Tank commanders received their orders verbally, often with no maps.

Company and platoon leaders were told to follow regimental commanders and attack anything German.

Brigade commander reports from the night of the 11th to the 12th of July described confusion, inadequate fuel distribution, ammunition trucks arriving late, and crews sleeping in or under their tanks.

One account from a Soviet tank company commander recalled being told, “Attack at dawn toward Procarovka.

Destroy enemy armor.

Do not stop.

When he asked for clarification on routes, objectives, or coordination with neighboring units, he was told there was no time.

Soviet infantry support was equally problematic.

Rifle divisions assigned to support the tank attack were exhausted from previous fighting.

Many units were under strength.

Coordination between tank and infantry commanders was minimal.

The standard Soviet tactic, infantry advancing closely behind tanks, required tight coordination and mutual support.

At Procarovka, there was neither.

Bromistrov’s headquarters was several kilometers behind the front line.

He would have almost no ability to influence the battle once it started.

His staff officers knew this.

Some of them later admitted in interviews that they expected heavy losses but believed mass would overwhelm the Germans.

The phrase used in one account was acceptable losses.

What constituted acceptable was never defined.

The other issue was command and control.

Soviet tank formations in 1943 relied heavily on rigid orders and centralized control.

Once battle was joined, junior commanders had limited ability to adapt.

German doctrine emphasized initiative at lower levels, what they called Alfrag’s tactic.

A German platoon leader or even tank commander could make tactical decisions based on the situation in front of him.

Soviet crews were expected to follow orders, advance and attack.

At Procarovka, this doctrinal difference would prove catastrophic.

The Soviet artillery preparation before the attack was brief and ineffective.

Several hundred guns fired for approximately 15 minutes starting at 0800 hours.

The barrage was intended to suppress German anti-tank defenses and disrupt command and control.

In practice, most shells fell on empty ground.

German positions were either well camouflaged or located in areas Soviet intelligence had not identified.

The barrage made noise but accomplished little that the attack began shortly after 0800 hours.

Soviet accounts describe waves of tanks moving forward through the wheat field southwest of Procarovka.

German accounts describe the appearance of Soviet armor as sudden and overwhelming despite the artillery preparation.

The first echelon of 18th tank core, approximately 200 tanks, advanced directly toward Lipstand’s positions.

The terrain immediately created problems.

Tanks had to funnel through gaps between the anti-tank ditches and balas.

What was supposed to be a broadfront assault became a series of columns moving along predictable routes.

German anti-tank guns opened fire first.

The 88 mm flat guns positioned in camouflaged imp placements began engaging T34s at ranges of 1,500 m.

Soviet tanks started burning before they were within effective range to return fire.

One afteraction report from a Lifestand anti-tank battery claimed seven confirmed kills in the first 15 minutes.

The crews were reloading as fast as they could physically manage, but but there were too many Soviet tanks.

For every T34 knocked out, three more kept coming.

The German defensive line was not deep enough to stop this kind of mass attack through attrition alone.

The anti-tank guns could kill tanks.

They could not kill all the tanks.

Lifestand artist panzas positioned in hull down firing positions behind the rail embankment opened fire as Soviet armor closed to under 1,000 m.

Panzer 4 crews had been told to hold fire until they had clear targets.

The opening volleys were devastating.

A platoon of T34s attempting to cross the embankment was caught in Alfalad and destroyed in under 2 minutes, but the Soviets kept advancing.

A Soviet tank platoon commander with the 181st Tank Brigade, Junior Lieutenant Vasili Buov, described advancing through wheat so tall it obscured vision beyond 20 m.

His platoon, five T34s, was supposed to follow the brigade commander’s tank.

In the smoke and dust, he lost sight of the lead tank within minutes.

His own tank hit an anti-tank ditch concealed by wheat and threw a track.

The crew bailed out under machine gun fire.

Brilov survived by hiding in the wheat for 3 hours before crawling back to Soviet lines after dark.

His platoon’s other four tanks were all destroyed.

He never saw what hit them.

This is when the battle started to break down.

Soviet tank commanders, unable to coordinate by radio and blinded by smoke and dust, closed the range to eliminate the German gunnery advantage.

Doctrine said, “If you cannot fight at range, fight close.

” Some T-34s accelerated to maximum speed over 50 kmh and drove straight at German positions.

The idea was to close so fast that German gunners could not track and engage effectively.

Sometimes it worked, often it didn’t.

One Tiger crew engaged Soviet armor throughout the day fighting.

In a gunner’s account recorded in the 1980s, he described the first Soviet tank he fired at simply exploding.

Apparently, the round hit ammunition storage.

The second T34 lost its turret.

The third caught fire but kept moving.

He fired again and the tank stopped.

He stopped counting after that.

Load.

Aim at whatever moves.

Fire.

Load.

Aim.

Fire.

The fighting compartment filled with cordite smoke and empty shell casings.

The noise made his ears ring for days afterward.

By 0900 hours, the battlefield was covered in black smoke from burning tanks and dust thrown up by hundreds of tracks churning the dry step.

Visibility dropped below 100 m in many areas.

Crews were firing at shapes.

The noise made verbal communication inside tanks nearly impossible.

Gunners relied on hand signals from commanders.

Loaders worked mechanically.

Load, fire, load, fire without thinking.

Yoim Pipers, Panza Grenaders, mounted in half tracks attempted to support the tanks by engaging Soviet infantry following behind the armor.

Soviet infantry doctrine called for rifle units to advance closely behind tanks, using them as mobile cover.

At Procarovka, this meant men on foot were trying to keep up with T34s moving at speed across broken ground while under fire from German machine guns and artillery.

The casualties were immediate and severe.

One Soviet infantryman interviewed in the 1960s recalled advancing behind a T-34 when it was hit by a German round.

The tank did not explode, but stopped abruptly.

He ran past it and saw the driver trying to escape through his hatch.

The tank was on fire inside.

He kept running because stopping meant dying.

He never learned if the driver got out.

A sergeant in one of Piper’s companies described firing an MG42 machine gun into Soviet infantry at ranges of less than 100 m.

The Germans had positioned themselves in a small depression that provided cover from direct fire.

Soviet infantry advancing across open ground toward them had no cover at all.

The sergeant estimated his gun crew killed at least 30 men in the first hour of fighting.

Then Soviet tanks reached their position and they withdrew.

German infantry positions were being overrun in places where Soviet tanks simply drove through defensive lines.

A T34 weighs 26 tons.

Trenches collapsed under that weight.

Strong points were bypassed.

In sector after sector, German infantry reported Soviet armor in their rear areas while fighting was still ongoing to their front.

The battle was fragmenting.

The Reich, positioned south of Libandata, was engaged by the 29th tank corps attacking from the east.

The terrain here was more open, which favored German longrange gunnery.

Desich tank crews reported clear fields of fire out to 2,000 m in some areas.

T-34s advancing across this ground were destroyed at range before they could close.

One account describes a Soviet brigade losing over half its tanks in less than 30 minutes without inflicting a single German casualty.

But the Soviets adjusted.

Subsequent waves used the burning wrecks of destroyed tanks as cover, maneuvering between them to close the range.

This worked better.

German crews found themselves engaging targets at ranges under 500 meters, distances where the T34’s 76 millm gun could penetrate Panza 4 armor.

One company commander in the Lipstandata Panza regiment reported a running battle with a Soviet tank battalion that lasted over 2 hours.

Divisional accounts describe a series of short-range engagements where both sides were taking losses.

One of his platoon leaders, an SS Obashafura, was killed when his Panza 4 was hit in the side by a T34 that had worked its way into a flanking position through a bala.

His tank exploded when the ammunition cooked off.

None of the crew survived.

The Germans withdrew, repositioned, and counterattacked to recover the wrecked tank.

They found the Soviet tank that had killed the platoon leader destroyed less than 100 meters away, apparently by another German tank whose crew never identified themselves in the confusion.

The Soviet crew had bailed out but were killed by machine gun fire before they could reach cover.

This kind of confused close-range fighting was happening across the entire battlefield.

battalion from the 181st tank brigade hit the Livestandard’s main defensive line around 0930 hours.

Simonov’s afteraction report describes what happened next in clinical terms.

His lead company, 10 tanks, advanced across a wheat field toward the rail embankment.

German anti-tank guns destroyed seven of the 10 tanks before they reached the embankment.

The remaining three tanks crossed the embankment and engaged German armor at close range.

One was immediately knocked out.

The other two disappeared into the smoke.

Simon never learned what happened to them.

Neither tank returned.

His second company advancing to the left of the first had better luck.

They found a gap in the anti-tank defenses and pushed through, engaging German tanks from the flank.

A brief chaotic firefight followed.

Simonov claimed three German tanks destroyed, two Panza 4s and a Panza 3.

Soviet losses were four T34s.

The survivors withdrew when they ran low on ammunition.

Simonov himself remained in radio contact with his battalion for approximately 1 hour before his radio failed.

After that, he commanded by hand signals and by following what other Soviet units were doing.

part of the battlefield had devolved into something resembling a mechanized brawl more than a coordinated battle.

Soviet tanks having broken through initial defensive lines in several places were intermingled with German armor.

Unit cohesion on both sides was collapsing.

Radio communication had become impossible due to atmospheric conditions, damage to equipment, and the sheer volume of transmissions overwhelming available frequencies.

A live standard situation report from midm morning sent by motorcycle courier because radio was unreliable stated enemy tanks penetrated to battalion headquarters.

Situation unclear.

Request orders.

The response, if any, never arrived.

The battalion fought independently for the rest of the day.

T34s were ramming German tanks.

This was not doctrine.

This was desperation.

A Soviet tank that could not penetrate a Tiger’s frontal armor at close range could still try to damage it by collision, knock off a track, jam a turret, disable a gun.

Several instances were documented.

One Tiger reported damage to its main gun after a T-34 rammed its barrel while the gun was traversing.

The Tiger’s crew abandoned the vehicle temporarily, returned under covering fire from infantry, and found the T34 crew had also abandoned their tank.

Both vehicles were immobilized less than 10 m apart.

The German crew destroyed the T34 with a demolition charge and then withdrew on foot.

Another Tiger found itself surrounded by Soviet tanks after becoming separated from its platoon.

The gunner engaged targets in a complete circle, firing, traversing, firing again.

The loader was working so fast he suffered burns from handling hot shell casings.

The Tiger destroyed at least five T-34s in close proximity before German infantry reached the position and drove off the remaining Soviet tanks.

The tank had been hit seven times.

None of the hits penetrated, but the impact had damaged the commander’s cup and vision ports.

The Tiger withdrew for repairs and did not return to action that day.

Infantry on both sides were suffering casualties that would only be fully counted later.

Men caught between tanks had no chance.

One German soldier from a Panza Grenadier company described taking cover in a shell crater and watching a T34 drive pass close enough to touch.

The tank did not see him.

It was hit by a Panzafoust fired from a nearby position and exploded.

Burning fuel poured into the crater.

He ran.

Soviet riflemen advancing with the tanks were being cut down by German machine guns and artillery.

A company commander in a Soviet rifle regiment supporting 18th tank corps reported that his company lost 60% of its strength in the first two hours of fighting.

Most casualties were from machine gun fire.

His men were ordered to advance across open ground with minimal artillery support.

German MG42s firing at rates of up to 1,200 rounds per minute created beaten zones that nothing could cross.

The Soviet response was to keep advancing.

officers led from the front and died first.

One account from a Soviet junior sergeant describes his platoon, 32 men, ordered to clear a German strong point that was holding up the tank advance.

They attacked across 200 m of Wheatfield.

German machine guns opened fire when they were halfway across.

The sergeant went to ground with the survivors, nine men.

They waited for artillery support.

None came.

They withdrew after dark.

The strong point was still in German hands the next morning.

The smoke by midm morning was so thick that tank commanders were fighting from closed hatches, something avoided whenever possible because it reduced visibility to almost nothing.

Periscopes fogged up or were spattered with mud and oil.

Gunners were aiming at muzzle flashes and engine noise.

Martin Gross, commanding second uptail of Libandata’s Panza regiment, described in post battle reports attempting to coordinate companies that had lost contact with each other.

His command tank remained behind the main fighting, but even from this position, he could see almost nothing through the smoke.

Radio calls went unanswered.

He dispatched runners, officers, and NCOs’s and vehicles to locate his companies and issue orders verbally.

Some runners never returned.

Others came back with contradictory reports about where friendly forces were and what the tactical situation looked like.

By 10:30 hours, Gross had given up trying to coordinate at battalion level and was allowing company commanders to fight independently.

This was the only realistic option.

Each company became its own small battle, engaging whatever Soviet forces appeared in front of it.

Soviet tank losses were mounting catastrophically.

Analysis of Soviet records suggests that Fifth Guard’s tank army lost approximately 300 tanks totally destroyed on July 12th with the majority lost in the first 4 hours of fighting.

Rott’s staff knew the losses were severe by late morning, but the attack continued.

Political pressure demanded results.

German losses were lighter, but significant.

Second SS Panza Corps reported approximately 40 to 50 tanks knocked out or damaged on July 12th.

Some were total losses, others were repairable, but would require days of workshop time.

The critical difference was that German tanks were being destroyed or damaged on ground they held, which meant recovery was possible.

Soviet tanks were burning in no man’s land or behind German lines, which meant total loss.

Around midday, elements of second guard’s tank corps, Harot Mistrov’s reserve, were committed to the fighting.

These were supposed to be the exploitation force, the units that would break through once 18th and 29th core had smashed the German defenses.

Instead, they were thrown into a stalled offensive to prevent complete failure.

Major General Berdini’s core attacked toward the same killing grounds that had already consumed two Soviet tank corps.

Bodini had approximately 150 tanks.

His orders were to break through the German line and advance toward Procarovka itself.

The orders made no sense given what had already happened, but orders were orders.

The second guard’s tank core attack began around 1200 hours.

By this point, German anti-tank defenses were well prepared and had clear fields of fire across ground littered with Soviet tank wrecks.

Badini’s leading brigades were engaged immediately.

One brigade commander later reported losing 30 tanks in the first 20 minutes of the attack.

His brigade advanced less than 500 m before being forced to withdraw.

The result was more burning tanks.

One Soviet tank brigade commander in an account preserved by Soviet military historians described receiving orders to attack through a wheat field already littered with destroyed vehicles.

His brigade had 32 tanks.

They advanced in line ab breast as doctrine required.

German anti-tank guns engaged from concealed positions.

He lost eight tanks before reaching the German line.

His own tank was hit but remained mobile.

He ordered a withdrawal.

He was relieved of command 2 days later for failing to achieve his objective.

Soviet accounts from survivors describe a battlefield that looked like an industrial scrapyard.

Burning tanks everywhere.

Smoke so thick you couldn’t see the sun.

The smell of burning fuel and flesh.

Bodies of tank crewmen who had bailed out and been cut down by machine gun fire.

Wounded men screaming.

The noise constant, overwhelming, making thought impossible.

A T34 driver with a 29th Tank Corps interviewed decades later described his tank being hit by German fire around noon.

The shell penetrated the hull and killed the commander and gunner instantly.

The driver and loader escaped through the bottom hatch.

They ran towards Soviet lines through smoke, jumping over bodies and tank wrecks.

They made it back.

The driver never got into another tank.

He was reassigned to infantry and survived the war.

By early afternoon, the offensive had lost all momentum.

Soviet units were still attacking in places, but these were isolated efforts by individual battalions or companies who had not received orders to stop.

The coordinated mass assault Rot Mistrov had planned was over.

While Livandata and Das Reich were engaged south of Procarovka, Tottenoff was fighting a separate battle north of the Cell River.

The terrain here was marshy and cut by streams.

Routes of advance were limited.

Soviet defenders, elements of fifth guard’s army under Lieutenant General Zadov, were dug in along the southern bank of the river with clear fields of fire.

Tottenov’s mission was to cross the cell envelope Soviet positions from the north and link up with Libandarta advancing from the south.

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