image

When Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, Germany was still bound by the impositions of the Treaty of Versailles, which had limited the country’s military capacity.

After the defeat of 1918, the German army, known under that agreement as the Reich, was restricted to 100,000 men with no tanks, no heavy artillery, no combat aviation, and a navy reduced to small ships.

The prohibition of a formal general staff forced military planning structures to be camouflaged under organizations with other names and arms production was subject to strict international surveillance.

However, even before Hitler came to power, there was a clear determination among the military leadership and nationalist sectors to overcome these limitations and rebuild war potential.

What changed with the arrival of the national socialist regime was the speed, scale, and political determination to transform these aspirations into concrete actions.

In the first months of his reign, Hitler presented his rise as the beginning of a new era for Germany.

Propaganda insisted that the people had regained strong leadership and that the country must free itself from the humiliation imposed by the victors of the Great War.

Although Germany ostensibly continued to respect the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, in reality, discreet measures began to promote rearmament which took place under administrative cover and public works programs.

In these initial steps, the objective was to avoid direct clashes with the Western powers while preparing the ground for greater military expansion.

Clandestine rearmament was not an entirely new phenomenon as secret links with the Soviet Union had been maintained since the Vhimar Republic, allowing weapons testing on Russian territory far from international supervision.

However, under Hitler’s government, these practices expanded and were integrated into a coherent plan linking economic reconstruction with war preparation.

Job creation in arms factories and public works was presented as a social policy, but in practice it meant the development of an industrial infrastructure ready to support military production.

A turning point came in 1935 when Hitler openly announced the introduction of compulsory military service transforming the Reich into the Vermacht.

The army was organized into larger divisions and the formation of armored and motorized units began.

That same year, the Luftwaffer, already secretly developing, was officially established, and massive resources were invested in the creation of a modern military aviation system.

The cremine, although more limited for budgetary and strategic reasons, also began a process of expansion with new submarines and plans for a stronger surface fleet.

The here, as the land army was called, was the first to expand.

From the 100,000 men permitted by Versailles, the force grew to several million in just a few years.

Infantry, panza, and motorized divisions were organized, giving the army greater flexibility and mobility than in the previous war.

Officer schools were reactivated and doctrines were developed that sought to avoid the positional warfare that had characterized the conflict from 1914 to 1918.

Instead, the idea of a quick war was promoted in which armored vehicles and aircraft would play a central role.

The Luftvafer under the leadership of Herman Guring became one of the most visible symbols of Germany’s new military power.

From its earliest years, it focused on the production of fighters such as the Messmitt BF 109 dive bombers such as the Junker’s J87 Stooker and medium bombers such as the Hankl 111.

These models were designed not only to match the capabilities of other powers, but to shape a style of warfare in which aviation would directly support ground forces, striking enemy concentrations and disrupting their defenses.

The Luftvafer was not born as an independent strategic weapon, but as an integral part of a Blitz Creek plan.

The Creeks marine, for its part, faced greater limitations.

Germany could not compete in terms of ship numbers with the British Royal Navy, so it opted for a development centered on Ubot.

In 1935, a naval agreement was signed with Great Britain that in theory set limits on the German fleet, but in practice was used as a justification for expanding naval construction.

The most ambitious plan known as plan Z called for the construction of large battleships and aircraft carriers.

Although by the outbreak of war only a portion of that program had been completed.

Meanwhile, Yubot offered a tool of asymmetric warfare capable of threatening enemy supply routes in the event of a conflict.

The development of this military machine was accompanied by a doctrinal framework that sought to avoid the mistakes of the previous war.

The experience of the trenches and stalemate had left German officers with the conviction that the next conflict must be resolved quickly and with the coordinated use of all available means.

Thus was born the idea of blitzkrieg or lightning war which was not a single plan codified in a manual but a set of principles that prioritized surprise, speed and coordination between forces.

The army was to penetrate enemy lines with tanks and motorized troops while the air force destroyed key points and disrupted the rear guard.

The infantry would advance behind to consolidate the positions gained.

This combination was intended to destabilize the enemy from the outset and prevent them from having time to reorganize.

Blitzkrieg represented a break with the classic view of attrition warfare.

Instead of relying on the accumulation of forces to slowly wear down the enemy, it aimed to achieve a rapid collapse of its capacity to resist.

This required meticulous planning, efficient logistics, and coordination between branches that had previously been unseen on such a scale.

Although the vermar was still in the process of formation in the second half of the 1930s and lacked many of the necessary resources, the doctrine was consolidated as the basis upon which officers and troops were trained.

Politically, Hitler combined these measures with a public discourse that continued to speak of peace and a just revision of the international order while in practice directing all of the state’s resources toward rearmament.

Financial mechanisms such as the so-called mephoexel were used.

Bills of exchange issued by a fictitious company that allowed arms production to be financed without appearing in official budgets.

This financial engineering concealed the real pace of rearmament, avoiding an immediate economic collapse while allowing a massive military expansion.

The organization of the economy was adjusted to the needs of the military.

Heavy industry, steel production, and research into new fuels and synthetic materials were placed under state control.

Agriculture was also adapted to the expectations of self-sufficiency, seeking to ensure food supplies in the event of war.

The 4-year plan, launched in 1936, was the clearest expression of this policy.

Its objective was to prepare Germany for war in the short term, reducing dependence on imports and ensuring the capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict.

The German military command, although occasionally reticent about the pace imposed by Hitler, gradually aligned itself with these objectives.

Generals who had experienced the First World War understood the risks of a premature conflict.

But the regime’s authority and initial foreign policy successes reinforced confidence that Germany could once again confront Europe.

The army, which during the Vhimar years had sought to maintain a low profile, became the central pillar of a state that conceived itself as a militarized community.

Internationally, these measures generated concern among neighboring powers.

But the policy of appeasement and the desire to avoid a new war allowed Germany to continue expanding its capabilities without encountering immediate opposition.

Thus, by 1939, the Vermacht had become a force of several million men equipped with modern divisions, a large air force, and an expanding navy.

What had begun as rearmament disguised as a social program, was transformed into a war machine ready to be deployed.

The Reich’s big lie, the pretext for invading Poland and starting the war.

Since the spring of 1939, the German high command no longer discussed whether to attack Poland, but when.

Planning began to take concrete shape in April when Hitler issued instructions for swift and decisive action against the eastern neighbor.

The objective was not solely military.

It was about imposing a definitive solution to the Polish problem, which for the regime was both territorial and ideological.

The guidelines were clear.

Eliminate Poland’s defensive capacity from day one.

Destroy its administrative structures and make it clear that this was not a temporary campaign or a partial occupation.

To achieve this, the German army needed meticulous organization.

By mid year, plans were finalized for what would be the fastest campaign Europe had yet seen.

Forces were concentrated at several strategic border points.

The Vemar had overwhelming forces at its disposal.

Around 1.

5 million men, almost 2,500 tanks, and more than 2,000 aircraft were ready to participate in the offensive.

This mobilization included the here, the Luftvafer, and the criggs marine, although the latter had a more limited role due to the land-based nature of the conflict.

Tactical preparations included strong coordination between ground and air forces.

The concept of blitzkrieg, which had already been developed in previous years, found its first practical application in this operation.

Although it was not a formally established doctrine as it would later become, the idea of combining rapid, deep, and wells synchronized attacks with intensive use of aviation was key.

The Panza divisions supported by tactical aviation would seek to penetrate the interior of the country as quickly as possible, avoiding conventional defensive lines and sewing confusion in the enemy rear guard.

The regime not only prepared the military aspect.

Weeks before the attack, a propaganda apparatus was deployed to justify the action.

Messages were crafted that portrayed Poland as a potential aggressor, and border incidents were exaggerated to generate an atmosphere of imminent threat.

One of the most notorious fabrications was the Glyitz incident, a covert operation carried out by German forces disguised as Poles, simulating an attack on a German radio station.

This event was presented to the world as a Polish provocation and served as an immediate pretext for launching the offensive.

At 4:45 a.

m.

on September 1st, 1939, the attack began.

The Luftvafa bombed strategic positions in the Polish interior, including airfields, communication centers, and military warehouses.

Almost simultaneously, ground units crossed the border on multiple fronts with encircling movements that sought to disorganize the enemy from the first minutes.

The Panza divisions advanced at high speed, flanked by motorized infantry that secured the conquered areas.

The attack was devastating.

Within days, the Polish defenses began to collapse.

German forces did not pause at points of resistance, but instead surrounded them and continued inland, leaving the mopping up and consolidation tasks to the rear guard.

This strategy allowed for a continuous advance without exhausting forces in protracted engagements.

Polish units, although they offered resistance at various points, were unable to coordinate effectively or establish a coherent defensive line.

Furthermore, German air supremacy hampered any attempt at reorganization or counterattack.

Meanwhile, propaganda within Germany spread the idea of a preemptive, necessary, and just operation.

Alleged abuses committed by Poland against German minorities on its territory were highlighted and the Reich was portrayed as a victim forced to defend itself.

Hitler’s speeches constantly repeated this narrative, asserting that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and that the attack was an inevitable response to Polish provocations.

The news reels featured carefully selected images of smiling soldiers, columns advancing unopposed, and towns supposedly welcoming the German troops.

Coordination between the various branches of the military was fine-tuned in real time.

Mobile divisions communicated their progress and requested air support when they encountered resistance.

The Luftvafer responded swiftly, removing obstacles and allowing the advance to continue unabated.

This breakneck pace surprised not only the Poles but also international observers.

Within a few days, German forces were deep inside enemy territory surrounding Warsaw and other key cities.

On the diplomatic front, Germany had previously assured that the Soviet Union would not intervene on behalf of Poland.

This was made possible by the pact signed in August between the two powers, officially known as the non-aggression pact, but which included secret clauses on the partition of Polish territory.

With this agreement, Hitler eliminated the risk of a two-front war and could concentrate exclusively on the Eastern campaign.

Furthermore, he was confident that France and Great Britain would not react strongly as had happened in previous episodes.

However, the diplomatic calculation was not entirely correct.

On September 3rd, France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany, fulfilling their commitments to Poland.

Despite this, no immediate military action was taken by these powers.

For weeks, the so-called joke war raged in the West with minimal defensive movements and no significant fighting.

This allowed Germany to continue its offensive without worrying about a second front.

Within German territory, the news of the war was received with a mixture of enthusiasm and resignation.

Propaganda had prepared the ground, presenting the conflict as a just and necessary cause.

Many citizens supported the action, convinced that it was the only way to resolve the outstanding problems with Poland.

At the same time, censorship and information control measures were activated to ensure a single narrative and prevent dissenting voices.

Values such as sacrifice, discipline, and national pride were promoted while casualties were minimized and the harshest aspects of the conflict were hidden.

The campaign was brief but intense.

On September 17th, the Soviet Union invaded Eastern Poland, fulfilling its agreement with Germany.

This further accelerated the disintegration of the Polish army, which was already in retreat.

Warsaw held out until the end of the month, but finally capitulated after a siege accompanied by constant bombardment.

The Polish resistance was valiant in many instances, but completely overwhelmed by the enemy’s technical and organizational superiority.

By the end of September, the map of Europe had changed.

Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the world had formally entered the war.

For the Nazi regime, the campaign was a demonstration of military effectiveness, strategic planning, and political control.

It confirmed that the rapid war model worked, and this reinforced the high command’s confidence in future operations.

Blitzkrieg was not yet a familiar word to the public, but its essence had been put into practice with brutal efficiency.

The experience in Poland became a model to follow.

Generals studied every detail of the operation to fine-tune the mechanisms for future campaigns.

Political authorities highlighted the results as proof of the superiority of the German system.

Parades were organized.

Victory bulletins were distributed and the figure of the German soldier was glorified.

The initial success reinforced the idea that the Reich had an inevitable and justified expansionist destiny and that obstacles would be overcome with the same speed and determination as in this first campaign.

Thus began from the German perspective a conflict that had not yet revealed its true colors, but which already revealed the determination of a regime willing to use all its resources to achieve its ends.

The invasion of Poland not only marked the beginning of the world war but also the starting point of a way of waging war where speed, surprise and propaganda were as important as weapons.

Lightning victories, the Blitzkrieg and the rise of the Vermachar.

German military strategy in 1940 focused on leveraging speed and coordination as the primary tools for victory.

After the campaign in Poland, the German army turned its attention westward, aiming to conquer France and its allies through an offensive that broke with traditional methods of attrition warfare.

The concept of Blitzkrieg, which had already proven effective in Poland, was now applied on an even grander scale and with a precision that took the Western powers by surprise.

The idea was simple but devastating.

Rapid, deep, and coordinated air and ground penetrations to disorganize the enemy before it could react.

In May of that year, the Vermachar launched its attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, nations that were inshed in the German military machine as part of the plan to outflank the French defenses.

The Majino line built by France to resist an invasion from the east, was rendered useless when German forces avoided directly confronting it and instead pushed through the Arden, a forested region considered unsuitable for mass movements.

This tactical choice was key.

The Panza divisions managed to quickly open gaps, pushing the Allied forces northward and cutting them off from their rear.

The Netherlands could not hold out for long.

The German advance, accompanied by intense bombardment, caused the rapid collapse of the Dutch army.

Rotterdam was bombed as a warning and the threat of total destruction forced surrender.

The speed of the offensive and the brutality of the impact paralyzed any possibility of a coordinated response.

Belgium, which had also attempted to remain neutral, was similarly overwhelmed.

Belgian, British, and French forces attempted to form a defensive line, but well-calculated German maneuvers backed by unprecedented mobility engulfed them before they could establish a firm front.

The most decisive operation was the advance through Sedan.

There, the Germans managed to quickly cross the Muse River, overcoming the French defenses.

Once this crossing was achieved, the armored divisions launched a westward thrust toward the English Channel, encircling the Allied forces in Belgium and Northern France.

The rapidity of the movement left Allied commanders with no time to regroup, causing a collapse in morale and the command structure.

Dunkirk then became the only escape point.

As British forces and part of the French army were trapped against the coast, an emergency evacuation was organized.

Although the Germans could have closed the encirclement, they paused briefly at the decision of the high command, allowing hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers to escape by sea.

This tactical pause is still debated, but it did not change the overall course of the campaign.

France was divided and its forces overwhelmed.

The government collapsed under the speed of the German advance.

Continue reading….
Next »