The ‘Expendable’ American Carrier That Faced Japan’s Most Powerful Fleet At Samar

If you enjoy these forgotten weapons stories from World War II, please hit the like button and subscribe.

It really helps us uncover more of these remarkable naval innovations.

Today’s story is about a type of American warship that found itself in a nightmare scenario off the Philippine Islands in October 1944.

slow, thinly armored vessels suddenly facing the most powerful surface fleet Japan could assemble.

This is the story of what happened when auxiliary carriers met battleship guns.

October 25th, 1944 0645 hours.

Task unit 77.4.3 designated Taffy 3 steams 70 mi east of Samar Island in the Philippine Sea.

Six escort carriers maintain formation, their flight decks busy with morning combat air patrol launches.

Radar operators scan their screens for expected friendly destroyers and returning aircraft.

What appears instead makes no tactical sense.

Massive surface contacts are bearing southwest, 17 mi and closing.

The contact signatures indicate capital ships, but Admiral Hallyy’s third fleet battleships are supposed to be north, chasing the Japanese carrier force.

These contacts are behind Taffy 3 between the escort carriers and the Philippine coast.

At 0647 hours, lookouts on the escort carrier screen destroyers spot pagota masts on the horizon.

The silhouettes are unmistakable.

The battleship Yamato Eongo class fast battleships.

Toneclass heavy cruisers.

Vice Admiral Karita’s center force, written off as retreating after the battle of the Sibuan Sea the previous day, has transited San Bernardino Strait during the night and now bears down on the unprotected carrier formation.

The first Japanese salvos arrive at 0659 hours.

18-in shells from Yamato create water spouts taller than the escort carrier’s masts.

The dyed splashes red, green, yellow, allowing Japanese spotters to distinguish which ship is firing.

8-in rounds from heavy cruisers follow, walking toward the American formation.

The escort carriers begin emergency turns, smoke pouring from their stacks as boilers are pushed beyond rated capacity.

Maximum speed 18 knots.

The Japanese heavy cruisers could make over 30 knots.

Kita’s force will overtake the American formation in less than 90 minutes.

Fleet carriers.

The Essex class ships with Hoy’s third fleet carry 4-in armor belts, armored flight decks, and compartmentalization designed to absorb damage.

Escort carriers possess none of these features.

Their holes began as Maritime Commission C3 cargo ship designs modified with flight decks.

The hole plating measures 3/8 of an inch.

Armor is minimal with thin plates protecting only steering gear and engineering spaces.

Nothing approaching battleship grade protection.

The an 8 in armor-piercing shell will punch through this plating like paper, its fuse untriggered by the thin metal before exiting the far side of the ship.

Their defensive armament reflects their intended role.

A single 5-in SL38 caliber gun positioned on the stern has an effective surface range of about 10 miles, though accuracy degrades past 7.

Against Yamato’s 18-in guns with a range exceeding 25 mi, this represents no deterrent.

Now, the escort carriers mount 40mm Bowforce and 20 mm ERCON anti-aircraft guns.

These weapons cannot damage an armored warship.

The crews manning these mounts know this.

They will fire anyway because there is nothing else to do.

At 0706 hours, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprag orders all available aircraft launched immediately.

The escort carriers turn into the wind directly toward the Japanese fleet to get planes airborne.

Flight deck crews manhandle aircraft into launch positions.

Some planes have partial fuel loads.

Others are armed with depth charges for anti-ubmarine patrol, inadequate against armored ships.

Pilots launch knowing their ordinance may accomplish little against battleship armor, but the psychological effect might cause the Japanese to maneuver, buying precious minutes.

Every minute matters when being overtaken at a rate of 17 knots.

The first Japanese shells find their mark at 0716 hours.

An escort carrier takes an 8-in hit amid ships.

The armor-piercing round penetrates the thin hole, traverses crew birthing spaces, exits the opposite side, and detonates in the water.

Casualties are immediate with men killed by the shell’s passage through occupied compartments, but this shows the vessel’s perverse vulnerability.

Armor-piercing rounds designed for battleship armor do not always fuse on such thin plating.

Some shells pass completely through the holes without detonating.

Had the rounds been high explosive, damage would be catastrophic.

The Japanese are firing the wrong ammunition for this target, but it hardly matters.

Enough incoming shells guarantees destruction.

Sprag orders the carriers to make smoke.

Ships generate dense black clouds from smoke generators augmented by damage control parties burning diesel fuel on their fan tails.

The acurid smoke drifts across the formation, complicating Japanese fire control.

Ease the screening destroyers and destroyer escorts receive orders that constitute death sentences.

Close the Japanese formation and attack with torpedoes.

USS Johnston, commanded by Commander Ernest Evans, reverses course and charges at the Japanese heavy cruisers.

Johnston displaces 2,700 tons.

The heavy cruiser Kumano displaces 13,000 tons, mounts 10 8-in guns, and can absorb damage that would obliterate a destroyer.

Johnston fires her full spread of 10 torpedoes at ranges under 10,000 yd, then turns away under smoke, her 5-in guns engaging vessels that outweigh her 5:1.

By 0730 hours, the tactical situation has not improved.

Japanese heavy cruisers continue closing from the southwest, their superior speed negating the escort carrier’s evasive maneuvers.

Yamato and the battleships hang back, firing from extreme range, and their massive guns acting as artillery support for the cruisers moving in for the kill.

American destroyer torpedo attacks create temporary disruptions as Japanese captains maneuver to avoid spreads, breaking formation, and temporarily losing fire control solutions.

But there are four Japanese battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers in Kurita’s center force.

The American destroyer attacks, however courageous, cannot stop this much steel.

The escort carrier’s aircraft begin their attacks at 0745 hours.

Wildcat fighters and Avenger torpedo bombers strafe Japanese ships, drop depth charges on cruiser decks, and make dry runs to distract anti-aircraft gunners.

Some aircraft carry bombs or torpedoes, weapons that might damage a cruiser’s topside or an unarmored section of hole.

Against battleship armor, these weapons are nearly useless.

Yamato’s armor belt is 16 in thick.

American aerial torpedoes were unlikely to heavily armored battleships without multiple hits.

The pilots know this.

They attack anyway because there is nothing else.

At 0750 hours, the heavy cruiser Chokai closes to 14,000 yd 7 mi from the formation’s rear.

At this range, her 8-in guns are firing nearly flat shots.

Shellflight time is under 30 seconds.

Fire control is simple.

Ranging salvos have walked right up to the American formation.

One escort carrier at maximum speed with smoke generators running begins taking concentrated fire from multiple cruisers.

Enough 8-in rounds fired rapidly enough will achieve hits regardless of evasive action.

The carrier single 5-in gun returns fire, a defiant gesture that accomplishes nothing against armored warships at this range.

At 0805 hours, a critical hit strikes.

An 8-in shell penetrates an escort carrier’s engineering spaces.

This time, the fuse functions.

The detonation ruptures steam lines, kills engine room personnel instantly, and floods compartments with superheated steam.

The carrier begins losing speed from 18 knots to 15, then 12.

The Japanese cruisers are making 30 knots.

The wounded carrier falls behind the formation, the scenario every captain feared.

Isolation means concentration of fire.

Pursuing Japanese cruisers shift their aim to this straggler, the most vulnerable target.

Additional hits follow at 08080812 and 0815 hours.

8in shells rip through the thin hole plating, detonating inside unarmored compartments.

Fires break out in multiple locations.

The carrier’s damage control capabilities are limited.

These vessels have smaller crews than fleet carriers, fewer firefighting parties, and less equipment.

Fire mains rupture from shell impacts, reducing water pressure.

Electrical systems fail as compartments flood.

The thin plating that made these ships quick and cheap to build now ensures their rapid destruction.

There is no armor to stop shells, no redundant systems to maintain function when critical spaces are hit, no chance of survival against concentrated heavy cruiser fire.

By 0820 hours, this escort carrier is dead in the water, listing to port, burning from multiple fires and taking hits from cruisers closing to point blank range.

The captain orders abandoned ship.

Crew members jump from the flight deck into the Philippine Sea, swimming from the burning hull, hoping to reach life rafts before the ship’s depth charges set for anti-ubmarine operations detonate.

As the vessel sinks, the heavy cruiser Tone moves in for the kill, firing high explosive rounds.

Now, each detonation tearing larger holes in the dying ship.

The remaining five escort carriers of Taffy three continue their run to the east, still launching aircraft, making smoke, and hoping American battleships will arrive before the Japanese cruisers complete their interception.

But the tactical problem is unchanged.

These vessels were never designed to face surface gunfire.

Their armor is non-existent, their speed inadequate, and their defensive armament meaningless against heavy cruisers and battleships.

Every doctrinal assumption about escort carrier employment has been violated this morning.

The ships were supposed to operate far behind the battle line.

Ah, protected by heavy surface combatants that should have been guarding San Bernardino Strait.

Those battleships are with Hollyy chasing Japanese carriers 300 m north.

At 0830 hours, Japanese cruiser fire concentrates on a second escort carrier.

The pattern repeats.

ranging salvos, hits to engineering spaces, speed loss, and isolation from the formation, followed by concentrated fire from multiple ships.

The vessel’s thin hull provides no protection.

8-in rounds penetrate, undetonate, start fires, and flood compartments.

The destroyers and destroyer escorts continue their attacks, charging the Japanese formation, firing every torpedo, and engaging with 5-in guns at ranges where Japanese 8-in return fire can obliterate them.

USS Samuel B.

Roberts, a destroyer escort of only 1,350 tons, closes to 4,000 yards from Japanese heavy cruisers to fire her torpedoes.

She takes over a 100 hits in return.

She will sink by 0850 hours.

The situation has become absolute.

The Japanese cruisers can sink escort carriers faster than the American destroyers can delay them.

Aircraft attacks create confusion, but cannot stop armored warships whose crews have trained for this their entire careers.

The escort carriers are losing a fight that was never winnable.

When thin skinned auxiliary vessels meet battleships and heavy cruisers in a surface engagement, the outcome is determined by basic physics.

Armor plate versus steel, longrange guns versus short-range weapons, 30 knots speed versus 18 knight.

What the American forces need desperately is something that doesn’t exist.

Escort carriers that can survive battleship gunfire.

But such ships would not be escort carriers.

They would be armored fleet carriers, requiring years to build instead of months, costing four times as much and displacing twice the tonnage.

The entire purpose of escort carrier construction was to produce aircraft platforms quickly and cheaply for convoy escort and amphibious support.

adding armor defeats the design philosophy.

These vessels were built for economy and speed of production, not survival against battleships.

The men aboard them were not informed of this fact.

At 0911 hours, the reality of escort carrier vulnerability becomes complete and undeniable.

One of these auxiliary warships, having absorbed multiple 8-in hits, burning from stem to stern, lists heavily and begins to capsize.

She rolls to port, her flight deck tilting toward the water.

Men jump from the high starboard side as the hole continues its rotation.

At 0920 hours, she turns turtle, keel exposed, and begins her final plunge.

The Japanese cruisers shift fire to the next target.

There are still four escort carriers running east, still making smoke, still launching whatever aircraft remain.

The surface action off Samar continues, and the fundamental problem remains unsolved.

How do you protect vessels that have no protection? The escort carriers reached Lady Gulf in early October 1944, part of the American Armada for the liberation of the Philippines.

Among them was a ship whose crew had little idea they would soon face the Imperial Japanese Navy’s most powerful surface units in a battle defying every assumption of modern naval warfare.

The carrier had the distinctive silhouette of the Casablanca class, a merchant hole conversion with a flat flight deck perched to top what looked more like a cargo ship than a warship.

Her gray paint was fresh, her flight deck timber still relatively unmarked, her crew still learning the rhythms of carrier operations in a combat zone.

Vulnerable compared to fleet carriers, her flight deck extended the full hole length, but sat low to the water, supported by a seemingly thin structure.

Her hole plating was commercial-grade steel, little thicker than a merchant vessels.

The island superructure rose modestly from the starboard side, a cramped collection of bridge, flight control, and radio rooms that looked hastily assembled against the towering islands of Essexclass carriers.

Gun tubs along the flight deck mounted single 40mm bow fours and 20 mm or lacon guns, but nothing heavier.

No armor belt protected her waterline.

No armored deck covered her magazines or engineering spaces.

She was built simply to get aircraft airborne close to shore, sacrificing everything else for speed and economy of construction.

The engineering spaces vibrated constantly from reciprocating steam engines from an earlier era.

A single propeller shaft, limited speed and maneuverability.

Maximum speed was perhaps 19 knots, slow by carrier standards.

The flight deck flexed in heavy seas.

Its timber planking groaning as the hull worked beneath it.

Below decks, the hangar bay was a cramped space where maintenance crews worked elbow-to- elbow, aware only thin steel separated them from the ocean.

Aviation fuel lines and ammunition sat behind sheet metal bulkheads, not armor.

Fire suppression and damage control systems were minimal.

The design prioritized economy and rapid production over heavy protection.

Yet, the ship functioned.

Her single catapult launched aircraft, though not as rapidly as fleet carriers.

Her arresting gear recovered them.

And though pilots complained of the short deck, her magazines held enough torpedoes, bombs, and ammunition for sustained operations, although resupply was frequent.

Her crew of 900 men settled into Spartan accommodations.

The air group consisted of nine FM2 Wildcat fighters and 12 TBM Avenger torpedo bombers, a composite squadron for anti-ubmarine patrol, close air support, and light strike missions.

The official designation was CVE Escort, though sailors invented their own less flattering interpretations.

USS Gambia Bay CVE73 was the 19th Casablanca class commissioned laid down as a maritime commission hull at the Kaiser ship building company in Vancouver, Washington.

Her keel was laid in September 1943.

She was launched November 22nd, 1943 and commissioned on December 28th, 1943, barely 3 months from Keel to service.

This reflected the brutal math of American industrial mobilization.

produce carriers faster than the enemy could sink them, accepting minimal protection for maximum numbers to overwhelm Japanese forces through sheer quantity.

The Casablanca class design was a compromise.

The Navy needed carriers for amphibious air cover, anti-ubmarine warfare, and aircraft transport, but fleet carriers were too valuable to risk in secondary operations.

Light carriers were still too expensive.

The solution was a design based on merchant ship construction with a simple hull, reliable machinery, minimal armament, and a flight deck for two dozen aircraft.

Kaiser’s yards produced them in 3 months using pre-fabricated sections.

The design sacrificed speed, armor, and survivability for rapid production.

Navy planners accepted this, assuming the CVS would operate in safe rear areas, protected by screening warships, and never facing enemy capital ships.

Gambir Bay’s combat debut was in the Mariana’s campaign during June 1944, where her aircraft flew anti-ubmarine patrols and close air support for the invasion of Saipan.

Her Avengers bombed Japanese positions ashore while her Wildcats flew combat air patrol, missions well suited to her capabilities.

In July and August, she supported operations in the Western Carolines.

Her aircraft harassing bypassed Japanese garrisons.

These lowintensity operations confirmed the ship was adequate for uncontested areas, but terrifyingly vulnerable to any serious threat.

E.

Her unarmored hull, thin deck, and flammable stores offered no real defense against torpedoes, bombs, or surface gunfire.

By October 1944, Gambia Bay was assigned to Taffy 3, an escort carrier group providing air support for the Laty Gulf invasion.

The mission was straightforward.

Close air support, anti-ubmarine patrols, and harassing local Japanese airfields.

Intelligence assessments indicated the Japanese combined fleet was crippled.

Its capital ships posing no threat to the landing zones.

The American carrier groups and battleships would control the approaches.

The escort carriers of Taffy 3 would operate off Samar’s east coast, seemingly well protected.

No operational planning suggested Gambia Bay and her sisters would have to fight a running gun battle against battleships and cruisers.

The morning of October 25th, 1944 shattered every assumption.

At dawn, Taffy 3’s carriers were conducting routine flight operations northeast of Samar when lookout spotted anti-aircraft bursts on the northern horizon.

Within minutes, the identification was horrifying.

Japanese battleships, cruisers, and destroyers were charging toward them at high speed, having broken through the San Bernardino Strait unopposed.

Admiral Karita’s center force, thought to be retreating, D had turned back and was bearing down on six escort carriers and their handful of destroyer escorts.

The carriers went to flank speed, black smoke pouring from their stacks.

Gambir Bay’s crew coaxed every revolution from her single screw, but her top speed barely reached 17 knots as Japanese heavy cruisers capable of 33 knots closed the range with terrifying speed.

What followed was a battle that violated every principle of modern naval warfare.

Null escort carriers designed never to see enemy surface ships were now under direct fire from 14, 16, and 18in battleship guns.

Destroyers and destroyer escorts launched suicidal torpedo attacks to buy time.

Aircraft from all three Taffy groups swarmed the Japanese formation, making repeated attacks with any available ordinance, strafing even after expending all ammunition.

The carriers ran south, generating smoke screens and making radical turns to throw off Japanese gunnery, though launching every aircraft to clear their decks.

For 2 hours, the impossible battle continued.

A running fight between unarmored carriers and battleships that became one of the most dramatic surface actions in American naval history.

Gambia Bay’s position at the rear of the formation made her the most exposed target.

Japanese heavy cruisers concentrated their fire on her.

The first shells arrived around 0750 hours.

8in projectiles from the heavy cruisers Chikuma, Tone, and Haguro.

Splashes rose around the carrier as Japanese gunners found the range.

The ship’s meager anti-aircraft armament was useless against surface targets.

Her single 5-in stern gun fired back, but it was feudal against multiple 8-in cruiser batteries.

With her aircraft launched and unable to land, she had no armor and no defense except her speed, and she was the slowest ship in the formation.

The first hit struck around 0810.

No, an 8 in shell penetrating the flight deck and detonating in the hanger bay.

Fragments tore through aircraft, starting fires among fuel and ammunition.

Damage control parties responded immediately.

More shells hit in rapid succession on the flight deck, island, and aft gun mounts.

As the range closed, Japanese gunnery improved.

By 0820, Gambia Bay was taking hits every few minutes.

The cumulative damage affected her engineering and steering as black smoke poured from fires below.

Her speed dropped to 15 knots, then 12, then 10.

The Japanese cruisers closed to less than 10,000 yds, firing methodically into the crippled carrier.

An 8-in shell struck the forward engine room around 0840, rupturing steam lines and flooding the space.

The crew abandoned the compartment as superheated steam filled it, scalding those unable to escape.

With her forward engine room destroyed, Gambir Bay’s speed dropped below 5 knots.

She was dead in the water, wallowing as Japanese cruisers continued closing.

The crew fought to save the ship even as shells struck, sealing compartments, shoring up bulkheads, and fighting fires.

Medical personnel treated the wounded in exposed passageways as officers maintained discipline while their ship was systematically destroyed.

By 0850, Gambir Bay had lost all power.

Fires burned out of control and her list to port increased as flooding spread through the unarmored hull.

Japanese cruisers approached to point blank range, firing into the defenseless carrier.

The abandoned ship order came around 0900.

Crew members went over the side in life jackets and rafts.

Many were wounded or burned.

All knowing survival depended on staying afloat until rescue, if it ever came.

They watched their ship continue taking hits as they swam away.

Gambir Bay capsized at 0907 hours October 25th, 1944.

Her hole rolled to port, exposing the red bottom paint and single propeller.

She hung inverted for minutes as trapped air bubbled to the surface, then slipped beneath the waves stern first, the flight deck submerging last into nearly 4 m down.

She became the only American aircraft carrier sunk by surface gunfire in World War II.

The Japanese cruisers that destroyed her did not stop for survivors, continuing south to pursue the remaining carriers and leaving more than 800 American sailors in the water.

The survivors spent nearly 2 days in the water before rescue.

Many died from their wounds while others succumbed to exposure from the tropical sun and cold nights.

Sharks were drawn to the area.

Some men gave up from exhaustion and despair.

Rescue ships finally pulled approximately 600 survivors from the water.

Nearly 300 officers and men went down with the ship or died awaiting rescue.

Sacrificed aboard a vessel designed never to face the weapons that destroyed her.

The battle of Samar ended with the Japanese withdrawal around 0930 hours when Admiral Karita turned his powerful force away from Lady Gulf after sinking one escort carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort.

Historians debate why Karita withdrew when victory seemed imminent.

Aggressive attacks by American destroyers and aircraft likely convinced Japanese commanders they faced a much larger force.

While confusion and mounting losses also contributed.

Whatever the cause, these Taffy 3’s desperate stand achieved its objective of protecting the invasion beaches.

Gambir Bay’s loss represented the price paid by crews who held their positions against impossible odds.

USS Gambir Bay received the Navy unit commenation postumously.

Her crew received decorations for heroism, including silver stars, bronze stars, and purple hearts.

The ship became emblematic of the battle of Samar, symbolizing the courage of small ships, and ordinary sailors.

The historians recognize that Gambir Bay and her sisters accomplished something unprecedented.

Escort carriers designed for safe rear area operations fought a delaying action against battleships and cruisers.

Buying time through sacrifice, proving determination could compensate for inadequate weapons.

The Casablanca class program continued.

Kaiser’s yards completed all 50 planned escort carriers by July 1944, and these CVEes supported every major amphibious operation from Samar to Okinawa.

Most survived the war and served into the 1950s as the transports, training carriers, and auxiliaries before being transferred or scrapped.

None faced circumstances comparable to Gambir Bay.

The Battle of Samar remained unique, the only time American escort carriers fought enemy battleships in surface combat.

Modern naval historians recognize Gambier Bay’s sacrifice as exemplifying a broader truth of the Pacific War.

American industrial capacity produced ships faster than Japan could sink them.

My numerical superiority compensated for individual vulnerability, and ordinary sailors achieved extraordinary results.

She was a merchant hole with a flight deck, built quickly, sent to war, inadequately protected and destroyed by weapons she could not counter.

Yet, her crew fought their ship to the end, and her loss contributed to a tactical victory that helped secure the Philippines.

The wreckage of USS Gambia Bay rests in waters too deep for salvage or visitation.

Her wreck was located in 2019, erecting nearly 4 miles beneath the surface.

She remains on eternal patrol in the Philippine Sea, a steel monument to the escort carrier sailors who faced battleships and cruisers with courage that compensated for everything their fragile ships lacked.

Her legacy endures wherever naval historians study the Battle of Samar, analyzing how the impossible became real on October 25th, 1944, when the expendable ships proved unexpendable and the inadequate proved adequate to the task demanded of