, some on the ground, some in desperate air-to-air combat.
The final attack on August 21st was the largest and most thorough.
Kenny committed every available strafer and bomber to ensure that Waywac was rendered completely non-operational.
The fifth air force claimed 70 aircraft destroyed on this final day with approximately half shot down in air combat by escorting P38s and half destroyed on the ground.
The Japanese pilots who flew against the Americans on August 21st demonstrated remarkable courage in the face of overwhelming odds.
They were outnumbered, outgunned, flying damaged aircraft from cratered runways with minimal fuel and ammunition.
Many knew their missions were suicidal.
They flew anyway.
Lieutenant Teo Tanimizu, flying a K61 Tony fighter from Weiwak, Maine, managed to get airborne during the final attack despite anti-aircraft fire from his own forces who mistook his aircraft for American in the chaos.
He climbed to 8,000 ft and dove on a formation of B-25 Strafers.
His first pass damaged one Mitchell, setting an engine on fire.
The bomber fell away, trailing smoke.
Tanimizu climbed for a second attack, but 4 P38 Lightnings dove on his position.
In the ensuing dog fight, Tanimizu demonstrated the exceptional maneuverability of the Tony, outturning the Lightnings in horizontal combat, but maneuverability alone could not overcome numerical disadvantage and the P38’s superior speed and firepower.
After 3 minutes of combat, Tanameizu’s Tony was hit by concentrated fire from two lightnings attacking from different angles.
The aircraft disintegrated in midair.
Tanameizu did not survive.
His was one of 35 Japanese aircraft shot down in air combat on August 21st.
It was the last significant aerial resistance the Fourth Air Army would offer.
By the evening of August 21st, 1943, the accounting was complete.
In 5 days of sustained attacks, the American Fifth Air Force had destroyed or rendered inoperative 175 Japanese aircraft.
The Japanese Fourth Air Army, which had begun the month with 200 aircraft and operational control over New Guinea airspace, had been reduced to fewer than 30 flyable aircraft.
More importantly, the organizational structure and support infrastructure had been devastated.
Wewax airfields were unusable.
Fuel supplies were exhausted.
Ammunition stocks were depleted.
Maintenance facilities were destroyed.
Experienced pilots and ground crew were dead or demoralized.
The American losses, while not insignificant, were sustainable.
10 aircraft from the fifth air force were lost during the 5-day campaign.
Most of the crew members from these aircraft were killed or missing.
But American industrial production could replace 10 bombers in less than a week.
American training programs could replace the lost air crew in less than a month.
The Japanese had no such capacity for rapid replacement.
Japan’s aircraft production was constrained by material shortages and bombing of industrial facilities.
Pilot training programs already abbreviated to meet urgent needs could not produce replacements fast enough to match losses.
The experienced pilots killed at Wiiweek represented years of institutional knowledge that could never be recovered.
The strategic implications of the Wiiweek raids rippled across the entire New Guinea campaign.
With Japanese air power effectively eliminated, Allied ground operations could proceed without significant air opposition.
Amphibious landings could be conducted with minimal risk of air attack.
Supply convoys could move with reduced escort requirements.
Forward airfields could be established without fear of Japanese bomber attacks.
The campaign to recapture New Guinea accelerated dramatically in the months following Weiwake.
The town of Lei fell to Australian forces in September 1943.
Finchen was captured in October.
By the end of 1943, the Allies controlled the entire Huan Peninsula and were positioned to move up the northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines.
None of this would have been possible without air superiority, and air superiority was won decisively in 5 days in August over the skies and airfields of Wiiwok.
The tactical lessons of Wiiwak were studied intensively by Allied air commanders.
The effectiveness of low-level strafer attacks against concentrated aircraft became doctrine.
The importance of deception and surprise was reinforced.
The value of sustained multi-day attacks that prevented recovery was demonstrated.
The B25 Mitchell Strafer modified by Paul Papy Gun’s innovative engineering became the template for ground attack aircraft development.
The concept of transforming medium bombers into heavily armed strafers influenced aircraft design throughout the remainder of the war and into the postwar era.
Major Gun himself continued his work improving strafer armament.
Later versions of the Mitchell mounted even more machine guns up to 1850 caliber weapons on the J model strafers.
Some variants mounted a 75 mm cannon in the nose for attacking shipping and hardened targets.
The human cost of Wiiwick was carried by both sides.
American air crew who flew the missions experienced the psychological impact of delivering such devastating attacks.
Some struggled with the reality that they had killed hundreds of Japanese pilots and ground crew, many of whom died without the chance to defend themselves.
Lieutenant William Ben, whose strafer participated in multiple attacks on Boram, wrote in his personal diary 3 weeks after the raids, “We did what was necessary.
We destroyed the enemy’s ability to wage war from those bases.
But I cannot forget the sight of men running from their aircraft trying to escape the fire, cut down before they made it 10 yards.
This is the nature of war at its most brutal.
We kill efficiently because inefficient killing prolongs the war and costs more lives on both sides.
But efficiency does not ease the conscience.
The Japanese survivors of Wiiwac carried different burdens.
Those who witnessed the attacks understood that they had experienced something unprecedented, an enemy with such overwhelming material and tactical superiority that resistance was futile.
This knowledge spread through the Japanese military in New Guinea, eroding the fighting spirit that had sustained them through earlier campaigns.
flight.
Sergeant Sabaro Kitaharta, a zero pilot who survived the Weiwak raids by being on patrol when the first attack occurred, returned to find his entire squadron destroyed on the ground.
In his postwar memoir, he described the scene.
The airfield looked like a vision of hell.
Nothing was intact.
Everything was burning or had already burned.
Bodies of my comrades lay among the wreckage.
The Americans had achieved in minutes what we thought impossible.
They had destroyed an entire air army without even engaging us in combat.
We who survived realized that Japan could not win this war.
The Americans had too many resources, too much industrial capacity, too much innovation.
This demoralization was perhaps as significant as the physical destruction.
Japanese air crew who had believed in their superiority, who had dominated the Pacific skies for nearly 2 years, suddenly confronted the reality of American industrial and tactical power.
The myth of Japanese invincibility, already damaged at Midway and Guadal Canal, suffered another crushing blow.
The fourth air army attempted to rebuild after Weiweek.
Replacement aircraft were flown in from bases in the Philippines and the Dutch East.
Indies.
New pilots were transferred from training programs.
Supplies were laboriously shipped forward.
By October 1943, the unit had recovered to approximately 100 aircraft, but it never regained its effectiveness.
The organizational structure had been shattered.
The experienced leadership was gone.
The new pilots lacked the skill and confidence of their predecessors.
Most critically, the Americans now knew that UAC was vulnerable and continued to attack it whenever Japanese forces attempted to concentrate there.
The final significant aerial combat in New Guinea occurred on June 3rd, 1944, nearly 10 months after the Wiiwac raids.
By that time, the fourth air army had been reduced to a shadow force conducting harassing attacks and defensive patrols.
The last aerial victories of the New Guinea campaign for American and Australian forces occurred in June 1944.
The war moved on.
Allied forces bypassed Wiiwac entirely in their advance toward the Philippines, leaving Japanese ground forces isolated and irrelevant.
The town was not recaptured until after Japan’s surrender in August 1945.
When Australian forces finally occupied Wiiwac, they found the airfield still scarred by bomb craters, still littered with rusted wreckage from the August 1943 attacks.
The legacy of Weiwak extended far beyond the immediate tactical victory.
The raids demonstrated that air power properly applied with innovation and overwhelming force could achieve decisive strategic results.
The concept influenced American air doctrine for decades.
During the Korean War, similar tactics were employed against North Korean and Chinese airfields with B26 invaders, the successor to the sector Mitchell conducting low-level attacks.
In Vietnam, the principle of sustained multi-day attacks to prevent enemy recovery became standard practice.
The Wiiwac raids also highlighted the importance of airfield defense, particularly against low-level attack.
Post-war analysis by military theorists emphasized the need for dispersal of aircraft, construction of protective revetments, improved early warning systems, and rapid reaction anti-aircraft defenses.
Modern air bases incorporate these lessons.
Aircraft are dispersed widely.
Hardened shelters protect valuable assets.
Radar provides early warning against low-flying attackers.
surfaceto-air missiles can engage targets at all altitudes.
The concentrated exposed parking arrangements that made Wiiwac so vulnerable would be considered criminally negligent by contemporary standards.
But in August 1943, the Japanese defenders at Wiiwak were following standard doctrine as they understood it.
They concentrated aircraft for security and maintenance efficiency.
They relied on visual warning systems that had worked adequately against previous threats.
They assumed their forward position placed them beyond effective range of American fighters.
Every one of these assumptions proved fatally wrong.
The B25 Mitchell Strafers that devastated Weiwak flew on throughout the war.
The type participated in campaigns across the Pacific from the Solomons to the Philippines to Okinawa.
Marine Corps versions designated PBJ flew with distinction in ground attack and anti-shipping roles.
British, Australian, Dutch, Soviet, and Chinese air forces operated Mitchells in every theater of World War II.
By wars end, more than 11,000 Mitchells had been produced.
The type compiled one of the most distinguished combat records of any American aircraft.
From the Dittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942 to the final missions over Japan in August 1945, the Mitchell was present for every major campaign in the Pacific.
But no single series of missions had more strategic impact than the Wiiwac raids.
In 5 days, at a cost of 10 aircraft, the American fifth air force eliminated Japanese air power as a significant factor in New Guinea.
The campaign that followed the Allied advance from New Guinea to the Philippines proceeded with virtually no Japanese air opposition.
The 60 Betty bombers caught with engines running at Borum on the morning of August 17th symbolized the broader failure of Japanese air strategy in the Pacific.
concentration of forces, reliance on outdated defensive systems, underestimation of American capabilities.
These errors compounded into catastrophic defeat.
The individual stories of courage on both sides, American air crew pressing attacks through defensive fire, Japanese pilots attempting impossible defenses, demonstrate that wars are ultimately fought by human beings facing mortal danger.
Technology and tactics matter.
Industrial capacity and innovation matter, but in the end, wars are won or lost by people making decisions under extreme pressure.
General George Kenny made the right decisions.
His deception plan drew Japanese forces into concentration at Wiiwak.
His tactical innovations, particularly the development of heavily armed strafers, created the weapons necessary for the mission.
His operational plan sustained attacks over multiple days ensured that the initial success was not wasted.
Major Paul Papyun made the right decisions.
His engineering modifications transformed the Mitchell from a medium bomber into the most effective ground attack aircraft in the Pacific.
His willingness to experiment, to ignore conventional wisdom, to try unproven concepts exemplified the innovative spirit that gave the allies their technological edge.
The bomber and strafer crews made the right decisions.
Flying at treetop level into concentrated anti-aircraft fire required courage that training alone cannot instill.
Knowing that friends and comrades had been killed on previous missions, yet climbing into the cockpit for another attack demonstrated the comrade determination that ultimately won the war.
The lessons of Wiiwak remain relevant in the 21st century.
Military forces that fail to adapt to changing threats, that rely on outdated doctrine, that underestimate their opponents, risk catastrophic defeat.
Defensive systems must evolve to counter new offensive capabilities.
Concentration of valuable assets creates vulnerability that precision weapons can exploit.
Innovation matters.
The side that develops new tactics, new technologies, new approaches to old problems gains decisive advantages.
But innovation must be coupled with the wisdom to recognize good ideas regardless of their source and the courage to implement them despite institutional resistance.
Paul Gun was not a formally trained aerospace engineer.
He was a creative mechanic who saw a problem and developed a solution.
George Kenny was not a traditional bombing advocate.
He was an air power theorist who understood that medium bombers could be more effective at low altitude than high.
The institutional willingness to listen to these non-traditional voices contributed directly to victory.
The physical evidence of Wiiwak has largely disappeared.
The airfields rebuilt and expanded after the war show no signs of the devastation of August 1943.
The jungle has reclaimed much of the wreckage.
The participants are nearly all gone.
American and Japanese veterans who survived the war have passed into history, but the historical record remains.
Combat reports, afteraction analyses, pilot diaries, Japanese interrogation records, all document what happened in those 5 days.
The statistics tell part of the story.
175 aircraft destroyed.
Operational strength reduced from 200 to 30.
10 American aircraft lost.
But statistics cannot capture the full reality.
The terror of Japanese air crew caught in their parked bombers as walls of 50 caliber fire shredded their aircraft.
The determination of American strafer crews making their attack runs through defensive fire.
The despair of Japanese commanders watching years of careful preparation destroyed in minutes.
The satisfaction of Allied ground forces who could now advance without constant fear of air attack.
War at its core is about applying force to achieve political objectives.
The Wiiwac raids achieved their objective with brutal efficiency.
Japanese air power in New Guinea was eliminated as an effective fighting force.
The path to Allied victory in the Southwest Pacific was cleared.
The cost was measured in lives, aircraft, and infrastructure.
Japanese pilots and ground crew died by the hundreds.
American air crew died in dup.
Smaller numbers, but no less tragically.
Millions of dollars in aircraft and equipment was destroyed.
Airfields that had taken months to construct were rendered useless in hours.
This is the arithmetic of industrial warfare.
Resources are expended to gain advantages.
Lives are spent to achieve objectives.
The side with greater resources, better technology, superior tactics, and stronger will ultimately prevails.
In August 1943, over the airfields of Wiiwac, New Guinea, American air power demonstrated all of these advantages.
The B-25 Mitchell Strafers roaring in at treetop level, machine guns blazing, epitomized the industrial and tactical superiority that would carry the Allies to victory.
The 60 Betty bombers that sat with engines running at Borum, waiting for a takeoff clearance that would never come represented the failure of Japanese strategy and the obsolescence of their defensive systems.
In the span of 30 seconds, American innovation and firepower transformed an operational Japanese air base into a burning graveyard.
The reverberations from those 30 seconds echoed across the Pacific and through history.
They echo still in the common doctrine of air forces worldwide.
in the design of air bases and defensive systems, in the understanding that wars are won not just by courage and skill, but by innovation, resources, and the will to use them decisively.
The morning of August 17th, 1943 began like any other at Boram airfield.
It ended with the destruction of an entire air army and the beginning of Japan’s inevitable defeat in New Guinea.
The pilots and crews who flew those missions, American Strafer crews and Japanese defenders alike, became part of a story larger than themselves.
A story of how air power transformed warfare and how innovation and determination can overcome any defense.
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