The inevitable German counterattack came late that afternoon.

[music] It was repulsed with heavy losses.

Hudgen village had finally fallen, but the forest had not, and the cost of taking that small cluster of houses would echo far beyond its ruins.

Stro alerted Colonel Glenn Anderson, commanding combat command reserve, and ordered him forward.

His mission was to prepare an armored thrust toward the nearby town of Kleinhow and the high ground that dominated it.

Control of that ground was essential if the Americans were to break out of the forest and reach the Rorow River approaches beyond.

While the armor prepared, the third battalion of the 121st Infantry was tasked with finishing the clearance of the woods around Herten itself.

At the same time, coordination was established for a wider effort.

Infantry from the 28th Infantry Division and the 121st would strike toward Brandenburgg while Combat Command Reserve attacked Kleinhow from the road.

On November 29th, the armored assault began.

Task Force Hamburg led the way.

[music] It was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Hamburg, the commander of the 10th Tank Battalion.

At first light, he advanced with company C of his tank battalion, supported by company C of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion.

Almost immediately, the forest asserted itself again.

A leading platoon under Lieutenant Robert Leas moved off the road to provide flank security.

Four tanks bogged down in the mud within minutes, immobilized before they could fire a shot.

The following platoon stayed on the road and pushed forward directly toward Kleinhow.

By midm morning, tanks under Lieutenant Thomas Maguire and Lieutenant George Kleinstyber entered the outskirts of the village.

Supported by artillery from the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the task force pushed into Kleinhau itself.

Additional tanks and armored infantry followed from other elements of combat command reserve.

Inside the village, resistance was sharp but uneven.

A single German Panza 4 tank engaged the column, knocking out one American tank before it was destroyed.

An anti-tank gun hidden in the woods outside the village opened fire, but was quickly located and destroyed by Sherman tanks.

German defenders fell back from the streets, retreating toward the surrounding high ground.

Outposts were established near Hill 4001.

3, but not on it.

The hill was still under German observation, and no one was eager to repeat earlier mistakes.

By nightfall, Kleinhow was in American hands.

Combat Command Reserve turned the town over to elements of the Eighth Infantry Division and pulled back to reorganize.

The cost had been severe.

Eight tanks were destroyed, most by mines.

13 halftracks and a tank destroyer from the 628th tank destroyer battalion were badly damaged.

60 armored infantrymen were casualties.

In total, the fighting for Hertgun and Kleinhow had cost the 121st Infantry and the First Battalion of the 13th Infantry more than 1,200 men.

German losses were harder to measure, but at least 882 were taken prisoner in this phase alone.

Many more were dead or wounded, scattered through the forest and villages they had defended for weeks.

Behind the front lines, command of the Golden Arrow Division changed hands.

General Stro had been overseas almost continuously since 1942.

He had led men across multiple campaigns.

He had also endured a personal loss that few commanders could bear.

His son had been shot down and killed while flying a fighter bomber in direct support of the very division his father commanded.

Exhausted in body and spirit, Stro was ordered home to the United States for rest with the understanding that he would return to command another division once recovered.

Command passed to Brigadier General William Weaver.

Weaver was a veteran of an earlier war, commissioned from West Point before the First World War.

He had served in France, been wounded multiple times, and earned numerous decorations.

He took command of the eighth infantry division, knowing full well that Herkin village was not the end.

It was only the beginning.

By now, first United States Army fully understood the importance of the Brandenburg Bergstein Ridge.

Control of that ground was essential for any move toward the Roer River dams.

The Herkin and Kleinhow area provided the only viable launching point for such an attack.

A narrow highway ran along the ridge, hemmed in by forest on both sides.

General Leonard Gerro ordered Weaver to clear that corridor using the 28th and 121st Infantry Regiments while the 13th Infantry held the Herkin Kleinhow area.

Combat Command Reserve remained attached for armored support.

It took until December 1st for the infantry to clear enough ground for armor to move again.

The problems were unchanged.

Mines buried beneath leaves, log bunkers hidden among trees, barbed wire stretched across narrow paths, automatic weapons and artillery covering every approach.

When Task Force Hamburg finally moved down the highway once more, lead tanks were again knocked out by mines and anti-tank fire.

Armored infantry were pinned down by mortars and machine guns.

The forest [music] resisted every step.

General Weaver sent infantry forward to clear enemy positions that had remained hidden during earlier fighting, while armored engineers crawled ahead, probing the road for mines.

By December 3rd, 1944, elements of the 28th Infantry Division and the 121st Infantry, supported by tanks from the 709th Tank Battalion, had reached the Brandenburg Ridge.

On that same day, the weather finally cleared.

With air conditions improving, Republic P47 Thunderbolt fighter bombers from the 366th Fighter Group were able to provide support.

Task Force Hamburg advanced once again along the highway with infantry, armor, artillery, and air support briefly aligned.

American tanks moved toward Brandenburgg shortly after breakfast.

The momentum was strong enough that Lieutenant George Kleinstyber advanced beyond the town and nearly reached Bergstein itself, destroying two German anti-tank guns along the way.

Colonel William Hamburg ordered him back, recognizing that his force lacked the strength to seize and hold both villages against an expected counterattack.

That concern was quickly reinforced.

American aircraft were forced to return to base as weather conditions deteriorated elsewhere.

And soon afterward, approximately 60 German Messesmidt 109 fighters appeared over the battlefield.

They attacked Task Force Hamburg, although several were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from Combat Command Reserve and the Eighth Infantry Division.

Another serious problem remained unresolved.

German artillery observers were still directing fire from Hill 400.

5.

Known to the Americans as Castle Hill and to the Germans as the Bergberg, the hill dominated the surrounding area.

Artillery fire from this position continued to fall on American units around Brandenburgg and Bergstein.

By this stage, Task Force Hamburg was badly reduced.

Only 11 tanks, five tank destroyers, and approximately 140 infantrymen remained available.

Holding the ground already taken was becoming increasingly difficult.

General William Weaver nevertheless pressed forward.

Determined to secure Bergstein, he ordered a renewed attack.

Colonel Glenn Anderson launched the operation with combat command reserve on the afternoon of December 4th.

The town was secured by nightfall.

Once inside Bergstein, however, the situation remained dangerous.

Castle Hill continued to direct artillery fire onto the town.

Bergstein itself lay exposed to attack from multiple directions.

On December 5th, German forces launched three coordinated counterattacks against the third battalion of the 28th Infantry Division.

The battalion held its ground under intense pressure, an action for which it later received a presidential unit citation.

German commanders were increasingly concerned by the American penetration of the ridge.

To counter it, they committed additional forces from the 47th and 272nd Folks Grenadier divisions.

Although neither formation was at full strength, [music] they represented a serious threat to the weakened American units.

The first German reinforcements arrived on December 6th and counterattacks followed immediately.

These were supported by five armored vehicles and numerous anti-tank teams.

At one point, the Germans came close to success, but American forces held Bergstein.

Castle Hill remained the key problem.

From its heights, German artillery continued to strike Bergstein and the surrounding approaches.

Two further counterattacks were launched from its vicinity, again supported by observed artillery fire.

By now, combat command reserve was nearing exhaustion.

General Weaver had no additional infantry available to reinforce [music] the position.

Recognizing the risk, he appealed to fifth core for assistance and specifically requested the commitment of [music] the second ranger battalion, which was nearby but still under core control.

From the German side, the fighting around Brandenburgg, Bergstein, and Castle Hill was not viewed as an offensive battle, but as a delaying action fought under extreme pressure.

By early December 1944, the German units holding the Herk gun forest were no longer cohesive divisions in the traditional sense.

They were improvised defensive groupings built from fragments of shattered formations, training units, fortress battalions, fox grenaders, and survivors pulled back from earlier defeats in Normandy and Arkan.

The primary German formation in this sector remained the 275th Infantry Division, reinforced over time by elements of the 353rd Infantry Division, parts of the 116th Panza Division, and later units from the 272nd and 47th Volk Grenadier Divisions.

Most of these formations were under strength, short of heavy weapons, and exhausted.

Some battalions had fewer than 300 men under arms.

Command responsibility lay within the German 7th Army under General Eric Brandenburgger operating within Army Group B commanded by Field Marshal Walter Model.

Model understood that the forest could not be held indefinitely, but he also understood its value.

Every day the Americans were delayed in the Hurden was a day gained elsewhere along the front, particularly for the assembly of German forces east of the Royal River.

German doctrine favored defense in depth, and the Hgun forest offered ideal conditions for it.

The terrain neutralized American armor and air power.

Narrow roads, dense fur trees, steep ravines, and constant mud forced attacking infantry into predictable routes.

German units occupied log bunkers, concrete pill boxes, and reverse slopes, often invisible until the moment they opened fire.

Artillery played a central role.

German gunners deliberately set their shells to detonate in the treetops.

These air bursts shattered trunks and branches, turning wood into lethal fragments.

Even soldiers undercover were vulnerable.

This tactic required little ammunition compared to direct fire and had a powerful psychological effect on advancing troops.

Castle Hill, Hill 400.

5, was one of the most valuable German positions in the sector.

From its elevation, artillery observers could see American movement around Bergstein and Brandenburgg and direct fire with accuracy.

As long as Castle Hill remained in German hands, any American position in the villages [music] below was exposed.

German commanders were well aware that they were bleeding manpower they could not replace.

But they also knew that withdrawal without orders was forbidden.

The forest was treated as a holding ground, a place to trade space for time.

orders emphasized counterattacks not to regain lost ground permanently, but to disrupt American organization, isolate forward units, and force repeated regrouping.

For many German soldiers, the Hurken forest felt familiar in a deeper sense.

German military culture had long emphasized fighting in forests.

[music] From the First World War to interwar training doctrine, wooded terrain was seen as favorable to disciplined infantry.

Older officers sometimes referenced earlier history, noting that forests had been places where Germanic tribes once resisted Roman legions.

While not official doctrine, the idea reinforced the belief that the forest favored the defender.

By early December, morale among German troops was mixed.

Many understood that the war was being lost strategically, yet locally in [music] the forest, they could still fight effectively.

They knew the ground.

They knew the approaches.

And they knew that the Americans would have to come through the trees, one unit at a time.

As long as Castle Hill stood, the Germans believed they could still hold the ridge.

Companies D, E, and F of the Second Ranger Battalion were already well known within the United States Army by the winter of 1944.

On D-Day, they had scaled the cliffs at Point Duh Hawk under fire to neutralize German coastal artillery threatening the Omaha beach landings.

After reaching the top, the Rangers had held their position for 2 days against repeated German counterattacks before being relieved.

Losses had been severe and much of the battalion spent the following weeks absorbing replacements and rebuilding its strength.

Under Lieutenant Colonel James Earl Rudder, the Rangers were next committed to the fighting around Breast in Britany.

There they protected the flank of the 29th Infantry Division and played a key role in the capture of the Loist, also known as the Graph Spe battery on September 8th, 1944.

During that action, the Rangers took approximately 1,800 German prisoners.

After breastfell, the battalion moved east through Paris and was eventually assigned to a training and rest area in the hken forest itself.

It was there on December 6th that General William Weaver located the battalion and ordered it forward.

The Rangers were rushed toward Bergstein during the night of December 6th into December 7th, arriving in the early morning hours.

As the battalion prepared to move out from its bivwac area, Lieutenant Colonel Rudder was unexpectedly reassigned to take command of the 109th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division.

Command of the Second Ranger Battalion passed to Major George S.

Williams, the battalion’s executive officer.

The timing of the change was poorly received.

One Ranger officer later remarked that it was a difficult moment to change command, especially with a major engagement imminent.

Nevertheless, the battalion accepted the transition, and Williams, recently promoted to major, led the Rangers forward.

As the Rangers moved through the American lines toward Bergstein, their presence had an immediate effect on morale.

Soldiers from nearby units recognized them and understood their reputation.

One infantryman later recalled seeing three Ranger left tenants move down the road late at night, spaced several yards apart, asking for enemy positions and the route forward.

After a brief discussion, the Rangers moved out without ceremony, weapons ready.

The observer noted that morale among nearby troops rose almost instantly.

Major Williams was given two clear tasks.

First, he was to seize Castle Hill, designated Hill 400.

5.

Second, he was to strengthen the defense of Bergstein against further German counterattacks.

To accomplish the latter, he established roadblocks to the west, east, and south of the town.

These were reinforced with platoon from the 893rd tank destroyer battalion.

Castle Hill was defended by the second battalion of the 988th Grenadier Regiment, part of the 272nd Vulks Grenadier Division under the command of Captain Adolf Tom.

The German defenders were supported by 36 artillery pieces positioned to cover the surrounding approaches.

Major Williams committed companies D and F to the main assault.

Ranger scouts moved ahead first.

In the darkness, they ignored shouted challenges they believed to be English and suddenly realized they were already inside the German forward positions.

Behind them, Captain Duke Slater organized companies D, E, and F and launched the attack.

Company E led the initial assault.

The German defenders, believing the scouts had withdrawn and that no major attack was imminent, were caught off guard.

As German artillery began to fall among the Rangers, companies D, and F pushed past company E and continued the advance toward the crest of Castle Hill.

Below the hill outside Bergstein, companies A, B, and C of the Rangers observed German self-propelled artillery moving into position.

A request was passed to Combat Command Reserve, which engaged and neutralized the threat before it could interfere with the assault.

Captain Mort McBride’s D Company and Captain Otto Maznney’s F company now faced an open field separating them from the main German positions on Castle Hill.

The ground offered little cover.

Closely behind a rolling American artillery barrage, the Rangers advanced with fixed bayonets, moving directly into fire from German machine guns and a fortified bunker covering the approach.

Lieutenant Lemu Lamel led the assault for decomp.

Several men were lost crossing the open ground, but the Rangers maintained momentum and reached the crest of the hill.

The advance was so rapid that some Rangers pushed beyond the objective and began moving downs slope towards the Row River before Lamel was able to halt and regroup them.

Captain Adolf Tomi commanding the German defenders had anticipated a breakthrough of this kind.

Once the hill was penetrated, pre-planned German artillery concentrations were activated.

Shells fell with increasing intensity across the summit.

As Lomel later remarked, survival under such fire was no longer a matter of training or skill, but chance.

Despite the bombardment, the Rangers cleared the remaining German positions and occupied the bunkers and fighting holes on the hilltop.

Casualties were already severe, but the battalion remained in place.

Over the next two days, the Rangers endured five determined German counterattacks.

These included infantry assaults and attacks by German paratroopers.

Artillery fire remained constant.

Losses among ranger leaders were particularly heavy.

In one company, every officer and senior non-commissioned officer became a casualty, leaving the unit under the command of a sergeant.

Communications were difficult.

Resupply was limited.

An evacuation of wounded men was slow and dangerous.

Late on December 8th, 1944, the first battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment finally relieved the Rangers on Castle Hill.

Of the men who had made the initial assault, only 22 were able to walk off the hill under their own power.

The Second Ranger Battalion had suffered 19 killed, 107 wounded, and four missing.

Roughly one out of every four Rangers committed to the attack became a casualty.

From the summit of Castle Hill, American forces could now see the town of Schmidt, the Row River, and the Row River dams beyond.

The position that had dominated the battlefield for weeks was finally in American hands.

For the Hutkin Forest, the cost had been paid in full.

By early December 1944, the German position in the Hutkin Forest was no longer sustainable in the long term.

The loss of Castle Hill removed one of the last effective observation points overlooking the approaches to Schmidt, Bergstein, and the Roar River Valley.

German commanders understood what this meant.

Continue reading….
« Prev Next »