The morning of February 17th, 1944, broke clear and calm over Truck Lagoon, the vast anchorage in the Caroline Islands that the Japanese Navy called their Gibralar of the Pacific.
Vice Admiral Masami Kobayashi stood on the bridge of the light cruiser Couturi, watching the sun rise over a forest of masts and superructures.
45 warships and merchant vessels lay at anchor within the protective ring of coral atals.
their crews settling into another day of routine repair work and supply operations.
The air smelled of salt and diesel fuel, the sounds of hammering and welding echoing across the glassy water.
At precisely 0600 hours, a junior radar operator on the ATL’s northern shore noticed something unusual on his screen.
Multiple contacts approaching from the northeast at high speed and altitude.
He reached for the telephone to report it, but hesitated.
The equipment was temperamental, prone to false readings.
By the time he made his decision to call it in, 18 minutes had already passed since the first detection.
Those 18 minutes would prove catastrophic.
The American task force that bore down on truck that morning represented the largest concentration of naval power yet assembled in the Pacific War.
Task Force 58 commanded by Rear Admiral Mark Mitcher consisted of five fleet carriers for light carriers, seven battleships, and a screening force of cruisers and destroyers.
Among those battleships were two of the newest, most powerful warships ever constructed.
USS Iowa and USS New Jersey, sister ships of a class designed to hunt down and destroy anything that floated.
But the title’s claim of 11 Iowa class battleships firing on truck is a myth, a piece of wartime hyperbole that has persisted in popular memory.
The truth, as it so often does, tells a more complex and ultimately more fascinating story than the legend.
If you’re enjoying this deep dive into the story, hit the subscribe button and let us know in the comments from where in the world you are watching from today.
To understand what really happened at Truck, we must first understand what Truck represented to the Japanese Empire in early 1944.
The lagoon, roughly 40 mi across, was nature’s perfect fleet anchorage.
Surrounded by a barrier reef punctuated by volcanic islands, it offered protection from both storms and submarine attack.
The Japanese had fortified it extensively since seizing it from German control after the First World War, building airfields on four islands, constructing repair facilities, ammunition dumps, and fuel storage tanks.
By 1943, truck had become the primary forward base for the combined fleet, the staging point for operations throughout the central Pacific.
American naval intelligence working from reconnaissance photos, radio intercepts, and submarine reports estimated that at any given time between 40 and 70 vessels occupied the lagoon.
The Japanese believe truck was invulnerable.
The coral barrier made submarine penetration nearly impossible.
The distance from American bases in the Marshall Islands, over 1,000 mi, seemed to place it beyond the range of effective carrier strikes.
Japanese planners had calculated that any American attack would be detected at least 2 hours in advance by patrol aircraft and radar stations, providing ample time to launch defending fighters and disperse the fleet.
These calculations, meticulous and reasonable, failed to account for two factors, the revolutionary capabilities of America’s new Essexclass carriers and the aggressive tactical doctrine that Admiral Mitcher would employ.
The Essexclass carriers, first entering service in late 1942, represented a quantum leap in naval aviation.
Each could operate up to 90 aircraft, three times the number of earlier carriers.
Their armored flight decks could sustain damage and continue operations.
Their fuel capacity allowed them to steam for weeks without replenishment.
When operating together, as they did in Task Force 58, they could put nearly 600 aircraft into the sky simultaneously.
This was an aerial armada on a scale the world had never witnessed, and Japanese intelligence had failed to grasp its implications.
Mark Mitcher, 57 years old in February of 1944, was a slight man with a weathered face and piercing eyes who looked more like a small town accountant than a naval warrior.
But he had been one of naval aviation’s pioneers, commanding the carrier Hornet during the Dittle raid on Tokyo in 1942.
He understood better than almost anyone how carriers could project power across vast distances, and he was willing to take risks that more conservative admirals would reject.
His plan for truck was audacious.
Approach within 100 m undercover of darkness, launch a massive fighter sweep at dawn to suppress Japanese air defenses, then follow with wave after wave of bombers to systematically destroy every vessel in the lagoon.
The battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, would perform a surface sweep around the ATL’s perimeter, hunting down any ships attempting to escape.
The task force departed its forward anchorage at Madro atal in the Marshalss on February 12th, 1944, 5 days before the plan strike.
Nine carriers, seven battleships, 10 cruisers, and 28 destroyers steamed westward in a formation that covered miles of ocean.
Aboard the carriers, pilots attended briefing after briefing, studying aerial photographs of truck, memorizing the locations of anti-aircraft batteries, fuel tanks, and priority targets.
The photograph showed an almost surreal concentration of shipping, battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, transports, oilers, all packed into the lagoon like toys in a bathtub.
The briefing officers emphasized that surprise was essential.
If the Japanese detected the approach and dispersed the fleet, the entire operation would be a costly failure.
What the Americans did not know was that Japanese naval intelligence had in fact detected signs that a major operation was underway.
Radio traffic analysis suggested unusual American naval activity in the Marshals.
Reconnaissance aircraft reported increased carrier movements.
On February 10th, Admiral Manachi Koga, commander of the combined fleet, made a fateful decision.
He ordered all major combatant ships to withdraw from truck to Palao a thousand m to the west.
The super battleships Yamo and Mousashi, the fleet carriers, the heavy cruisers, all departed on February 10th and 12th.
What remained at truck on February 17th was primarily auxiliary vessels like cruisers, destroyers, submarines, oilers, transports, and merchantmen.
It was still a significant concentration of shipping representing hundreds of thousands of tons of vital supplies and transport capacity, but it was not the decisive blow against the combined fleet that American planners had hoped for.
Task Force 58 approached truck through the night of February 16th and 17th.
The carriers maintained strict radio silence.
Navigation lights were extinguished.
The massive fleet moved through darkness like a ghost.
Its wake phosphorescent in the tropical sea.
In the ready rooms, pilots tried to sleep or played cards or wrote letters they hoped they wouldn’t need to mail.
The tension was palpable.
Everyone understood that the next day would be historic one way or another.
At 0300 hours on February 17th, the task force reached its launch position 90 mi northeast of truck.
The carriers turned into the wind, their flight decks illuminated by faint red lights.
In the darkness, deck crews began moving aircraft into position, the roar of engines breaking the night silence.
The first wave would launch at 06:30, time to arrive over truck at dawn, when Japanese fighters would be most vulnerable on the ground.
Aboard USS Enterprise, Lieutenant Commander Edward Stiken, the famous photographer who had joined the Navy at age 62, prepared his cameras.
He had been assigned to document the strike, and he understood its significance.
This would be the first time American forces had penetrated what the Japanese considered their inner defensive perimeter.
The photographs he would take that day would show the world that Japanese naval power, which had seemed invincible just 2 years earlier, was now vulnerable to American might.
The Japanese radar operator who detected the first American aircraft at 0600 hours, was stationed on Dublon Island, one of Truck’s main facilities.
His equipment, a Type 2 Mark II air search radar, had a maximum range of approximately 120 mi under ideal conditions.
The contacts he saw were Hellcat fighters from USS Yorktown approaching at 25,000 ft.
They were still 70 mi out, closing at 300 mph.
Simple mathematics meant they would arrive over the lagoon in 14 minutes.
But the operator’s hesitation, his uncertainty about whether the contacts were real or electronic ghosts, consumed precious time.
When he finally reported the contacts at 0612, only 6 minutes remained before the Americans would be overhead.
The alert that went out across truck at 0613 was urgent but confused.
Air raid sirens began wailing on the four main islands.
Japanese pilots sprinted toward their aircraft.
If you find this story engaging, please take a moment to subscribe and enable notifications.
It helps us continue producing in-depth content like this.
Ground crews rushed to man anti-aircraft guns, but there was no time for an organized response.
Fighters could not be warmed up, armed, and launched in 6 minutes.
Ships could not raise anchor and disperse.
The best that could be managed was to man battle stations and prepare for the onslaught.
At precisely 0618, the first wave of 72 Hellcat fighters swept over Truck Lagoon at wavetop height, then climbed rapidly to attack Japanese aircraft on the ground.
What followed was not a battle, but a massacre.
Japanese fighters caught while warming up on their airirst strips were strafed and burned.
Patrol bombers mored in the lagoon exploded under 50 caliber fire.
Within 15 minutes, Japanese air power at truck had been effectively neutralized.
Fewer than 30 Japanese fighters managed to get airborne, and most of those were quickly shot down by the swarms of Hellcats that filled the sky.
Vice Admiral Kobayashi, standing on Couttor’s bridge, watched in horror as American fighters materialized seemingly from nowhere, their guns sparkling as they worked over the airfields.
The sound reached him seconds later, a sustained roar of engines and gunfire that seemed to come from every direction at once.
He grabbed the bridge telephone and shouted orders to his engineering spaces.
Full steam, prepare to get underway immediately.
But even as he spoke, he knew it was feudal.
Couture’s boilers were cold, her anchor firmly set.
It would take hours to build steam pressure sufficient to move the ship.
Ours they did not have.
The second wave arrived at 07 42 torpedo bombers and dive bombers escorted by more fighters.
They came in low over the water, spreading out to attack the ships anchored throughout the lagoon.
The destroyer Fuzzuki was the first to die.
Struck by three torpedoes in rapid succession.
She rolled over and sank in less than two minutes, taking most of her crew with her.
The light cruiser, Aano, already damaged by a submarine weeks earlier and sitting immobile while awaiting repairs, took four torpedoes and broke in half.
The submarine tinder Han Maru erupted in a spectacular explosion when bombs penetrated her magazine.
The blast felt miles away.
Throughout that long morning, wave after wave of American aircraft struck truck.
Dive bombers plunged nearly vertically onto their targets, releasing their bombs at the last possible moment before pulling out of their dives.
Torpedo bombers skimmed the water at mast head height, dropping their weapons with devastating accuracy.
Fighters strafed anything that moved, shooting up small craft, setting fire to fuel dumps, destroying buildings and hangers.
The sky above truck filled with smoke and flames.
The lagoon churned white with explosions and sinking ships.
Japanese anti-aircraft fire was intense but largely ineffective.
The gunners trained to engage high altitude bombers struggled to track the fast, low-flying attackers.
American pilots reported flying through walls of flack, seeing their aircraft punctured by shrapnel, but the sheer number of attackers overwhelmed the defenses.
For every American aircraft shot down, a dozen more pressed home their attacks.
By noon on February 17th, 32 Japanese vessels lay sunk or sinking in Truck Lagoon.
The water was choked with debris, oil, and bodies.
Fires burned on every island, sending columns of black smoke thousands of feet into the sky.
The harbor that had been the Japanese Navy’s primary forward base was now a graveyard.
But the operation was far from over.
Admiral Mitcher had planned for a two-day attack, and the second day would introduce a new element.
The surface action that would give rise to the legend of the battleship bombardment.
As darkness fell on February 17th, 1944, the American carriers of Task Force 58 withdrew to the northeast, their decks crowded with aircraft being refueled and rearmed for the next day strikes.
Aboard the battleship USS New Jersey, Rear Admiral Willis Lee prepared for a mission that would demonstrate why battleships, despite the carrier’s ascendancy, still had a place in modern naval warfare.
Lee, 56 years old, was one of the Navy’s most experienced gunnery officers, a man who understood the devastating power of 16-in naval rifles better than almost anyone alive.
His orders were straightforward.
Take the two Iowa class battleships along with screening cruisers and destroyers and sweep around trucks northern perimeter.
Any Japanese vessel attempting to escape undercover of darkness was to be intercepted and destroyed.
The surface action group departed the main task force at 2000 hours, steaming southwest at 25 knots.
Iowa and New Jersey, each displacing 45,000 tons and mounting nine 16-in guns, led the formation.
They were followed by the heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans, two light cruisers, and four destroyers.
The night was moonless, visibility limited to a few thousand yards.
Radar operators hunched over their screens, searching for contacts.
Gun crews stood ready at their stations, knowing that Japanese ships might appear at any moment from the darkness.
The legend that 11 Iowa class battleships participated in the truck operation stems from a combination of wartime propaganda, confused reporting, and the psychological impact of the attack on Japanese survivors.
In reality, only two Iowa class battleships existed in the Pacific in February 1944.
Iowa and New Jersey.
The other ships of the class, Missouri and Wisconsin, were still completing construction in American shipyards.
No other battleships in the US Navy resembled the Iowa’s distinctive profile with their long, sleek hulls and raked stacks.
Yet, Japanese reports from truck consistently mentioned many large battleships, and the number grew with each retelling until it reached the mythical 11.
The truth is that Iowa and New Jersey, operating together, possessed firepower equivalent to a much larger force.
Each ship could fire 96in shells every 30 seconds.
Every shell weighing 2,700 lb and capable of penetrating 2 ft of steel armor at 20 mi range.
When both ships fired full broadsides, they could put 18 massive projectiles on target in half a minute.
The psychological effect on anyone witnessing such firepower was overwhelming.
And it’s understandable that terrified Japanese sailors seeing their ships torn apart by explosions in the darkness might overestimate the number of attackers.
At 2315 hours on February 17th, New Jerseyy’s radar picked up a contact bearing 270 degrees, range 28,000 yards.
Admiral Lee ordered the formation to turn toward the contact, increasing speed to 28 knots.
As they closed, additional radar contacts appeared.
Multiple vessels fleeing northwest from truck.
Lee’s flag lieutenant recorded in the action report that the admiral smiled grimly and said, “Gentlemen, we have customers.
” The tone was casual, but everyone on the bridge understood they were about to engage in the kind of surface action that had become increasingly rare in this carrier dominated war.
The first Japanese vessel, identified by radar as a light cruiser, became aware of the American ships at approximately 2330 hours.
She turned sharply to port and increased speed attempting to escape, but the IAS capable of 33 knots closed relentlessly.
At 2342, with the range down to 18,000 yd, Admiral Lee gave the order to open fire.
New Jerseys forward turret mounting three 16-in guns trained out to starboard.
The guns elevated to the correct angle.
The complex mechanical computers having calculated the firing solution.
At 2343, the knight exploded with light and sound as New Jersey fired her first salvo.
The experience of firing a 16-in gun is difficult to convey to anyone who hasn’t witnessed it.
The muzzle blast creates a shock wave that can be felt in the bones, a physical punch that makes the entire ship shutter despite its 45,000 tons of mass.
The flash illuminates everything within miles, bright as day for an instant.
The shells, visible as they leave the barrels, arc out into the darkness, trailing fire.
Then comes the sound, not a bang, but a deep, prolonged roar that seems to shake the air itself.
Aboard New Jersey that night, the crew on deck felt the heat of the blast wash over them, saw the ocean lit up in stark relief and watched as the shells flew toward their target, covering 9 mi in less than 30 seconds.
The first salvo straddled the Japanese cruiser, shells landing short and over.
Fire control adjusted, and the second salvo fired 40 seconds later, struck home.
Two 16-in shells hit the cruiser amid ships, penetrating deep into her vitals before exploding.
The detonations broke her back, and she began to sink almost immediately.
But there was no time to observe her death throws because radar had identified three more targets.
Destroyers attempting to flee westward.
Iowa, steaming parallel to New Jersey and 2,000 yd to port, shifted fire to these new contacts.
What followed was a running gun battle that lasted nearly 4 hours as the American surface action group hunted down fleeing Japanese vessels one by one.
The Japanese ships, smaller and more maneuverable, attempted to use darkness and evasive tactics to escape.
Some laid smoke screens, turning sharply and trying to slip away in the confusion.
Others fired torpedoes, though at extreme range and with little chance of hitting.
The American battleships with their superior radar and fire control methodically eliminated each target.
The light cruiser Couttorii, Vice Admiral Kobayashi’s flagship, had managed to escape Truck Lagoon earlier that evening, her engineers having worked miracles to raise steam quickly.
She was steaming northwest at 18 knots, her maximum speed with cold boilers, when Iowa’s radar found her at 0130 hours on February 18th.
Admiral Lee, aware from intelligence reports that Couture was a flagship and might carry important officers, initially ordered his destroyers to close and attempt to force her surrender.
The destroyer USS Bradford approached to within 5,000 yards and signaled by light, “Stop your engines.
Prepare to be boarded.
” Kobayashi’s response was defiant.
Couture opened fire with her 5-in guns, hitting Bradford twice and causing moderate damage.
The American destroyer retreated under smoke and Admiral Lee made his decision.
At 0215, New Jersey opened fire on Couturi from 16,000 yd.
The first salvo missed, but the second and third salvo struck.
A 16-in shell hitting a lightly armored cruiser produces catastrophic damage.
The shell passes completely through the ship’s side, penetrating to the interior before its delay fuse triggers detonation.
The explosion releases energy equivalent to hundreds of pounds of TNT in a confined space, creating a pressure wave that pulverizes everything nearby.
Steel plates buckle and tear.
Machinery is ripped from its mounts.
Men are killed instantly by blast and fragmentation.
Couture took at least five direct hits from 16-in shells.
Her forward turret was blown completely off the ship.
Her bridge structure collapsed.
Fires erupted throughout her hull.
By 0240, she was dead in the water, burning fiercely down by the bow.
Admiral Lee ordered the firing to cease and directed destroyers to approach and attempt to rescue survivors.
But as American ships closed, Couture suddenly exploded, her magazines detonating in a fireball that briefly lit up the entire horizon.
She sank within minutes, taking Vice Admiral Kobayashi and most of her crew to the bottom.
of 475 men aboard.
Only 17 survived to be rescued by American destroyers.
The destroyer Mices met a similar fate at 0320 hours.
Attempting to escape to the north, she ran directly into Iowa’s path.
The battleship’s secondary battery, 5-in guns designed for anti-aircraft work, but equally effective against small surface targets, opened fire at 8,000 yd.
my case hit repeatedly, lost power and began to settle.
Iowa’s captain, considering the destroyer no longer a threat, ordered cease fire and continued after larger targets.
Mices remained afloat until dawn when carrier aircraft found her and finished the job with bombs and rockets.
By 0400 hours on February 18th, Admiral Lee’s surface action group had sunk or crippled six Japanese vessels, two light cruisers, three destroyers, and a large oiler.
They had expended 297 16in shells, the number that would later be cited in reports, and become part of the truck legend.
But those shells had come from two battleships, not 11.
And they had been fired over 4 hours of nocturnal hunting, not in a single devastating bombardment.
The difference between legend and reality is significant.
Yet, the reality was impressive enough without embellishment.
As dawn broke on February 18th, the carriers resumed their attacks on truck.
The second day strikes focused on what remained of the Japanese installation, fuel tanks, repair facilities, air strips, and the vessels that had survived the first day’s onslaught.
American pilots found fewer targets, but pressed their attacks with the same intensity.
By nightfall on February 18th, truck had effectively ceased to function as a naval base.
45 vessels had been sunk, ranging from the light cruisers to small inter island fairies.
250 aircraft had been destroyed, most on the ground.
The fuel storage facilities representing months of accumulated supplies burned for days.
The repair shops, the barracks, the administrative buildings all lay in ruins.
The human cost was severe on both sides.
Japanese casualties at truck totaled approximately 4,500 killed, including Admiral Kobayashi and numerous other senior officers.
American losses were remarkably light given the scale of the operation.
25 aircraft shot down with 25 aviators killed or missing.
No American ships were lost and only destroyer Bradford suffered significant damage.
The disparity reflected the growing technological and tactical superiority that American forces had achieved by early 1944.
In the aftermath of Operation Hailstone, as the truck strike was officially designated, American Naval Intelligence conducted extensive interrogations of Japanese prisoners.
These interrogations preserved in archives at the Naval War College reveal the profound psychological impact of the attack.
One survivor, a junior officer from the destroyer oid, which had been sunk by carrier aircraft, stated, “We believe truck was invulnerable.
We were told American carriers could never reach us, that our air defenses would destroy any attack.
When your planes appeared from nowhere at dawn, we knew we had been lied to.
When your battleships found us in the darkness and destroyed our ships with such ease, we knew the war was lost.
” Another prisoner, a lieutenant commander from Couttorii, provided testimony about the night’s surface action that helps explain how the legend of multiple battleships emerged.
He stated, “We were fleeing northwest when the American battleships appeared.
There seemed to be many of them, their guns firing constantly.
The explosions were continuous, the shells enormous.
We estimated at least 8 to 10 large battleships.
Later, I learned there were only two.
But in the darkness and confusion, with shells falling all around us, it seemed impossible that only two ships could produce such firepower.
This testimony captures a crucial truth.
The psychological impact of modern naval gunnery often exceeded its actual physical effect.
The Iowa class battleships with their rapid fire 16-in guns, their sophisticated radar fire control, and their ability to engage multiple targets nearly simultaneously created an impression of overwhelming force that survivors consistently overestimated.
The myth of 11 battleships was born not from deliberate deception, but from the terrified perceptions of men experiencing the most advanced naval weaponry of the era under the worst possible circumstances.
The strategic consequences of the truck attack reverberated throughout the Pacific War.
The Japanese combined fleet, having withdrawn its major units just days before the strike, never again based significant forces at truck.
The lagoon, once considered Japan’s impregnable forward anchorage, was effectively neutralized without requiring a costly amphibious invasion.
American forces simply bypassed it, leaving a small garrison to wither ineffectively while the war moved west toward the Philippines and ultimately Japan itself.
This strategy of island hopping, attacking some Japanese strongholds while bypassing others, owed much of its success to demonstrations like truck that American carrier task forces could strike anywhere with devastating effect.
Admiral Mitcher in his action report filed on February 25th, 1944, assessed Operation Hailstone as a complete success.
He noted that the operation had proven the capability of fast carrier task forces to conduct sustained offensive operations deep in enemy controlled waters.
The integration of carrier air strikes with surface actions by battleships and cruisers had worked flawlessly.
Perhaps most significantly, Mitcher wrote, “The enemy’s belief in the security of truck has been shattered.
The psychological effect of this defeat may prove as valuable as the physical destruction we inflicted.
” Admiral Lee, in a separate report focusing on the surface action, was more measured in his assessment.
He acknowledged that the night engagement had been successful, but noted several areas for improvement.
Radar directed fire control, while effective, still required refinement.
Communication between the battleships and their screening vessels needed work.
The difficulty of conducting rescue operations in a combat zone required new procedures.
Lee concluded the surface action off truck demonstrated that battleships retain significant value in modern naval warfare, not as line of battle units as in previous eras, but as powerful striking forces capable of independent operations in support of carrier task forces.
This assessment proved preient.
The remaining years of the Pacific War saw American battleships employed primarily as they had been at truck in support of carrier operations, conducting bombardments of enemy installations and hunting down fleeing enemy vessels.
The age of battleship versus battleship combat, which had dominated naval thinking for decades, had effectively ended.
The future belonged to carrier aviation, but battleships like Iowa and New Jersey still had roles to play as the most powerful surface combatants afloat.
The technical specifications that made the Iowa class battleships so effective deserve examination.
These ships represented the culmination of American battleship design, combining maximum firepower with maximum speed.
Each ship was 887 ft long, displacing 45,000 tons standard and 58,000 tons fully loaded.
The 916in 50 caliber guns mounted in three triple turrets could fire projectiles weighing up to 2,700 lb to a maximum range of 42,000 yd, approximately 24 mi.
The ships could sustain 33 knots, making them the fastest battleships ever built and capable of keeping pace with carrier task forces.
The fire control systems aboard the IAS were equally impressive, representing decades of development in naval gunnery.
Each main battery turret was equipped with optical rangefinders, but the primary fire control relied on radar.
The Mark 8 fire control radar mounted at top the main battery director could track targets at ranges exceeding 40,000 yards even in darkness or bad weather.
The Mark III fire control computer, a massive mechanical calculating machine, continuously computed firing solutions based on own ship’s course and speed, target course and speed, wind conditions, air temperature, and even the curvature of the Earth.
When integrated properly, these systems allowed the IAS to engage targets with first salvo hit probabilities that would have seemed impossible to earlier generations of naval officers.
Yet for all their technological sophistication, the Iowa class battleships were products of a strategic vision that was already becoming obsolete when they entered service.
The US Navy had begun their design in 1938 when naval planners still envisioned decisive fleet engagements between opposing lines of battleships.
The success of carrier aviation at Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the Coral Sea had demonstrated that carriers, not battleships, would dominate naval warfare.
By the time Iowa commissioned in February 1943, followed by New Jersey in May 1943, their primary role had shifted from battle fleet vanguard to carrier escort and shore bombardment.
The truck operation showcased this new role perfectly.
Iowa and New Jersey spent most of the operation screening the carriers, their massive anti-aircraft batteries helping to protect the more valuable flats from Japanese air attack.
Only during the night surface action did they function as the offensive striking force their designers had envisioned.
Even then they were hunting down fleeing light forces rather than engaging in the kind of battleship duel that earlier navies had considered the ultimate test of sea power.
The Japanese perspective on truck reveals the operation’s psychological impact perhaps better than American accounts.
Japanese naval officers trained in a tradition that emphasized decisive battle between capital ships struggled to comprehend the new reality of carrier dominated warfare.
The evacuation of major units from truck before the American attack while strategically sound felt like defeat even before the battle began.
The destruction of what remained, accomplished primarily by carrier aircraft with battleships mopping up escapees, confirmed that the combined fleet could no longer defend even its most important bases.
Captain Tasha Kazuami, a staff officer at Japanese naval headquarters, wrote in his postwar memoirs, “After truck, we knew that nowhere was safe.
If the Americans could strike truck with such overwhelming force, they could strike anywhere.
Our strategy of holding a defensive perimeter collapsed.
We were forced into a fighting withdrawal, trading space for time, hoping that American casualties would eventually force a negotiated peace.
After truck, few of us believe that peace would be on favorable terms.
The American ability to mass overwhelming force at the point of attack, to appear suddenly with carriers and battleships where the Japanese believed they were safe, represented a form of naval warfare that Japan simply could not counter.
The combined fleet, battered by years of attrition and unable to replace losses as quickly as American shipyards produced new vessels, was forced into an increasingly defensive posture.
Each American victory made the next victory easier as Japanese naval power contracted and American power expanded.
The material superiority that America brought to bear at truck was staggering.
The nine American carriers participating in operation hailstone had been built in a period of less than 2 years.
The Japanese with their more limited industrial capacity had required nearly a decade to build a comparable number of carriers most of which had already been sunk.
American pilots flew aircraft the F6F Hellcat and SB2C Hell Diver and TBF Avenger that were newer and more capable than most Japanese types.
American ships carried radar that could detect targets beyond visual range.
American damage control procedures learned from hard experience earlier in the war meant that ships which might have been lost could be saved and returned to action.
Yet, it would be a mistake to attribute American success solely to material superiority.
The tactical innovation demonstrated at truck, the willingness to conduct extended operations deep in enemy waters, the integration of different types of forces into a cohesive strike package, the aggressive pursuit of fleeing enemies, all reflected a level of professional competence that matched or exceeded the material advantages.
The US Navy of 1944 was not simply bigger than the Japanese Navy.
It was better trained, better led, and better organized to exploit its technological advantages.
The survivors of truck, those Japanese sailors and soldiers who were rescued after the two-day assault, carried with them stories that spread throughout the remaining Japanese-h held territories.
These stories growing in the telling, contributed to a growing sense that defeat was inevitable.
The myth of 11 American battleships, impossible though it was, persisted because it served a psychological need.
It was easier to accept defeat against overwhelming odds than to acknowledge that two battleships and nine carriers operating effectively could accomplish what had seemed impossible just months earlier.
American intelligence officers monitoring Japanese communications in the weeks after truck noted references to the huge American fleet and countless battleships.
Some analysts worry that these exaggerated reports might stiffen Japanese resistance by suggesting that further fighting was hopeless.
Others argued that accurate information about American strength might serve American purposes better, demonstrating that resistance would only bring more destruction.
The debate was never fully resolved, but American forces made no particular effort to correct Japanese overestimates of the forces employed at truck.
The long-term implications of operation hailstone extended far beyond the immediate destruction of Japanese naval assets.
The attack on truck represented a turning point in Pacific war strategy demonstrating conclusively that American forces had achieved the capability to strike at will throughout the Japanese defensive perimeter.
This capability would shape the remaining year and a half of the war, enabling the island hopping campaign that carried American forces from the Marshalss to the Marianis to the Philippines and ultimately to Okinawa within striking distance of the Japanese home islands.
The underwater legacy of Truck tells its own story.
The underwater legacy of Truck tells its own story.
The lagoon with its dozens of sunken vessels became one of the world’s premier wreck diving sites in the decades after the war.
Divers exploring the wrecks found ships frozen in time, still loaded with cargo, their crews personal effects scattered throughout rusting compartments.
The destroyer Fumizuzuki lies in 60 ft of water, her deck gun still trained toward the sky.
The submarine tender Han Maru sits upright in 100 ft of water.
Her holds filled with torpedoes, mines, and aircraft parts.
These wrecks serve as monuments to the men who died there and as physical evidence of the battle’s intensity.
Archaeological surveys of the truck wrecks conducted beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present have provided historians with detailed information about Japanese naval logistics in the Pacific War.
The cargo vessels, still loaded with supplies intended for outlying garrisons, reveal the desperate state of Japanese logistics by early 1944.
Rice intended for troops in New Guinea, medical supplies for the Marianis, ammunition for the Carolines, all went to the bottom at truck.
The loss of these supplies, as much as the loss of the ships themselves, contributed to the collapse of Japanese defensive positions throughout the central Pacific.
The human dimension of truck should not be forgotten in discussions of strategy and tactics.
Approximately 4,500 Japanese sailors, soldiers, and civilian workers died during the 2-day attack.
Most died instantly, killed by explosions or trapped in sinking ships.
Some survived the initial attacks only to drown when their vessels capsized or broke apart.
A few made it to shore only to die from injuries in the overwhelmed medical facilities.
Each of these deaths represented a personal tragedy.
A family in Japan that would receive formal notification of loss, a mother or wife or child who would mourn.
American casualties, while much lighter, were no less tragic to those affected.
25 aviators died during the operation, shot down by anti-aircraft fire, or killed when damaged aircraft crashed attempting to return to their carriers.
Lieutenant Robert King, a dive bomber pilot from USS Bunker Hill, was hit during an attack on a Japanese cargo vessel.
His aircraft caught fire and he had time to aim it away from his carrier before it crashed into the sea.
His body was never recovered.
Insign William Morrison, a fighter pilot from USS Yorktown, was shot down during a strafing run on Dublon Island airfield.
He survived the crash and was taken prisoner by Japanese forces but died of his injuries 3 days later.
These men, like their Japanese counterparts, left behind families who would carry the weight of their loss for decades.
The strategic lessons of truck influenced American naval doctrine for the remainder of the war and beyond.
The demonstration that carrier task forces could operate effectively for extended periods far from friendly bases validated the Navy’s investment in fast carriers and their supporting logistics.
The success of night surface actions confirmed the value of radar directed gunnery and the continuing relevance of surface combatants in specific roles.
The relatively light American casualties achieved through overwhelming force and careful planning reinforced the doctrine of massing maximum power at the point of attack rather than dispersing forces across multiple objectives.
For the Japanese truck represented a decisive shift in strategic thinking.
The concept of a defensive perimeter that could be held indefinitely was abandoned.
Instead, Japanese planning focused on extracting maximum cost from American advances, hoping to inflict casualties severe enough to force a negotiated settlement.
This strategy would reach its terrible culmination at Ewoima and Okinawa, where Japanese defenders fought with suicidal determination, exacting high casualties, but ultimately failing to halt the American advance.
The myth of trucks invulnerability had been shattered and with it much of Japanese confidence in ultimate victory.
The Iowa class battleships Iowa and New Jersey continued their service throughout the remainder of World War II and beyond.
Both ships participated in the Philippines campaign, the Ewima and Okinawa assaults and the final bombardment of the Japanese home islands.
After the war, they were placed in reserve, then reactivated for the Korean War, where their 16-in guns provided devastating fire support for ground troops.
New Jersey was reactivated again for the Vietnam War.
Her guns pounding shore positions in support of ground operations.
Both ships underwent extensive modernization in the 1980s, receiving cruise missile launchers and modern electronics, though their main batteries remained unchanged from their World War II configuration.
The legend of 11 Iowa class battleships at truck persisted in popular memory, appearing in books, documentaries, and online discussions.
Some versions of the story claimed that all four Iowa class battleships participated, forgetting that Missouri and Wisconsin were not yet in service in February 1944.
Others suggested that older American battleships were somehow mistaken for Iowa’s, ignoring the distinctive appearance that made Iowa class ships unmistakable.
The truth that two battleships operating with exceptional effectiveness created an impression of far larger forces was somehow less satisfying than the myth of an overwhelming armada.
Yet the truth of what Iowa and New Jersey accomplished at truck is impressive enough without embellishment.
Two ships operating in darkness against a fleeing enemy sank or crippled six vessels in 4 hours of action.
They fired 29716in shells with remarkable accuracy, achieving hit rates that would have been impossible just a few years earlier.
They demonstrated that American technological advantages in radar and fire control, combined with superior training and aggressive tactics, had created a decisive edge in naval surface warfare.
This achievement stands on its own merits, requiring no exaggeration.
The broader context of the Pacific War gives Operation Hailstone its full significance.
In February 1944, less than 27 months after Pearl Harbor, American forces had advanced from defensive operations to deep offensive strikes into the Japanese defensive perimeter.
The industrial might that had seemed slow to mobilize in 1942 was now producing ships, aircraft, and equipment at rates that Japan could not hope to match.
The learning curve that had seen early American defeats at Tsavo Island and elsewhere had been climbed.
By the time of Truck, American naval forces were not just equal to their Japanese counterparts.
They were decisively superior in almost every measurable category.
The personal accounts of participants in Operation Hailstone provide texture to the historical narrative.
Admiral Mitcher, writing to his wife several weeks after the operation, expressed satisfaction with the results, but noted the heavy responsibility of sending young men into danger.
He wrote, “We destroyed a significant enemy base and achieved all our objectives with remarkably light losses.
Yet 25 of our pilots did not return.
I know the names of every one of them, and I will carry those names with me for the rest of my life.
” That is the burden of command.
The knowledge that every decision, every order may cost lives.
Admiral Lee in a letter to a friend written shortly after truck revealed his own ambivalence about the new type of warfare that carriers represented.
We had a good night’s work hunting down Japanese ships, and our gunnery was excellent.
Yet, I cannot escape the feeling that we were engaged in a mopping up operation, destroying targets that carrier aircraft had already crippled.
The age of battleship supremacy is clearly over.
These magnificent ships, the most powerful ever built, have been relegated to supporting roles.
It is the carriers that win battles now.
We battleship sailors must accept this new reality, however much it may contradict everything we learned in our careers.
These personal reflections preserved in archives and private collections reveal that the professionals who conducted Operation Hailstone understood its historical significance even as it was happening.
They recognized that they were witnessing and participating in a transition in naval warfare as fundamental as the shift from sail to steam or from wooden hulls to steel.
The ease with which American forces had neutralized truck, once considered one of Japan’s strongest positions, demonstrated that defensive fortifications, however formidable, could not withstand the concentrated application of modern naval air power supported by surface forces.
The technical lessons learned at truck influenced ship design and doctrine for decades.
The effectiveness of radar directed gunnery led to increased investment in fire control systems.
The success of coordinated carrier operations validated the fast carrier task force concept leading to the creation of even larger carrier groups in the post-war period.
The vulnerability of fixed bases to carrier strikes influenced cold war naval strategy with both American and Soviet planners recognizing that forward bases in wartime would require constant defense against air attack.
The myth of 11 battleships at truck examined closely reveals something about how military history is created and transmitted.
Wartime reports compiled under stress and with incomplete information contained exaggerations that were never fully corrected.
Veterans memories colored by the intensity of their experiences remembered details incorrectly or amplified specific moments.
Popular accounts written for general audiences sometimes prioritize dramatic narrative over precise accuracy.
Over time, these various threads wo together into a story that diverged significantly from documented facts, yet persisted because it captured an emotional truth that American naval power at truck was overwhelming and seemingly limitless.
Modern historians with access to archives on both sides of the Pacific have been able to reconstruct what actually happened at truck with considerable precision.
American action reports, Japanese survivor testimony, and archaeological evidence from the wrecks all tell the same basic story.
Yet, even in academic contexts, the myth occasionally appears, testament to its durability and appeal.
The responsibility of historians is to distinguish clearly between myth and reality.
While acknowledging that myths often reveal truths about how events were experienced and remembered, the ecological impact of Operation Hailstone, unrecognized at the time, has become apparent in recent decades.
The sunken ships released thousands of tons of oil into Truck Lagoon, much of which remains trapped in rusting hulls.
Environmental surveys have documented ongoing leakage from several wrecks, particularly the fuel tankers, creating a slow motion disaster that threatens coral reefs and marine life.
Efforts to mitigate this damage, removing the most dangerous fuel sources while preserving the Rex historical integrity represent a challenging balance between environmental protection and historic preservation.
The wrecks themselves have become artificial reefs colonized by corals, fish, and other marine life.
Divers exploring the hulks encounter a strange juxiposition of war’s destructive power and nature’s resilience.
Anti-aircraft guns are encrusted with soft corals.
Crew quarters where men once slept now house schools of tropical fish.
Engine rooms that once throbbed with power are silent caves where groupers lurk.
This transformation offers a kind of redemption, suggesting that even the machinery of war can eventually be reclaimed and renewed by natural processes.
Thank you for watching.
For more detailed historical breakdowns, check out the other videos on your screen now.
And don’t forget to subscribe.
