At on the morning of October 12th, 1944, Captain Toshikazu Omeay stood in the operations room of the second airfleet headquarters on Formosa and studied the reconnaissance report that had just been delivered by Courier.
The paper was still damp from the humid morning air.
The radio operator’s handwriting was hurried, almost panicked.
Omeay read it twice to be certain he understood correctly.
Eight American aircraft carriers detected.
Position 180 mi eastn northeast of Formosa.
Course 270.
Speed 25 knots.
Estimated aircraft complement 480.
Omeay checked his watch.
The reconnaissance aircraft had transmitted the sighting at 0558.
17 minutes ago.
He walked to the plotting table where a petty officer was updating the tactical map with grease pencil.
The American task force was marked with a red square moving steadily toward the island.
Omeay did the mathematics in his head.
At 25 knots, the carriers would close approximately 15 nautical miles in the time since detection.
They were now perhaps 165 mi offshore.
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More critically, if the Americans launched aircraft immediately after being spotted, those aircraft would reach Formosa in approximately 45 minutes, maybe less if they were carrying light loads.
The operations room had perhaps 15 minutes, maybe 20, before American carrier planes filled the sky over every airfield on the island.
Omeay had served in the Imperial Japanese Navy for 22 years.
He had watched carrier aviation evolve from experimental curiosity to the dominant weapon of naval warfare.
He had been at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 aboard the carrier Akagi when Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s strike force launched 183 aircraft in the first wave.
That operation had required six carriers, meticulous planning, and perfect coordination.
The Americans were now routinely launching similar strikes from half as many ships.
He looked at the map again.
Eight carriers.
The number represented something that would have been inconceivable 3 years earlier when Japan ruled the Pacific.
The Americans had built an industrial machine that produced Essexclass carriers in 16 months.
The shipyards at Newport News, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Quincy worked around the clock.
Steel arrived by rail.
Armor plate was cut and welded.
Turbines were installed.
Carriers slid down the ways every few weeks, each one displacing 27,000 tons, each one carrying 90 aircraft.
Japan could not match this production.
The Kur Naval Arsenal, Yokosuka, Sassibo, all of Japan’s shipyards combined could not produce carriers at onetenth the American rate.
Worse, even if Japan could build the carriers, there were no pilots to fly from them.
The carrier air groupoups that had struck Pearl Harbor, that had ranged across the Indian Ocean, that had fought at Coral Sea and Midway.
Those men were gone, dead or wounded or rotated to training commands where they tried desperately to teach replacement pilots skills that took years to develop.
The men flying American carriers were experienced.
Many had 50, 60, 70 combat missions.
They flew Grumman F6F Hellcats, aircraft that outperformed the Zero in nearly every category except turning radius.
The Hellcat had a top speed of 380 mph.
It could dive at over 450 mph.
It was rugged, capable of absorbing damage that would destroy a Zero.
Most importantly, it carried 650 caliber machine guns with 2400 rounds of ammunition.
The American pilots had been trained extensively in deflection shooting, in boom and zoom tactics, in coordinated section attacks.
They had radar, allowing them to vector toward targets with precision Japanese pilots could only dream of.
And they had numbers.
The eight carriers detected off Formosa could launch 480 aircraft in a single coordinated strike.
This was not theoretical.
American carriers had demonstrated this capability repeatedly over the past 6 months.
OM walked to the window.
Dawn was breaking over Formosa.
The airfields were visible in the distance.
Fighters were being fueled and armed for morning combat air patrol.
Mechanics worked on engines.
ground crews loaded ammunition belts.
All of this activity would be meaningless if 400 American aircraft appeared overhead in the next hour.
He turned back to the plotting table.
The petty officer had added estimated launch positions for the American strike.
The calculation assumed the carriers would turn into the wind at 0630 and begin launching.
A mass launch of 480 aircraft would take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
First the fighters launched to provide combat air patrol and escort.
Then the dive bombers, then the torpedo bombers.
Each carrier would launch its deck load in sequence.
The aircraft forming up in predetermined assembly points before proceeding to target.
The Americans had refined this procedure through constant practice.
Their flight deck crews could position, launch, and recover aircraft with mechanical precision.
An Essexclass carrier could launch 24 aircraft in 12 minutes under optimal conditions.
With eight carriers working simultaneously, the entire strike package could be airborne before Japanese reconnaissance aircraft could return to Formosa with updated position reports.
Omeay had studied American carrier doctrine.
He had read translated training manuals captured from downed aircraft.
He understood how the Americans operated their task forces.
Unlike the Japanese practice of keeping carriers spread across wide areas, the Americans concentrated their carriers in tight formations, typically four carriers per task group, with multiple task groups operating within mutual support range.
This concentration multiplied defensive effectiveness.
Each carrier was surrounded by cruisers and destroyers bristling with anti-aircraft guns.
The new 5-in 38 caliber dual-purpose guns could fire 22 rounds per minute to an effective altitude of 37,000 ft.
The 40mm Bowforce guns created an impenetrable wall of exploding shells at medium altitude.
The 20 mm Ericon cannons shredded any aircraft that penetrated to close range.
More dangerous than the guns were the American fighter pilots on combat air patrol.
The task force maintained continuous patrols at altitude.
The fighters stacked in layers controlled by radar equipped fighter directors who could vector them toward incoming threats with uncanny accuracy.
Japanese pilots attacking American carriers in 1944 faced odds their predecessors at Pearl Harbor and in the Indian Ocean could never have imagined.
The Americans called their carrier groups Task Force 38 when operating under Admiral William Holsey’s third fleet and Task Force 58 when under Admiral Raymond Spruent’s fifth fleet.
The designation changed every few months as command rotated, but the ships remained the same.
This confused Japanese intelligence officers who sometimes reported two separate American carrier forces where only one existed.
The confusion was understandable.
The scale of American carrier operations exceeded anything in naval history.
By October 1944, the fast carrier task force included 17 carriers, nine fleet carriers, and eight light carriers.
These ships operated in four task groups.
Each task group a self-contained striking force more powerful than the entire Japanese carrier fleet at the height of its strength.
Task group 38.
1 was commanded by Vice Admiral John McCain.
It included the fleet carriers Wasp, Hornet, and Hancock, plus the light carriers Mterrey and Cowpens.
Task group 38.2 under Rear Admiral Gerald Boen had the fleet carriers Intrepid and Kat plus the light carrier Independence.
Task group 38.3 commanded by Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman included Essex, Lexington, Princeton, and Langley.
Task group 38.
4 under Rear Admiral Ralph Davidson operated Enterprise, Franklin, Sanjasinto, and Bellow Wood.
Each task group operated as an independent strike force capable of launching over 100 aircraft.
When operating together, the combined task force could put over 1,000 aircraft in the air.
This represented more striking power than the entire Japanese carrier fleet had ever possessed, concentrated in a formation that could move at 30 knots and strike targets up to 300 m away.
OM understood what this meant for Formosa.
The eight carriers detected that morning represented approximately half of Task Force 38.
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If the Americans were committing this much strength to a single target, they intended to neutralize Formosa’s air defenses completely, not damage them, not reduce them, eliminate them.
The second airfleet had approximately 700 aircraft on Formosa.
This sounded impressive until one considered that these aircraft were spread across multiple airfields, that many were still being assembled or repaired, that fuel and ammunition were already in short supply, and that the pilots ranged from barely trained replacements to a handful of experienced veterans.
Against 480 American carrier planes, Formosa’s air defenses were inadequate.
The American strike would hit every airfield simultaneously.
F6F Hellcats would strafe parked aircraft.
SB2C Hell Diver dive bombers would crater runways with thousand-pound bombs.
TBM Avenger torpedo bombers configured as bombers would destroy hangers, fuel storage, and maintenance facilities.
The attack would last approximately 30 minutes.
When it was over, Formosa would be combat ineffective.
Any aircraft that survived would be unable to operate from cratered runways with destroyed fuel supplies and wrecked maintenance infrastructure.
Omeay knew all of this because he had seen it happen before.
The Americans had struck Troo in February.
They had struck Palao in March.
They had struck the Maranas in June.
Each time, Japanese air bases that had taken years to build were reduced to rubble in a single morning.
Each time, Japanese commanders had received reconnaissance reports of approaching American carriers.
Each time, there had been 15, maybe 20 minutes between detection and the first bombs falling.
The reconnaissance aircraft that had spotted the American carriers was a Nakajima C6N carrier reconnaissance plane cenamed Mert by the Americans.
It had taken off from Taiwan at 0430 on a routine patrol.
The pilot, Lieutenant Teeshi Yamada, was 23 years old.
He had been flying reconnaissance missions for 8 months.
His job was to search designated sectors of ocean east of Formosa, looking for American carrier task forces.
Yamada had found them at 0540, approximately 180 mi east of the island.
Eight carriers in formation, surrounded by their screening vessels.
He had transmitted his sighting report immediately, then turned away before American combat air patrol fighters could intercept him.
The Mert was fast, capable of 375 mph at altitude, but Hellcats were faster, and Yamada knew better than to linger near American carriers.
His report reached second airfleet headquarters at 0558, 17 minutes to evaluate the threat, calculate American launch time, and decide on a response.
In carrier warfare, 17 minutes was an eternity and an instant.
Long enough to scramble fighters for air defense.
Not long enough to launch a coordinated counterattack or evacuate aircraft to safer airfields in land.
Vice Admiral Shageru Fukome commanded second airfleet.
He had arrived in Formosa in August to rebuild Japanese air strength after catastrophic losses in the Maranas.
His orders were to defend Formosa and prepare for the coming battle in the Philippines.
The American approach force represented the preliminary operation, the neutralization of Japanese air bases before the invasion fleet arrived.
Fukodome was in his quarters when Omeay brought him the reconnaissance report.
He read it without expression, then walked to the operations room.
The sun was fully up now.
The morning was clear, visibility unlimited, perfect flying weather.
The Americans had chosen their timing well.
Fukuome studied the plotting table.
The American carriers would be launching within minutes if they had not already begun.
His fighters would engage the American strike force over the coast.
The air battle would be fought at 20,000 ft above Taiwanese towns and villages.
Wreckage would rain from the sky.
Some of it would be American.
Most of it would be Japanese.
Order all airfields to launch immediately.
Fuku said, “Everything that can fly, get them airborne before the Americans arrive.” Omay nodded and relayed the order.
Across Formosa, air raid sirens began to wail.
Fighters scrambled.
Pilots ran to their aircraft.
Ground crews pulled wheelchocks.
Engines coughed to life.
The sound of radial engines filled the morning air.
A sound that had once represented Japanese air power ranging freely across the Pacific, now reduced to desperate last stands on isolated islands.
Fukodome lit a cigarette.
The American carriers were 160 mi away.
At maximum cruise speed, F6F Hellcats would cover that distance in approximately 25 minutes.
The first fighters would arrive over Formosa around 0700.
The main strike would follow 15 minutes later.
He had perhaps 30 minutes before the battle began.
30 minutes to prepare 700 aircraft scattered across multiple airfields for the largest air battle over Formosa since Japan had seized the island from China 50 years earlier.
30 minutes to face a force that had destroyed Japanese air power at Truck, Palao, Guam, and Saipan.
30 minutes before 480, American aircraft filled the sky.
Fukuome exhald smoke and watched it dissipate in the morning air.
He thought about Pearl Harbor.
December 7th, 1941, 3 years, 10 months, and 5 days ago, the Japanese carrier task force had approached Oahu with six carriers and 414 aircraft.
The Americans had been caught completely by surprise.
Their aircraft had been destroyed on the ground, their battleships sunk at anchor, their fleet crippled.
Now the Americans were doing to Japan exactly what Japan had done to them.
But the Americans were doing it with industrial scale with production capacity that dwarfed anything Japan could match.
with replacement pilots flowing from training schools in Florida and Texas and California with carriers sliding down the ways every 6 weeks with aircraft factories in Seattle and California and New York producing fighters and bombers faster than Japan could destroy them.
The mathematics were brutal and undeniable.
Japan started the war with six fleet carriers.
The Americans started with three.
By October 1944, Japan had perhaps four operational carriers with minimal air groups.
The Americans had 17 fleet and light carriers in the fast carrier task force alone, plus dozens of escort carriers supporting amphibious operations.
This numerical superiority translated directly into operational capability.
When the Americans wanted to neutralize an air base, they sent 400 aircraft.
When they wanted to support an amphibious landing, they kept carriers on station for weeks, launching continuous strikes while supply ships refueled and rearmed them at sea.
When they lost aircraft in combat, replacement planes and pilots arrived within days.
Japan could do none of these things.
Japanese carriers operated individually or in small groups, unable to concentrate enough strength to overwhelm American defenses.
Japanese supply lines were interdicted by American submarines, making sustained carrier operations impossible.
Japanese pilot training took months, years to produce truly skilled aviators, and those months were time Japan no longer had.
The eight carriers approaching Formosa represented this reality in its starkkest form.
eight ships, 480 aircraft capable of launching coordinated strikes that would devastate any target within 300 m.
And behind those eight carriers were nine more somewhere in the Western Pacific, capable of repeating this performance whenever and wherever American commanders desired.
Fukodome crushed his cigarette.
0640.
The Americans would be launching now on eight carrier flight decks scattered across 20 square miles of ocean.
Aircraft engines were starting.
Flight deck crews in colored jerseys were positioning planes on catapults and launching spots.
Launch officers were signaling pilots.
Engines were reaching maximum power.
Brakes were releasing.
Aircraft were rolling forward, accelerating down the deck, lifting off into the morning air.
This process repeated 48 times per carrier spread across eight carriers would put 480 aircraft airborne in approximately 15 minutes.
The fighters would launch first climbing to altitude to provide escort and top cover.
Then the dive bombers formed up by squadrons, then the torpedo bombers configured with bombs rather than torpedoes for land attack.
The entire strike would assemble at a predetermined rendevous point probably 50 mi east of Formosa beyond effective Japanese reconnaissance range.
There the strike commander would organize the formation, assign targets, brief escort assignments, confirm frequencies and procedures.
Then they would turn west and begin the run toward Formosa at 220 knots.
The American precision in these matters was legendary.
Their strike formations arrived over target at the exact minute specified in the operations order.
Their fighters swept in first, establishing air superiority.
Their dive bombers approached from optimum altitude and dive angles.
Their bomber pilots coordinated timing to overwhelm defenses and maximize destruction.
Japanese pilots who survived encounters with American carrier strikes reported the same details repeatedly.
The Americans came in overwhelming numbers.
They were coordinated.
They were aggressive.
They pressed attacks through defensive fire that would have turned back earlier American pilots.
And they had radio communication that allowed them to adjust tactics in real time as the battle developed.
Omeay returned to the operations room.
All airfields report fighters launching, he said.
Estimate 250 aircraft airborne within 10 minutes.
Fukuome nodded.
250 fighters against 480 American aircraft.
The mathematics were clear.
The Americans had numerical superiority, aircraft superiority, pilot superiority, radar directed coordination, and the advantage of striking when and where they chose.
The Japanese had courage and desperation.
In 1941, courage and desperation had been sufficient.
Japanese pilots with superior training and superior aircraft had dominated the Pacific skies.
In 1944, courage and desperation were inadequate against an opponent who combined skill with overwhelming material advantage.
The air battle over Formosa would be decided not by individual heroism, but by industrial production capacity.
The Americans could afford to lose 50, 60, 70 aircraft because replacement planes and pilots would arrive from Pearl Harbor within a week.
Japan could not afford to lose 20 aircraft because there were no replacements, no trained pilots waiting at rear area bases, no industrial capacity to replace losses.
This was the mathematics of attrition warfare fought by an industrial superpower against a nation stretched beyond its capacity.
Every Japanese aircraft destroyed was irreplaceable.
Every Japanese pilot killed represented hundreds of hours of training that could never be recovered.
Every Japanese airfield damaged reduced the operational radius of remaining aircraft and concentrated forces in fewer locations, making them more vulnerable to future attacks.
The Americans understood this mathematics.
Their carrier task forces were designed to exploit it.
Hit hard, hit repeatedly, hit until the enemy’s ability to resist collapsed under the weight of accumulated losses.
It was the same strategy they used in Europe.
The same strategy that was grinding Germany into rubble.
Apply overwhelming force repeatedly until resistance became impossible.
Fukodome walked to the window again.
The sky was still clear.
No American aircraft visible yet, but they were coming.
480 aircraft were flying west at 220 knots, crossing the ocean between the American carriers and Formosa’s coast.
The first wave of American fighters appeared over Formosa’s northern coast at 0657.
Hellcats from task group 38.
2 launched from USS Intrepid and USS Kat.
48 fighters in sections of four, climbing to 25,000 ft.
They swept over the coastline like a sythe, searching for Japanese fighters climbing to intercept.
Lieutenant Shinji Nakamura was in the cockpit of his A6M0, climbing through 15,000 ft when he spotted them.
Silver aircraft far above, contrails streaming behind them in the cold upper air.
He counted at least 30, probably more beyond visual range.
His own squadron had 12 aircraft.
He keyed his radio.
Enemy fighters high.
many aircraft proceeding to intercept.
The response from ground control was garbled, overwhelmed by multiple transmissions as other Japanese fighters reported contact across the entire northern sector.
Nakamura pushed his throttle forward.
The Zero climbed well at this altitude, better than most American fighters.
He might reach 20,000 ft before they engaged.
He never made it.
The Hellcats dove on his squadron from above and behind, using altitude advantage to build speed.
Nakamura saw tracer fire flash past his canopy.
He broke hard left, the Zero responding instantly to control inputs.
A Hellcat flashed past, unable to follow the tight turn.
Nakamura reversed, trying to get on his attacker’s tail.
Another Hellcat appeared from below, climbing with excess speed from its dive.
Nakamura saw the muzzle flashes from its 650 caliber guns.
His Zero shuddered as rounds tore through the thin aluminum skin.
The left-wing fuel tank exploded.
Fire erupted along the wing route.
Nakamura had perhaps 5 seconds before the fire reached the cockpit.
He jettisoned the canopy and rolled inverted.
The slipstream tore him from the cockpit.
His parachute opened at 12,000 ft.
He watched his zero spiral downward, trailing black smoke.
Below, more aircraft were burning.
Some Japanese, some American, but mostly Japanese.
The sky was full of aircraft, all turning, all firing, all trying to kill each other in the span of seconds.
This engagement was repeated across 75 mi of airspace over northern Formosa.
Japanese fighters scrambled from six airfields engaged American fighters in a running battle that stretched from the coast to 15 mi inland.
The Americans had altitude, speed, numbers, and radio coordination.
The Japanese had desperation and the knowledge that if they failed, the bombers following behind the fighters would destroy everything.
The air battle lasted 23 minutes.
In that time, Japanese fighters shot down nine American aircraft.
American fighters shot down 53 Japanese aircraft.
The mathematics were exactly what Fuku had predicted.
For every American fighter lost, Japan lost six.
This was not sustainable.
At 0720, the American dive bombers arrived.
SP2C hell divers from three task groups, 136 aircraft carrying,000lb bombs.
They approached from 20,000 ft in formation.
Each squadron assigned specific targets.
Tynan air base on the southern coast.
Takao airfield near the harbor.
Shinchiku in the north.
Matsuyama near Taipei.
Every major airfield on Formosa was hit simultaneously.
The hell divers rolled into their dives from 18,000 ft, pushing over into 70° dives that accelerated them to 350 mph.
The pilots used perforated dive brakes to control speed, keeping the aircraft stable while lining up on targets visible through their bomb sights.
At 3,000 ft, they released, pulling out of the dives with G forces that compressed them into their seats and grayed out their peripheral vision.
The bombs struck with devastating precision.
Thousandpurpose bombs cratered runways, penetrated revetments, destroyed aircraft in their shelters.
Each bomb created a crater 25 ft across and 15 ft deep.
A direct hit on a runway made that section unusable until repair crews could fill the crater and compact the soil.
A near miss within 50 ft still rendered the runway dangerous.
Potentially collapsing landing gear on aircraft attempting to use it.
Tynan air base received 38,000lb bombs in the first strike.
Seven direct hits on the main runway, 11 hits on the taxi way, 20 hits in the dispersal area where fighters were being fueled and armed.
The base commander, Commander Saburro Hosino, watched from a slit trench as his airfield was systematically destroyed.
Hosino had been at Tynan since June.
He had rebuilt the base after American carrier strikes in the spring.
He had supervised the construction of new revetments, the improvement of anti-aircraft positions, the expansion of fuel storage.
All of that work was being erased in 30 minutes of sustained bombardment.
He counted the bombs as they fell.
Each explosion marked another week of reconstruction work, another delay in operational capability, another reduction in Japan’s ability to contest American air superiority.
The Americans were not trying to temporarily neutralize Tynan.
They were trying to make it permanently unusable.
After the dive bombers came the torpedo bombers, TBM Avengers configured as horizontal bombers carrying four 500 lb bombs each.
72 Avengers hit maintenance facilities, fuel storage, and headquarters buildings.
The 500lb bombs were not heavy enough to crater runways effectively, but they were perfect for destroying above ground structures.
At Takao airfield, fuel storage tanks erupted in massive fireballs visible from 20 mi away.
The installation had held approximately 80,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, carefully accumulated over months of convoy operations from Singapore and Borneo.
American pilots watched the explosion and radioed strike commanders with damage assessment.
Takao fuel storage destroyed.
Secondary explosions continuing.
Heavy black smoke to 15,000 ft.
Reconnaissance photographs taken days earlier had identified every fuel storage facility, every ammunition dump, every maintenance hanger on Formosa.
The strike planners had assigned specific aircraft to specific targets, ensuring nothing was missed.
This was not a raid.
It was systematic demolition.
By 0800, the first American strike was complete.
The aircraft reformed and flew back toward their carriers.
Behind them, Formosa’s airfields were burning.
Runways were cratered.
Hangers were demolished.
Fuel storage was destroyed.
Anti-aircraft positions had been suppressed by strafing fighters and bombers.
Approximately 150 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed on the ground or in the air.
Fuku received damage reports throughout the morning.
Every airfield reported heavy damage.
Tynan was nonoperational.
Taco had three runways damaged.
Shinchu reported fuel storage destroyed and 42 aircraft lost.
Matsuyama estimated 70% of its fighter strength had been destroyed.
The Americans had launched 480 aircraft.
Approximately 420 had reached Formosa.
18 had been shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft fire.
This meant the Americans had lost less than 4% of their strike force while destroying roughly 20% of second airfleet’s total strength in a single attack.
Worse, the Americans were not finished.
At 0930, reconnaissance aircraft reported the American carriers launching a second strike, same composition as the first 400 aircraft.
This would arrive over Formosa around 1100 hours.
Fukuome lit another cigarette.
His remaining aircraft were scattered across damaged airfields.
Fuel supplies were critically low.
Ammunition was running short.
Fighter strength was reduced by over a 100 aircraft and the Americans were coming again.
This was the reality of carrier warfare in 1944.
The Americans could launch, recover, rearm, refuel, and launch again.
Their supply ships carried thousands of tons of aviation, gasoline, bombs, rockets, and ammunition.
Their mechanics worked efficiently, turning aircraft around between strikes.
Their operational tempo was relentless.
Japan could not match this tempo.
Japanese carriers, when they operated at all, launched single strikes and then withdrew to safe harbors to rearm and refuel.
Japanese supply ships were hunted by American submarines.
Japanese mechanics worked without adequate spare parts or tools.
Japanese operational tempo was measured in days between strikes, not hours.
The second American strike hit Formosa at .
This time, the defenses were weaker.
Fewer fighters rose to intercept.
Anti-aircraft fire was less concentrated.
The Americans struck with near impunity, hitting targets that had survived the first strike or attacking new targets identified by reconnaissance.
By noon on October 12th, second airfleet had lost 230 aircraft, 50 in air combat, 180 on the ground.
Every major airfield on Formosa was damaged.
Fuel supplies were depleted.
Ammunition stocks were critically low.
Operational aircraft numbered fewer than 400 and many of those were damaged or lacking fuel.
Fuku sent a situation report to combined fleet headquarters in Tokyo.
The message was brief and factual.
Second airfleet combat capability reduced 60%.
Airfields heavily damaged.
Fuel supplies critical.
Request immediate reinforcements and supply convoy.
The response came 6 hours later.
Reinforcements approved.
200 aircraft departing Japan tomorrow.
Maintain defensive operations.
Report American carrier movements.
Fukodome read the message without expression.
200 replacement aircraft would arrive in 3 days if the weather held and American submarines did not intercept them.
By that time, the Americans would have launched additional strikes.
The reinforcements would arrive at damaged airfields with depleted fuel supplies and inadequate maintenance facilities.
They would be destroyed on the ground or shot down by American fighters, just like the aircraft they were replacing.
This was the pattern that had repeated across the Pacific for 18 months.
Japan would reinforce a threatened position.
The Americans would attack with overwhelming force.
Japan would lose the aircraft and pilots committed to the defense.
The Americans would move on to the next target.
Japan’s air strength diminished with each engagement while American strength grew continuously.
The mathematics were inexurable.
Japan started the war with approximately 3,000 operational naval aircraft.
By October 1944, perhaps 1,500 remained, and those were scattered across the Pacific from the home islands to the Philippines to the Netherlands East Indies.
The Americans had over 15,000 carrier and land-based aircraft in the Pacific theater.
This 10:1 numerical advantage combined with superior pilot training and aircraft performance made Japanese air operations increasingly futile.
On October 13th, the Americans struck Formosa again.
Same pattern.
400 aircraft in the morning, 400 in the afternoon.
Different targets this time.
Harbor facilities at Taco, railroad yards, supply depots.
The Americans were systematically dismantling Formosa’s infrastructure, ensuring the island could not support Japanese air operations.
Japanese pilots who flew against the American strikes reported the same observations that pilots had reported at Truk, Palao, Saipan, and Guam.
The Americans came in overwhelming numbers.
They were well coordinated.
They pressed their attacks aggressively.
They had numerical superiority at every engagement, and they had radar directed fighters that intercepted Japanese counterattacks before they reached the American carriers.
On the morning of October 14th, Fuku received orders to launch a counterattack against the American carriers.
Combined fleet headquarters wanted reconnaissance aircraft to locate the carriers, then strike aircraft to attack them.
The orders specified that maximum effort should be employed.
All available aircraft should be committed.
Fukodome studied the order.
His operational strength was approximately 320 aircraft.
Perhaps 200 of those were serviceable.
Fuel was sufficient for one major strike.
If the Americans remained on station at their current distance, Japanese aircraft would have enough fuel to reach the carriers, conduct a brief attack, and returned to Formosa with minimal reserves.
The problem was not capability.
Japan still had aircraft that could theoretically attack American carriers.
The problem was probability.
To reach the American carriers, Japanese strike aircraft would have to fly through American combat air patrol fighters.
Those fighters were radar directed, vetored by fighter controllers aboard the carriers, who could see Japanese aircraft from over a 100 miles away.
The American fighters would intercept the Japanese strike force long before it reached the carriers.
Even if Japanese aircraft penetrated the fighter screen, they would face the anti-aircraft guns of the screening vessels.
The Americans had spent three years developing anti-aircraft doctrine.
There formations were designed to create overlapping fields of fire.
Their new proximityfused shells exploded near aircraft without requiring direct hits.
Their gun crews were well-trained and experienced.
Japanese pilots who survived attacks on American task forces reported that the anti-aircraft fire was the most intense they had ever experienced.
Shells exploded in patterns that filled the sky with shrapnel.
Tracers from 20 and 40 mm guns created walls of fire.
Even near misses damaged aircraft, forcing pilots to abort attacks or making controlled flight impossible.
And if Japanese aircraft somehow penetrated both the fighter screen and the anti-aircraft fire, they would have to make their attacks against carriers that were maneuvering at 30 knots, surrounded by destroyers throwing up additional anti-aircraft fire with American fighters pursuing from behind.
The historical record of such attacks was clear.
At the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June, Japanese aircraft had launched multiple strikes against American carriers.
Out of 400 aircraft launched, fewer than 50 survived.
Most were shot down by American fighters before ever seeing a carrier.
The few that penetrated to attack positions scored minimal hits despite pressing their attacks with suicidal determination.
Fukodome understood these odds, but orders were orders.
He directed his staff to organize a maximum effort strike for the afternoon of October 14th.
180 aircraft.
Every serviceable bomber and torpedo plane on Formosa escorted by 60 fighters.
The strike launched at 1430.
Reconnaissance aircraft had reported the American carriers at position 22° north, 123° east.
Distance approximately 190 mi.
The Japanese strike would take 70 minutes to reach attack position if the carriers remained stationary, longer if they maneuvered.
The strike never reached the carriers.
American radar detected the Japanese formation at 1455 while the Japanese were still 80 miles from the task force.
Fighter directors vetoed 60 Hellcats toward the incoming strike.
The American fighters intercepted at 1507, 45 mi from the carriers.
The air battle was brief and one-sided.
American fighters attacked from altitude advantage, diving through the Japanese formation in coordinated section attacks.
The Japanese fighters tried to protect the bombers, but were quickly overwhelmed by superior numbers and superior tactics.
Within 15 minutes, 73 Japanese aircraft had been shot down.
The remainder turned back toward Formosa, jettisoning their bombs to gain speed for escape.
22 Japanese aircraft made it back to Formosa.
Lieutenant Kenji Watanabe landed at Matsuyama airfield at 1645.
His zero riddled with bullet holes, his wingman dead.
He climbed from the cockpit and vomited on the tarmac, overcome by stress and exhaustion.
Ground crews counted 37 bullet holes in his aircraft.
Several had passed within inches of the cockpit.
He had survived through luck, not skill.
Watonab reported to the operations officer.
The Americans were waiting for us.
They knew we were coming before we saw them.
They had fighters at altitude.
They attacked from above.
We never had a chance.
This was the pattern repeated throughout the Pacific.
Japanese strike forces launching against American carriers were detected by radar long before visual contact.
American fighters were vetored to optimal intercept positions.
The Japanese formations were torn apart before reaching attack positions.
survivors limped back to bases with tales of overwhelming American firepower and coordination.
The fundamental problem was not Japanese courage or determination.
Japanese pilots were willing to press attacks to the death as demonstrated repeatedly from Pearl Harbor to Guadal Canal to the Maranas.
The problem was that willingness to die could not overcome systematic material and tactical disadvantages.
American radar could detect aircraft at over 100 mi.
Japanese radar, where it existed at all, could detect aircraft at perhaps 30 mi under optimal conditions.
This gave American fighter directors 20 to 30 minutes of advance warning, time to position fighters for optimal intercept, time to vector additional fighters from combat air patrol, time to alert anti-aircraft crews.
American fighters operated in coordinated sections with radio communication.
Japanese fighters, many of which lacked radios or had unreliable radios, operated individually or in loose formations.
American pilots could call out threats, coordinate attacks, provide mutual support.
Japanese pilots often fought alone, unable to communicate with wingmen or squadron mates.
American aircraft were rugged and heavily armed.
Hellcats could absorb significant battle damage and continue flying.
Zeros and other Japanese fighters were fragile.
Built for maneuverability at the expense of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks.
A burst from American 50 caliber guns could destroy a Zero.
A Zero’s 20 mm cannons had to score multiple hits to bring down a Hellcat.
These accumulated advantages created a situation where American carrier task forces were nearly invulnerable to conventional attack.
Between June and October 1944, Japanese aircraft launched hundreds of attacks against American carriers.
They sank zero American fleet or light carriers.
They damaged several, forcing them to retire for repairs, but none were put out of action permanently.
In the same period, American carrier aircraft sank three Japanese fleet carriers at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, plus numerous smaller carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and transports.
The kill ratio favored the Americans by margins that would have seemed impossible in 1941.
On October 15th, the American carriers withdrew from Formosa’s vicinity.
They had launched over,200 aircraft sorties in 3 days.
They had destroyed approximately 450 Japanese aircraft, damaged all of Formosa’s major airfields, destroyed fuel storage facilities, and demonstrated conclusively that Japan could not defend its air bases against American carrier strikes.
The cost to the Americans was 48 aircraft lost, mostly to anti-aircraft fire and operational accidents rather than Japanese fighters.
Pilot losses were minimal because most shot down aviators were recovered by submarine or sea plane.
The Americans lost approximately 30 pilots and air crewmen.
Tragic for the individuals and their families, but strategically insignificant given the thousands of replacement pilots in the training pipeline.
Fukodome submitted his final report on October 16th.
Second airfleet strength stood at 190 operational aircraft, down from 700 before the attacks.
Fuel supplies were at critical levels.
Ammunition was exhausted.
Three airfields were completely non-operational.
Two more were operational only for emergency landings.
The remaining airfields had damaged runways and minimal support facilities.
Second airfleet combat effectiveness reduced to 25% of pre-attack levels.
Fukudome wrote unable to conduct sustained operations without major reinforcement and resupply.
Recommend Imperial headquarters reconsider strategy for defense of Philippines in light of American carrier strike capability.
This final sentence represented a profound shift in Japanese military thinking.
For three years, Japanese planning had assumed that air bases could be defended, that fighter strength could be concentrated to meet American attacks, that determination and fighting spirit could overcome material disadvantages.
The Formosa strikes demonstrated that these assumptions were obsolete.
When the Americans wanted to neutralize an air base, they sent eight carriers with 500 aircraft.
When the defenders tried to counterattack, American radar detected them from a 100 miles away and fighters intercepted them before they reached their targets.
When Japanese pilots pressed attacks with suicidal bravery, American anti-aircraft fire and fighter superiority made survival nearly impossible.
The 15-minute window between radar detection and aircraft launch had become Japan’s recurring nightmare.
American carriers could detect threats, launch defensive fighters, and vector them to optimal intercept positions faster than Japanese strike forces could close to attack range.
This 15-minute advantage, multiplied by superior aircraft, superior pilots, and overwhelming numbers made American carrier task forces the most powerful military forces afloat.
Japanese admirals had anticipated that the decisive battle would be fought by battleships as naval doctrine had predicted for 50 years.
Instead, the decisive advantage belonged to whichever side could put the most carrier aircraft over the target.
The Americans could put 800 aircraft from 17 carriers.
Japan could put perhaps 200 aircraft from its four remaining operational carriers and those carriers were forced to hide in safe harbors because they lacked the air groups to defend themselves at sea.
Admiral Sou Toyota, commanderin-chief of the combined fleet, reviewed Fuku’s report in Tokyo.
He understood the implications immediately.
The Americans had developed a system for projecting air power at sea that Japan could not counter.
American carriers operated with impunity, striking any target within 300 mi.
Japanese air bases, once thought secure behind defensive fighter screens, were vulnerable to systematic destruction.
The upcoming battle in the Philippines would be fought under these conditions.
American carriers would support the invasion fleet, launching continuous strikes against Japanese air bases and naval forces.
Japanese commanders would receive radar warnings 15, maybe 20 minutes before American aircraft arrived.
Those few minutes would determine whether Japanese fighters could scramble in time, whether counterattacks could be organized, whether defense was even possible.
Toyota knew the mathematics.
Eight American carriers launching 400 aircraft could appear off any Japanese position with less than half an hour’s warning.
17 carriers operating together could launch over a thousand aircraft.
Against such overwhelming force concentrated in mobile platforms that could strike anywhere in the Western Pacific, traditional Japanese naval strategy had become obsolete.
The plan for the Philippines would have to account for this reality.
Japanese carriers would serve as decoys, sacrificing themselves to draw American carrier forces away from the invasion beaches.
Japanese land-based aircraft would attack the invasion fleet, accepting catastrophic losses in exchange for any damage they could inflict.
Japanese battleships, unable to operate under American air superiority, would make suicide runs against American positions.
This was the strategic situation Japan faced in October 1944.
Not defeat through loss of fighting spirit, but defeat through industrial mathematics.
The Americans could build carriers faster than Japan could sink them, train pilots faster than Japan could kill them, produce aircraft faster than Japan could destroy them.
Every engagement eroded Japanese strength while American strength grew continuously.
The 15 minutes between detection and launch represented this disparity in microcosm.
American radar gave them time to react.
American carriers gave them the platform to strike.
American aircraft gave them the capability to destroy.
American industrial capacity gave them unlimited replacements.
Japan had none of these advantages and no way to acquire them.
Fukuome stood in the ruins of what had been second airfleet headquarters on Formosa.
The building had been hit by a 500 lb bomb on October 13th.
The operations room was a crater.
The communications center was destroyed.
Staff officers worked from tents erected in a nearby field.
He thought about the reconnaissance report from October 12th.
Eight American carriers detected.
480 aircraft estimated.
17 minutes from detection to the first bombs falling.
Those 17 minutes had determined everything that followed.
No time to evacuate aircraft in land.
Barely time to scramble fighters.
No time to organize coherent defense.
just enough time to understand that overwhelming force was coming and nothing could stop it.
This would be repeated in the Philippines, at Ewoima, at Okinawa, and finally at the home islands.
American carriers would appear offshore.
Radar would detect them.
Reconnaissance would report their position.
And 15 to 20 minutes later, hundreds of American aircraft would fill the sky while Japanese commanders watched their carefully prepared defenses disintegrate under precision bombardment.
The war would end not through decisive battle between battleship fleets as Mahan and Japanese naval doctrine predicted, but through industrial attrition.
The side with more carriers, more aircraft, more pilots, and more industrial capacity would grind the opposition into submission.
That side was the United States.
And by October 1944, the outcome was mathematically inevitable.
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